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Preface and Acknowledgement 
My first contact with the Great Lakes region was in 1994 when I was deployed to 
western Tanzania to assist with food aid to Rwandan refugees. I continued working 
with the refugee operation in Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and 
Kenya until 2003, and again in eastern DRC from 2007. I have worked in the region 
for more than 10 years. 
The DRC fascinates me the most, with its rich history, culture, people, nature, art, music, 
and food. The DRC is the third largest country in Africa in terms of land area, and has 
the fourth largest population on the continent. It is the lih largest country in the world. 
It is located in the heart of the continent, surrounded by nine neighboring countries. It 
also has abundant natural resources. The DRC is therefore in a strategic geographic 
and economic position and could be one of the wealthiest countries in the world. The 
current reality, however, does not match the DRC's potential. On the contrary, the 
DRC has been the centre of the "scramble for Africa" since 1885, when King Leopold 
of Belgium claimed the Congo as a personal possession. 
Among the good Congolese friends I made, Mr. Masumbuko (Mas) Matabishi became 
an unforgettable soul mate. Despite having worked only two months in eastern DRC 
until the First African World War began in August 1998, we became very close and 
exchanged ideas on peace and war issues. I learned a great deal from his calm, 
peaceful and considerate character. After the war started in 1998 and all humanitarian 
workers were compelled to evacuate, eastern DRC became inaccessible. We therefore 
lost contact until he called me for the first time in February 2002. We were hoping for 
a reunion soon after, but a few days later, he was shot and killed by an armed group in 
his house in front of his family. The motive of this incident is still unknown. 
Soon after, his family fled to Tanzania as refugees. We exchanged a few e-mails, but I 
soon lost track of their whereabouts. Later, I heard that his family was resettled to 
Australia in 2006 and we regained contact. 
This thesis is dedicated to Mas and his family, who all wish that the DRC will be in 











I also extend appreciation to myoId and new friends and acquaintances, who I (re-) met 
through this thesis. Many engaged in interviews or shared information. I gained a 
great amount of knowledge through these interviews, many of which revealed untold 
stories. 
I am fully aware that the Great Lakes region conflict has deeply rooted causes, but I 
hope this thesis can provide a better understanding of its complexity in order to seek a 
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List of Useful Names 
AFDL: Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour Ie Liberation du Congo-Zaire, or the 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation in Congo-Zaire, which is partially 
composed of Banyamulenge who were fighting for their nationality. Its objectives 
were to overthrow President Mobutu, and defend from Rwandan Hutu militias. It was 
headed by Laurent-Desire Kabila and supported by the Rwandan and Uganda 
governments. 
Banyamulenge: Literally meaning "the people of Mulenge" in Swahili. It is not an 
ethnic group, but instead refers to the Rwandan Tutsi who live in South Kivu. Its 
name was likely adopted in the 1960s by earlier Tutsi settlers to distinguish themselves 
from more recent refugees from Burundi and Rwanda. 
Banyarwanda: Literally meaning "the people from Rwanda" in Swahili. It includes 
both Hutu and Tutsi population living in North Kivu. 
FAR: Forces Armees Rwandais or Force Army of Rwanda, which was the army of 
Habyarimana regime overthrown in luly 1994 .. 
FDLR: Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda, or the Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of Rwanda, which is comprised of ex-FAR, Interahamwe and 
post-genocide recruits. It claimed to be a military-political group since 2000. 
Interahamwe: Literally meamng "those who stand together" In Kinyarwanda, who 
participated in the genocide. 
Mai Mai : Local militias in eastern Congo. 
MLC: The Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo or Movement for the Liberation of 
Congo, which was created in September 1998 by lean-Pierre Bemba to fight the regime 
of Laurent Kabila. It turned into a political party during the Congolese transition. 
RCD: The Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie, or the Rally for the 
Congolese Democracy, which was formed in August 1998 to overthrow President 











resources. It was backed by Rwanda and Uganda. It later split into several factions 
and became a political party during the Congolese transition. 
Rwandaphone: Those who speak Kinyarwandan, the mother tongue of Rwanda. 
RPA: Rwanda Patriotic Army, the new army created in Rwanda after RPF took power 
in 1994. 
RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front which was created as a political movement in 1987 by 
Rwandan refugees in Uganda. Since October 1990, it carried out an insurgency 












The Great Lakes region, where conflict resolution and peace operations have been a 
challenge for 40 years, has been the site of continuous conflicts in the 1960s and 1990s. 
Despite South Africa's enormous contribution as a peacemaker in the region since 1996, 
the situation in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains fragile. How 
can another potentially deadly conflict in the Great Lakes region be prevented in the 
future? And how can South Africa improve its performance as a peacemaker? 
This dissertation analyses South Africa's peacemaking efforts in the context of 
three events in the Great Lakes region: the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the First Congo 
War in 1996, and the Second Congo War in 1998. The dissertation takes an empirical 
approach and focuses on eastern DRC, which has the highest concentration of 
causalities and is crucial to the wars of the ORe. In addition to literature and 
documents, I have also incorporated key informant interviews and my own personal 
observations during my assignment as a humanitarian worker from March 2007 to July 
2008. These interviews and observations may shed light on the conflict from the 
perspective of Congolese people. 
I argue that South Africa has failed as a peacemaker due to four main factors: 
South Africa's inadequate knowledge of mediation skills; its ambivalent and 
contradictory foreign policy that stressed the country's interests; its insufficient 
understanding of major causes, aggravating factors and the nature of this regionalised 
conflict; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)'s paradoxical 











strengthening South Africa's peacemaking opportunities, which IS the key to 
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examine SA's possihle technical assiSLance.2~ 
Vice President Kagame visits SA. invited hy Deputy 
President Mhcki.::!t) 
. h f' f' I~ d \1) SA perrmts t e trans er 0 arms to "wan a. 
The DRC joins the SADC. 
United States Secretary of State Alhright 
visits Kinshasa. \I 
United States President Clinton's special 
Chronology of Events in South Africa and the Great Lakes Region 
(1906-2004)1 
Month Events/Movement between South Africa (SA) Other Major Events 
and the Great Lakes Region (GLR) 
The first mining company was established in Katanga 
with the involvement of British and SA partners.2 
June Congo becomes independent. 
July Katanga's secession continues until 1%4. 
17 Jan Prime Minister Lumllmba is assassinated. 
Sep United Nations (UN) Secretary-General 
Hammarskjold dies on a plane crash in Zamhia. The 
secret services of SA. the United States and United 
Kingdom were involved . .! 
Prime Minister Tshomhe recruits Mike Hoare to lead 
a mercenary from SA to fight Simba rebel group. 
.j 
President Mohutll intervenes in Angola as an 
ally of the CIA and apartheid SA. 
Sep The Economic Community of the Great 
Lakes Countries (CEPGL) is created by 
Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi. 
The Cold War ends. 
Feb Nelson Mandela is freed from prison. 
Mandela, after liheration, visits Zaire (Goma and 
Kinshasa) as the first country for his African tour.) 
Oct The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invades 












MFA Nzo et al meet President Kahila in Luhumhashi 
to seek political solution." 
17 Aug MFA Nzo goes to Kigali and Gulu (Uganda) to assess 
their political leadership in the conllicl.
17 
DRe. The Second Congo War hegins. 
Victoria Falls meeting is held without 
I 
. 16 
real' ling any agreement. 
I X Aug SADC Organ meeting takes place in Harare 
with a "unanilllous" decision to assist 
Kahila. SA is not invited.'x 
19 Aug Zimhahwean troops intervene in the DRC in 
'P 'd K h'l \I) support 01 reSI ent ala. 
2 I Aug Angolan and Namihian troops join 
Zimhahwean troops in the DRe.40 
23 Aug SA holds a SADC summit to call for ceascfire and 
negotiations. Zamhian President Chiluha is appointed 





Victoria Falls II Summit is held excluding 
SA.42 
SADC Summit recongises the legitimacy of 
the intervention of Angola, Zimhahwe and 
Namibia.41 
Ministers from I I African countries meet in 
:lG SAGI, "Media Statement on the Address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 
Crisis in the DRC, National Assembly, 20 August 1998," 
www.info.gov.za/speeches/1998m88250x26098HH12.htm. accessed on 2 February, 2007 
:lG Katharina Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The 
Politics ofInternational Legitimacy, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
120 
:li SAGI, "Media Statement on the Address of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 
Crisis in the DRC, National Assembly, 20 August 1998," 
www.info.gov.za/speeches/19981H88250x2609810412.htm. accessed on 2 February 2007 
:lll Coleman, International Orgal1Jsati'ons and Peace Enforcement. 121 
m Ibid, 124 
10 Gerry Cleaver and Simon Massey, "DRC: Africa's Scramble for Africa," Oliver Furley 
and Roy May (eds.>, AIi'ican In terventiol1Jst States. 2001, 202 
II Coleman, International Orgal1Jsations and Pellce Enforcement. 154 
I~ Ibid, 154 
I:l DRC: IRIN Chronology of Current Crisis, :30 September 1998. 












Oct Lusaka to adopt the rramework ror a 
ceaserire in the DRC.H 
6 Nov Vice President Kagame admits Rwandan tmops 
helping DRC rehels. 4' 
April Sirte (Lihya) Agreement is signed hy 
Presidents Kahila and Museveni. Rwanda 
docs not participate. 
May Mhek i is elected as President or SA. 
17 DRC summit is held in Pretoria with SADC, Rwanda. 
June Uganda. Lihya and Kenya. 46 
25 DRC summit is held in Lusaka for the purpose or 
June signing a ceascfire agreement. 
I () July Lusaka Agreement is signed hy all concerned parties. 
except for rehels. 
23 Aug MFA Dlamini-Zuma negotiates with Uganda. 
Rwanda and RCD on peace initiatives in the DRC,-17 
Aug Rehels Movement ror the Liheration or 
Congo (MLC) and Rally ror the Congoicse 
Democracy (RCD) sign peace accord. 
Aug Rwanda clashes with Uganda over control 
or Kisangani, a key centre for diamonds.4x 
J() Sep UNSC agrees to the creation or the United 
Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC).4
1
) 
Dec Mandela is appointed mediator ror Burundi peace Former Botswana President Masire is 
f N 'd h'in process a ter yerere seat .. appointed as facilitator or the 
Inter-Congoicse Dialogue (ICD). 
II Gerrie Swart and Hussein Solomon, "Conflict in the ORC: A Critical Assessment of 
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement," (Johannesburg, The South African Institute of 
International Affairs (SAIIA) Report NoAO), ~00·1, 50 
I:' "ORC: IRIN Chronology of the Rebellion," 9 June 1999, 
www.africa.upenn.edu/Hol'l1etlirin6999b.html, accessed on :3 Oecember :2008 
IG Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff, "A 90-0ay Plan to Bring Peace to the ORC? An 
Analysis of the Pretoria Agreement of ;30 July 2002," ISS, September 200~, ;3 
17 Ibid, 3 
III UN Mission in OR Congo (MONUC), Chronology of Event, 
http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx'?newsID-88·t, accessed on 2.1 January 2007 
W Ibid 
:;() Chris Landsberg, "South Africa," Gilbert M. Khadiagala (ed.), S{!Cll1·j~v Dynamjcs jn 













2lJ-30 President Mheki and MFA Olamini Zuma allend 
Apr ORC Summit in Algiers.5 1 
I X-IlJ President Mheki and his lklegation visit Rwanda 
Oct (the first official visit hy a SA Head of State).5~ 
7-X SA allends the ORC Summit in Tripoli. 51 
Nov 
The price of mohi Ie phones rises due to 
colLan hoom. 
16 Jan President Kahila is assassinated; Joseph 
Kahila takes control of the regime. 
30 Jan President Kahila receives President Mhcki (his first 
meeting with Head of State after inauguration).54 
31 Jan President Kahila leaves for his first tour to 
France, US (where Kahila meets Kagame) 
and Belgium. 
15 Feh President Kahila takes part in his first DRC 
summit in Lusaka. "') 
2lJ Mar MONUC deploys its first contingent to the 
easl. 56 
April UN Panel issues report on the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources of the ORC. 
20-24 Meeting in Gahorone is held with DRC mediator, 
Aug Ketumile Masire (supported hy Pretoria), with ORC 
government and rehels etc. 57 
Lynne Rienner, 2006), 125 
:>1 The Presidency, "President Mbeki and Dr Nkosanzana Dlamini-Zuma to attend 
Summit on DRC," 28 April 2000, 
www.thepresidency.gov . ./..a/show.asp?type=pr&incluc/e=president/pr/2000/pr042S.htm&I 
D=-1:3, accessed on 5 February 2007 
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www.info.gov.za/speeches/2000/001017lOlOalO02.htm. accessed on 27 February, 2007 
'i:l SAGI, "Summit in Tripoli on the Conflict in the DRC," 10 November 2000, 
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DRC President Kahila with Ministers visits SA.)~ 
FirstlCD is held in Addis Aoaha. taken over oy SA.'" 
The first contingent of the SA National Defense 
Force under the AU is deployed to Burundi.ho 
Deputy Prcsident Zuma aSSLlllles Mandela's former 
role as mediator in Burundi peace proccSS.hl 
ICO is held in Sun City without any immediatc 
dclivery of a comprchcnsive political agrccmcnt. 
Vodacom. with thc higgcst tclephonc nctwork in thc 
. h 11' country. opens a nctwork In t e ORe. -
P . A ".1 h4 rctona grccmcnt IS signeu. 
UN Panel Rcport is issued. which idcntifics 15 SA 
individuals and companics violating Organisation for 
New Partncrships for Africa's Dcvelopmcnt 
(NEPAO) is introduccd hy Presidcnt Mhcki. 
Former Scncgalcsc primc ministcr Niasse is 
appointcd as UN Spccial Envoy.hl 
Luanda Agrccmcnt on Ugandan troop's 
withdrawal is signcd.h) 
Rwandan and Uganda troops withdraw.h7 
:,/\ SAGI, "Statement on the Working Visit of the President of the Democratic Republic 
ofthe Congo, Mr. Joseph Kabila, to South Africa on 29'30 August 2001," 24 August 2001, 
www.info.gov.za/speeches/200I/0108279 i I5alOO·t.htm. accessed on 15 February 2007 
C,!) Boshoff and Rupiya, "Delegates, Dialogue and Desperadoes," 33'34 
(;() Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, "South Africa and Nigeria's Regional 
Hegemons," Mwesiga Bal'egu and Christopher Landsberg (edsJ, From Cape to Congo: 
Southern AfHca s Evolving Security Challenges. (London, Lynne Rienner. Boulder. 
2003), 188 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines.hl> 
Dec DRCs Glohal am) Inclusive Agreement on 
Transition is estahlished in Pretoria. 
2()()3 Feh 
Apr President Kahila signs a transitional constitution 
during Inter-Congolese Dialogue in Sun City. h') 
June 
July 
12 Sep President Mheki attends inauguration of President 
Kagaflle in Kigali.71 
Oct 
2004 13 Jan President Mheki and his delegation visit the DRC.72 
5 July SA and Rwanda sign a memorandum on military 
.... 
Withdrawal of Angolan. Nalllihian and 
Zifllhahwean troops ends. 
Governor of North Kivu. Serufuli. 
acknowledges reception of anns and 
uniforms from Rwanda.hK 
Transitional government is formed in DRC. 
UNSC efllhargo imposes mandatory arms 
eillhargo in eastern DRC.70 
United States President G.W. Bush conducts 
African tour, including Uganda and SA. 
Final UN Panel Report on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources is issued. 
(in UN Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
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(ill Amnesty International (AI), "Democratic Republic of Congo: Arming the East," 5 July 
2005 
W SAGI, "Statement of the President of South Africa Thabo Mbeki, at the Concluding 
Session Inter-Congolese Dialogue," 2 April 200:3, 
www.info.goz.za/speechcs/:WO:310:30·121:HGIOOI.htm. accessed on 21 February 2007 
70 AI, "DRC: Arming the East" 
,1 The Presidency, "President Thabo Mbeki attends Historic Inauguration of Paul 
Kagame as President of Rwanda," 10 September 200:3. 
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"Many wars have more to do with greed than with grievance. " 
--Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, speech to the World Bank 
Staff, 
19 October 1999 
1.1 Challenge of Peacemaking in the Great Lakes Conflicts' 
South Africa has implemented peacemaking initiatives in the Great Lakes region2 since 
1996. Conflict resolution and peace operations have proven to be challenging in this 
regIOn since the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force was deployed in the 
Congo3 in 1960. Riots erupted in Rwanda in 1959 and the first genocide took place in 
Burundi, which killed 200,000 Hutus in 1972. In the 1990s, it was the site of three 
continuous and inter-related conflicts. The first conflict was the Rwandan genocide4 
in 1994, which spilled over into Zaire. This conflict was followed by two successive 
1 In this dissertation, the term conflict is used to refer to armed, deadly and violent 
conflict, which has the same criteria as interstate war with a minimum of 1,000 battle 
fatalities among all of the system members involved. See Melvin Small and J. David 
Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars 1816-1980, (Beverly Hills, Sage 
Publications, 1982), 55 
2 The Great Lakes region is the area around the lakes of the Great Rift Valley, which 
forms Congo's border with Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania. 
3 The name of the country has changed four times since the country's independence in 
1960. The country's post-independence name was the Republic of the Congo until 
August 1, 1964, when its name was changed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
On October 27, 1971, then-President Mobutu renamed the country Zaire. Following 
the First Congo War, the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 
1997. In this dissertation, all the names Congo, Zaire and the DRC will be used 
according to the corresponding period. 
4 The term "genocide" in this dissertation reflects the definition stipulated in the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocides of 1948. 
According to the definition, genocide includes "any of the ... acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group." See 










wars in the Congo, beginning with the First Congo War (1996-1997) and the Second 
Congo War, or the First African World War (1998-2003). 
In order to prevent the recurrence of conflict in this region, peacemaking should 
be thoroughly examined, as it is the foundation of peace settlement. The dissertation 
presents a critical analysis of South Africa's peacemaking experiences in the Great 
Lakes conflict since the 1990s. The dissertation aims to seek and suggest solutions to 
conflict by strengthening South Africa's peacemaking opportunities. 
1.2 Peacemaking as a Prerequisite for the Peace Process 
According to the 1992 UN Report, An Agenda for Peace, "peacemaking" is action to 
bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means. 5 It is often a 
prelude to "peacekeeping" 6 and in many cases serves as a prerequisite for 
"peacebuilding." 7 An Agenda for Peace states that both peacemaking and 
peacekeeping, which are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained, 
"strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peacebuilding, which can [thereby] prevent 
the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples." 8 In other words, if 
peacemaking is not effectively established, it decreases the likelihood that successful 
peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives will be implemented. 
Having conducted a study on global peace operations, Refugees International, 
partnered with the Henry L. Stimson Centre and the Centre on International 
0) UN Report, An Agenda for Peace, 1992. paragraph 20 
G Peacekeeping is the deployment of UN military, police and civilians in the field with 
"possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace." UN Report, 
An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 20 
7 Post-conflict peacebuilding is action to identifY and support structures that tend to 
strengthen and solidifY peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. UN Report, An 
Agenda for Peace, paragraph 21", 45 











Cooperation concluded that "the critical issue is the need to focus far greater 
international attention efforts on the peacemaking process itself.,,9 The failure of 
peacemaking processes, which are highlighted as a fundamental political problem, is 
seldom fully addressed prior to the arrival of peacekeepers. IO As a result, "only 
one-third of the negotiated settlements of civil wars II that last for five years 'stick' and 
those conflicts ending in military victory have a higher likelihood of resulting in 
genocide or politicide after the war.,,12 
While peace operations have been widely debated, similar attention needs to be 
paid to mediation, which is part of the peacemaking process. Special attention must be 
paid due to the frequency with which mediation is undertaken. Mediation should be 
regarded as a "specialised activity that requires extensive experience and a high level of 
proficiency." 13 Peacemaking and mediation therefore form a critical foundation for 
peace processes. South Africa's model for peacemaking, which was demonstrated 
after 1996, must be reviewed and enforced in order to reach a peaceful settlement. 
1.3 South Africa's Commitment to Peacemaking Efforts 
Following the end of the Cold War, the world's superpower countries started to show 
less political will to seek solutions to African conflicts. Western powers' failure to 
9 Refugees International, "Annual Review of Global Peace Operations," 
Ilwww.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/10561, accessed on 15 April, 2008 
to Ibid, Refugees International, "Annual Review of Global Peace Operations" 
11 Civil war can be defined as "an armed conflict that pits the government and national 
army of an internationally recognised state against one of more armed oppositions 
groups able to mount effective resistance against the state." Michael Doyle and Nicholas 
Sambanis, Making War and BUilding Peace, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
2006), 31 
12 Fer Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace SettJements Succeed or FaiJ, 
(Washington D.C., US Institute of Peace Press, 1996),6 
13 Laurie Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise," Discussion 











intervene III Somalia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively was a significant 
turning point. The phrase "African solutions to African problems,,14 was born, which 
put pressure on African countries and African regional organisations to solve their own 
problems. The reluctance by Western powers to intervene in African conflicts 
coincided with the birth of the new South Africa in 1994. 
South Africa has long maintained an interest in expanding its economIC and 
political influence northwards, while it has also desired to playa leadership role on the 
African continent. 15 Although South Africa was politically, economically and 
militarily isolated during the apartheid era (1948-1994), 16 then President Nelson 
Mandela reestablished its relationship with the international community in the 
post-apartheid era. He began to place Africa on South Africa's foreign policy agenda, 
and expressed his new government's commitment to peacemaking through facilitation, 
mediation and arbitration. 17 Then Deputy President Thabo Mbeki spearheaded South 
Africa's leadership through an "African Renaissance." 18 This included the 
establishment of the New Partnerships for Africa's Development (NEPAD),19 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and de-mining activities. The country started to grow as a 
14 Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, "Pax Africana in the Age of Extremes," 
South African Journal of In terna tionalAffairs, VoL7 No.1, Summer 2000,14 
15 G.R. Berridge, South Africa, the Colonial Powers and "African Defense:" The Rise 
and Fall of the Hlbite Entente 1948-60, (London, Macmillan, 1992),5 
16 Berridge, South Africa, the Colonial Powers and "African Defense," 5 
17 Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, VoL 72, No.5, 
NovemberlDecember 1993,91 
18 According to Landsberg, the term "African Renaissance" may be defined as "a 
doctrine for Africa's political, economic, and social rejuvenation and as a call for political 
democratisation, economic growth, and the reintegration of Africa into the global 
economy." See Landsberg, "Promoting Democracy: The Mandela-Mbeki Doctrine," 
Journal of Democracy VoL 11, No.3, July 2000,118 












world middle-class hegemony,20 which raised the international community's high 
expectations regarding South Africa's leading role in conflict resolution. 
1.4 South Africa's Peacemaking Flaws 
In this dissertation, I argue that South Africa's greatest flaws during its efforts to resol ve 
conflict in the Great Lakes region are attributable to four factors: South Africa's 
inadequate knowledge of mediation skills, its ambivalent and contradictory foreign 
policy, its insufficient understanding of the nature, major causes and aggravating factors 
of the regionalised conflict and the Southern Africa Development Community's 
(SADC) paradoxical politics. 
South Africa's peacemaking role in the Great Lakes conflict was mainly that of 
mediation. The main mediator, President Mbeki, did not respect basic mediation rules, 
and became a biased and powerful manipulator and thereby lost his credibility. South 
Africa also imposed its own mediation model on the DRC rather than adapting a model 
for the specific context of the DRC. 
South Africa's ambivalent foreign policy, including its principles, economIC 
interests, contradictory behavior and questionable neutrality, will be analysed in the 
context of three events in the Great Lakes region: the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the First 
Congo War in 1996, and the Second Congo War in 1998. This dissertation primarily 
20 Christopher Landsberg calls South Africa's role as a serious middle-ranked power in 
world affairs. See Landsberg, "South Africa," Gilbert M. Khadiagala (edJ Security 
Dynamics in Africa s Great Lakes Region, A Project of the International Peace Academy, 
(Boulder Colo. Lynne Rienner, 2006), 137. However, Maxi Schoeman calls South Africa 
an emerging middle power. See Schoeman, "South Africa as an emerging middle 












addresses the South African state, but also examines non-state actors, such as private 
companies, that are interwoven with the state. 
As Howard Adelman argues, "peacemaking efforts must be grounded in both 
realistic analyses of conflict dynamics and realistic assessment of the capacities and 
capabilities of the diplomatic and international organisations involved in the 
response.,,21 There is a tendency to react only to the symptoms of conflict, but the main 
causes as key components of conflict resolution must be recognised as well. Although 
fully aware of the larger, structural root causes of conflicts, such as a weak state that 
takes a lifetime to build, I will only discuss the nature, main causes and aggravating and 
neglected factors of the conflict in eastern DRC. These include existing politicised 
inter-ethnic tension, nationality and land issues, the exploitation of natural resources, 
and the link between natural resources, arms trafficking and international business. 
Finally, this thesis analyses the SADC's internal politics, including its history and 
development, growing competition among regional leaders over politics and economics 
in post-apartheid era, and the SADC countries' involvement in the First and Second 
Congo Wars. It also examines the SADC's split during the Congo's Second War over 
the modality of their involvement. 
I.S Focus on Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
Among the nations that comprise the Great Lakes region, this dissertation focuses on 
eastern DRC, which is the main causality of the regionalised conflict and is crucial to 
the DRC wars. Eastern DRC was the location of three violent conflicts beginning in 
1994, following the spillover of Rwandans involved in the 1994 genocide. In 1996, 
21 Bruce Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure, (Colorado, Lynne 











conflict in Zaire involved foreign-armed groups that engaged in Laurent Desire Kabila's 
rebellion against the dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. In 1998, conflict involved a 
Rwandan and Ugandan rebellion against President Kabila, who was supported by 
several nations, including three SADC countries. 
Eastern DRC has experienced the deadliest war 10 terms of statistics 10 the 
post -Second World War era, resulting in 5.4 million deaths between 1998 and the 
present day from violence, disease and starvation. 22 This number represents more than 
six times the number of those killed during the Rwandan genocide in 1994, which 
claimed approximately 500,000 to 800,000 lives.23 Eastern DRC became the epicenter 
of the conflict, but its local and regional dynamics have received limited attention. 
1.6 Methodologies 
Four types of sources were used for this study. First, pnmary documents were 
reviewed, including peace and ceasefire agreements, news clips, and South African 
government documents that highlight the government's relationship with the Great 
Lakes region. Secondary documents by academics, research institutes, UN agencies, 
non-governmental organisations, and other organisations that deal with South Africa's 
foreign policy, the DRC's peace process and mediation have also served as valuable 
sources in this analysis. Since my dissertation takes an empirical approach, I also used 
22 International Rescue Committee, "IRC Study Shows Congo's Neglected Crisis Leaves 
5.4 Million Dead," www.theirc.org/newslirc·studv·shows-congos0122.html, accessed on 
28 January, 2008 
23 UNHCR, "The State ofWorJd'sRefugees, 245. However, according to Alison Desforges 
in "Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda," (HRW, March 1999, 17, 
http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/1317.pdf. 28 August 2008), the overall death toll was 
closer to 500,000, as the figure of 800,000 overestimated the percentage of Tutsi in the 












observation methods during my assignment as a humanitarian worker in eastern DRC 
(March 2007- July 2008). I also have met and interviewed key persons who are either 
directly involved in the conflicts or are working to resolve the crisis in eastern DRC and 
the region at large. 
During interviews and meetings, I met 39 individuals, mostly Congolese and 
South African opinion makers who reside in South Africa (Pretoria, Johannesburg, and 
Cape Town), the DRC (Kinshasa, Goma, Ruthsuru, Masisi and Walikale), Rwanda 
(Kigali) and Japan (Tokyo, Osaka and Mie). These informants clarified ambiguities in 
the literature. Government officials, religious leaders, traditional leaders, humanitarian 
workers, diplomats, academics, rebel leaders and other professionals were selected for 
interviews. Since most literature was written by non-Congolese academics or by a 
selected few Congolese who live outside the country, I intended to grasp the Congolese 
perspective and clarify some facts and analyses. Depending on the background and 
knowledge of the interviewee and given the time constraints surrounding the interviews, 
some questions were not raised. 
Of the 39 people who were interviewed, only four interviews were used for this 
dissertation. The remaining interviews were omitted either because the information 
given was not applicable to the dissertation, or the interviewees did not have sufficient 
information on the subject for discussion. Some of the Congolese key informants 
could not be interviewed due to their inaccessibility and logistical constraints. An 
attempt to interview some of the officials in South Africa's Department of Foreign 
Affairs in Pretoria also failed due to their unavailability. Therefore, with insufficient 











foreign policy could not be obtained. (See Annexes for a questionnaire, one sample of 
an interview, and the list of interviewees used for the dissertation). 
1.7 Organisation of the Study 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the 
second chapter describes the definition of mediation as an important element of 
peacemaking and the basis of peace settlement. This is followed by a discussion of 
mediators' roles and tactics, mediation's objectives, ripeness for negotiation, timeliness 
of diplomatic interventions, and the success of peace implementation. A brief 
literature review on South Africa's mediation and peacemaking in the Great Lakes 
region and Africa is included. 
The third chapter provides a brief history of the Great Lakes region in order to 
understand the regional dynamics that gave rise to the Rwandan genocide in 1994 as 
well as wars in 1996 and 1998. It focuses on the Rwandan migration and refugees' 
movement into eastern Zaire and Uganda before and during 1994. It emphasises the 
inter-linked problems of land ownership and Rwandaphones' nationality, which are 
major causes of conflict.24 
The fourth chapter examines the -relationship between South Africa and the Great 
Lakes region before 1994 and during the Rwandan genocide. South Africa's foreign 
policy in southern Africa and the Great Lakes region is highlighted through its mining 
operations in the Congo. The chapter also illustrates South Africa's expanding arms 
industries and its response during the genocide. 
24 Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations, The Final Act, 84, www.reliefweb.int, 











The fifth chapter provides an analysis of South Africa's initiative as a peacemaker 
during and following the First Congo War between 1996 and 1997. The background 
of the invasion and the attempts of then Deputy President Mbeki to broker a peace deal 
is explained. It also analyses South Africa's practices, the country's questionable 
neutrality and amorality and its economic interests. 
The sixth chapter discusses the background of the Second Congo War in 1998 and 
South Africa's continued involvement in peacemaking in the region, which led to the 
establishment of a transitional government in the DRC in 2003. It examines South 
Africa's behaviour and its economic interests behind the peace efforts in the DRC. 
These economic interests became apparent as recently as 2006 when South Africa 
ventured into various business opportunities in the DRC. 
The seventh chapter details the major failures of South Africa's peacekeeping 
efforts. This includes South Africa's export of its own peacemaking style; its timing 
of intervention; its failure to identify and manage the main spoiler; its failure to examine 
the extensive regionalised dynamics and the link between conflict, exploitation, arms 
and business, as well as nationality and land issues; the Rwandan government's 
respective tension with the FDLR and the DRC; and the SADC's internal politics. 
Following an analysis of South Africa's peacemaking experiences, the dissertation 
concludes in the eighth chapter by making suggestions on how South Africa could be a 
better peacemaker in the Great Lakes region. Due to the official cessation of the war 












Peacemaking and Mediation 
"The solution to a conflict is talking about the conflict. " 
--Somali proverb 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate mediation, which is a critical component of 
peacemaking efforts. This chapter reviews fundamental components of mediation in the 
Great Lakes region in order to suggest ways in which the overall methodology of the peace 
process can be strengthened to improve mediation. The first section describes the 
definitions of peacemaking and mediation, followed by the mediator's roles and tactics 
in the second section. The third section analyses ripeness, or the favourable 
environment, for negotiations. It highlights the "ripeness point," or mutual hurting 
stalemate, and the importance of appropriate timing in regard to negotiation. The 
fourth section deals with mediation's objectives and the mediator's responsibility 
regarding peace agreements, which can lead to the success or failure of peace 
implementation. The fifth section presents a literature review on South Africa's 
peacemaking in the Great Lakes region. 
2.1 Definitions of Peacemaking and Mediation 
As discussed in the introduction, peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to an 
agreement, essentially through peaceful means. It is often a prelude to peacekeeping, 
which usually complements the mediator's role 25 and in many cases serves as a 
25 'Funmi Olonisakin, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa," Power, Wealth and 












prerequisite for peacebuilding. Peacemaking is also crucial for conflict resolution 
efforts. 26 According to 'Funmi Olonisakin, peacemaking is "first and foremost a 
diplomatic effort, which may involve the use of mediation, negotiation, good offices27 
and fact-finding missions, amongst other things.,,28 Mediation can be defined as 
follows: 
• "an intermediary activity ... undertaken by a third party (peacemaker) with the primary 
intention of achieving some compromise settlement of the issues at stake between the parties, 
or at least ending disruptive conflict behaviour" (Christopher Mitchell).29 
• "a method of mitigating the concerns through the presence and support of an intermediary 
peacemaker ... who enjoys the trust of the disputants, and whose goal is to help them to forge 
agreements they find acceptable" (Laurie Nathan).30 
It must be noted that mediation as "a political process with no advance 
commitment from the parties to accept the mediator's ideas" is different from 
arbitration. 31 Arbitration requires judicial procedure and issues a verdict. 32 The 
26 Olonisakin, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa," 239 
27 Good offices is defined as "a technique of peaceful settlement of conflict whereby a 
third party acts as a go·between, transmitter of messages, and provided of meeting 
place, with the aim of bringing about direct negotiation between the parties." 
Olonisakin, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in Africa," 240 
28 Ibid,240 
29 Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall, "Multiparty Mediation and the 
Conflict Cycle," Crocker, Osler and Aall (edsJ, Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a 
Complex World, (Washington DC, USIP, 1999),8 
30 Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise," Discussion Paper No. 
10, Crisis States Research Center, London School of Economics, June 2005, 2 
31 Saadia Touval and William Zartman, "International Mediation in the Post-Cold War 
Era," Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.), Turbulent Peace: the 











mediator seeks to facilitate agreements 10 an "even-handed fashion and on terms 
acceptable to the parties.,,33 
2.2 Mediators' Roles and Tactics 
Mediators engage in the following functions throughout the pre-negotiation, negotiation, 
and implementation phases of the peace settlement process: meeting with stakeholders 
to assess their interests; diagnosing the causes and the local dynamics of the conflict; 
drafting protocols and setting agendas; identifying common grounds between the parties 
and testing possible tradeoffs; writing and ratifying agreements; engaging in shuttle 
diplomacy when adversaries refuse to talk directly to each other; serving as observers; 
monitoring and facilitating the implementation of agreements, and generating options to 
resolve deadlocks.34 
According to William Zartman, mediators are divided into three types: 
communicators, formulators and manipulators.35 Communicators assume a passive role 
and are mere moral messengers between the parties.36 Traditional African mediators 
fit into this type and function, which is similar to that of an ombudsman who intervenes 
Peace Press, 2001), 427 
32 Ibid,428 
33 Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise," 2 
34 Fen Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Wily Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, 
(Washington D.C., USIP Press, 1996), 12; Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's 
Panel of the Wise," 9 
35 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Reduction," Edward A Kolodziej and Roger E 
Kanet (eds.), Coping with Conflict after the Cold War, (Baltimore, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1996),279 











between authorities and citizens?7 Formulators have more substantial roles and use 
. + f 18 persuasIon as a lorm 0 power: 
In contrast to these two types of mediators, manipulators act as full participants 
with maximum authority. Manipulators increase a solution's attractiveness by 
promoting the unattractiveness of prolonging conflict.39 This can be carried out by 
"shoring up one side or condemning another and further straining the appearances of 
neutrality. ,,40 
In Laurie Nathan's view, it is not ideal to use force and the balance of power in 
conflict management or punitive action. A party who is threatened with sanctions or 
military force, for example, may lose its confidence and willingness to cooperate.41 
Mediators should therefore assume a moral stature rather than asserting formal power. 
Therefore, it is preferable to use a confidence-building structure and power-sharing 
. 4') 
tactIcs. -
While Nathan makes salient points, mediation cannot act as mere advice in the 
case of the Great Lakes conflict, where the methods of conflict are brutal and complex. 
Instead, mediation should take the form of powerful and proactive manipulation. 
When manipulation is required, as Nathan suggests, another actor besides a mediator 
should become involved in order for the mediator to maintain herlhis impartiality.43 
The manipulator can use coercive approaches such as extraction, limitation, elimination, 
gratification and deprivation as well as various side payments, penalties, sanctions, 
3i Zartman (ed.), Ibditjonai Curses for Modern Conflict: African Conflict 'Medicine,' 
(Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2000), 222 
38 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Reduction," 280 
39 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Reduction," 281 
40 Ibid 













threats and the presentation of demands or conditions.44 Other non-coercive mediation 
attempts include the use of adjudication, conciliation, arbitration and inquiry.45 
One of the first tasks that the manipulation team can execute is to identify 
moderates and "spoilers" among the concerned parties. 46 The former can be 
encouraged to cooperate to build sustainable peace.47 For the latter, it is common that 
peace creates spoilers because not all war leaders and factions consider peace to be 
beneficial.48 Therefore, spoilers need closer attention and analysis, as their presence 
can enormously complicate efforts to establish peace. 
As Stephen Stedman argues, the process of understanding spoilers' problems is 
the sine qua non of effective peacemaking implementation. 49 This includes 
understanding the number and type of problems, examining the spoilers' motivations 
and adapting peacemaking strategies based on these motivations. 50 The strategies of 
spoiler management include "1) inducement (positive and negative), or giving the 
spoiler what it wants; 2) socialisation, or changing the behaviour of the spoiler to adhere 
H Zartman, "Diplomacy," Mark Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (edsJ, Encyclopedia 
of Government and Politics, (London, Routledge, 2004), 1000; Crocker, Hampson and 
Aall, "Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle," 21; K. J. Holsti, International 
Politics:A Framework for Analysis, (New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1993), 141 
45 Inquiry is described as "a formal and impartial determination of the facts underlying 
a dispute in which the third-party reports hislher findings to the parties with the aim of 
clarifying the basis for the conflict." Olonisakin, "Conflict and Conflict Resolution in 
Africa," 240 
46 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, 50. According to Stephen 
Stedman, spoilers are "leaders or parties that believe that peace emerging from 
negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to 
undermine attempts to achieve it." Stedman, "Negotiation and Mediation in Internal 
Conflicts," Michael Brown (edJ, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict 
(Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1996),369-371 
17 Doyle and Sambanis, Making War and BUlJding Peace, 50 
48 Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security, Vo1.22, No.2 
(Fall 1997), 7 












to a set of established norms, and 3) coerCIOn, or punishing spoiler behaviour or 
reducing the capacity of the spoiler to destroy the peace process.,,51 
In light of the above, it is understood that mediation is clearly a specialised and 
complex endeavour, but the principles of effective mediation are often undermined. 52 
There is a tendency to appoint mediators on the basis of political status or profile rather 
than their personal qualities as mediators. 53 As a result, mediators often use techniques 
such as persuasion, bargaining and the exercise of leverage, and fail to apply effective 
mediation skills.54 Nevertheless, mediation is more than pure persuasion, and the basis 
of effective persuasion is the ability to fulfill the needs of parties and produce an 
attractive outcome from each party.55 The choice of mediators can easily affect the 
success or failure of the peace process. 
2.3 Ripeness for Negotiations 
When can negotiation work best? Ripeness, or a favorable environment, is essential to 
sustaining the peace process and is associated with the prerequisites for diplomatic 
progress. 56 While the level of violence is sti11low, there are greater opportunities for 
mediators to engage.57 These opportunities may diminish as the level of violence 
increases. 58 However, the likelihood of success in mediation may increase when the 
51 Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Process," 12; Hampson, "Parent, Midwife, or 
Accidental Executer?: The Role of Third Parties in Ending Violent Conflict," Crocker, 
Hampson and Aall (eds.), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International 
Conflict, (Washington D.C., U.S Institute of Peace Press, 2001)," 391 
52 Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise," 9 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
55 Touval and Zartman, "International Mediation in the Post·Cold War Era," 439 
56 Crocker, Hampson and Aall, "Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle," 21 












point of a mutually hurting stalemate is reached. 59 According to Zartman, this is the 
situation that is most conducive to supporting a resolution: 
" ... conflicting parties seek to win, which leads to a stalemate as they check each other's 
efforts. In an attempt to break that stalemate, both parties seek to escalate their way out and 
overcome the other party. Since these efforts, like the initial level of conflict, are pursued by 
both sides, the result is the escalation of contlict and the reinforcement of stalemate. When 
both parties reach the point where they can no longer escalate their way to victory and the 
sunk costs plus the countering efforts of the other side make for a costly deadlock, the point of 
mutually hurting stalemate has arrived. When this realisation has taken hold, the situation is 
ripe for resolution.,,6o 
It is further argued that mediators should best await the development of a hurting 
stalemate for both adversaries, accompanied by an approaching mutual catastrophe.61 
Mediators are less likely to face a lack of political will from the adversaries. Such an 
environment compels leaders to consider possible exit strategies from the conflict.62 
Besides this mutually hurting stalemate, additional requirements for ripeness may 
include: 1) impending catastrophes; 2) shared perception among the parties about the 
desirability of an accord or that there is a way out; 3) a feeling of equality between 
parties; 4) an early timing of negotiation; 5) shifting power balances; 6) the redefinition 
of interests by the parties due to certain changes (for example, in leadership or 
59 Ibid 
60 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Resolution," 276 
61 Christopher Mitchell, "Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts," John Darby and 












constituency pressures); 7) the replacement of previous or existing norms and patterns 
of behaviour that increase the possibility of compromise; 8) the availability of a formula 
that is conducive to compromise and a negotiated settlement.63 
Zartman further argues that it is unlikely that parties will negotiate a compromise 
when" 1) one side is on the verge of victory and the other on the edge of defeat, 2) both 
sides face no prospects of either victory or defeat and the conflict is not costly to either 
of them, and 3) the deadlock is painful but the pain has been internalised into national 
myths and purpose.,,64 In addition, no matter how well intentioned may be, too much 
diplomacy or mediation in an unripe situation brings a counterproductive result and can 
lead to further dispute.65 It is also hypothesised that failed agreements are related to 
underdeveloped or unripe conditions at the time that agreements are signed.66 
However, this mutually hurting stalemate as well as other requirements is only 
part of the conditions to initiate negotiation, and they do not necessarily turn into 
negotiations automatically.67 Ripeness must be developed with the assistance of a 
mediator who helps the parties to reach a better understanding of the conflict dynamics 
and an acceptable solution. 68 This is because "conflict is essentially a matter of 
perceptions, [and therefore], third parties have to work on changing the perceptions, 
attitudes, values and behaviours of the parties.,,69 
63 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Resolution," 276, 278, 284; Fen Hamspon, 
"Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner?," 392 
64 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Resolution" 276 
65 Hampson, Nurturing Peace, 15 
66 Ibid,209 
67 Philip Schrodt et aI, "Evaluating 'Ripeness and Hurting Stalemate,'" Mediated 
International Conflicts: An Event Data Study of the Middle East, Balkans, and West 
Africa. Paper prepared for the delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International 
Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, Center for International Political Analysis 
Department of Political Science, University of Kansas, February 2003 












The timing of intervention, which is crucial for effective negotiation, will be 
discussed further in order to understand the inappropriate and illogical timing of South 
Africa's mediation in the DRC. This led to failed mediation in 1997, as well as 
inappropriate timing of diplomatic intervention in the post-Second Congo War (see 
Chapters 4 and 5). All types of conflicts should be handled early and "by means of 
normal politics, while government legitimacy is still intact and grievances are 
manageable.,,7o Early intervention has significant advantages in regard to motivating 
parties, in addition to its effectiveness, completeness and the cost it saves to the peace 
process. 71 There is a greater likelihood of accepting external assistance before 
grievances accumulate and issues are multiplied.72 Most importantly, since "the goal 
of early prevention is resolution rather than containment," it is less likely that conflict 
will recur. 73 
In the context of late negotiation, and once relations have deteriorated and created 
a "we-they" enemy structure, it becomes much more laborious and complex for 
mediators to move forward in the process and change these perceptions during the 
full-blown period.74 According to Zartman, "if rebuffed and neglected, such demands 
cause the aggrieved community to turn inward, consolidate its political organisations, 
challenge the legitimacy of the state, look for neighbours' support and sanctuary and 
reject government efforts to meet their grievances as too little too late.,,75 At a later 
70 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Resolution," 284 
71 Evans Gareth, "Preventive Action and Conflict Resolution," Olara A. Otunnu and 
Michael Doyle, Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping for the New Century, (Lanham, 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 65 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid 
74 Crocker, Hampson and Aall, "Multiparty Mediation and the Conflict Cycle," 25 











phase, when equality between two parties has been established and a military stalemate 
has been achieved, then negotiation once again becomes possible.76 
2.4 Mediation's Objectives and Mediators' Responsibility in Agreements 
Mediation involves more than reaching a negotiated solution, as ending the conflict 
itself is not enough. Mediation is intended to build trust and strengthen the 
relationship between the adversaries,n to change the parties' mindset from win-lose to 
win-win,78 and to create the conditions that lead to conflict de-escalation. This will 
eventually lead to "positive peace," as opposed to "negative peace." 79 For an 
agreement to be implemented effectively, the quality, performance and personal 
credibility of third party mediators are crucial, as the mediators serve as both a buffer 
and a bridge between the antagonists.so Therefore, mediators need to be non-partisan; 
confidence-building and long-term stability through a negotiated settlement should be 
reflected as the basic logic of mediation.sl Mediators must also be flexible since 
fl · d' 8') con lCts are ynamlc processes. -
76 Ibid 
77 Mitchell, "Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts," 82-83, 
78 Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's Panel ofthe Wise," 9 
79 Johan Galtung distinguishes between negative and positive peace. The former is 
characterised by "the absence of direct violence" and the latter by "the overcoming of 
structural and cultural violence" or "the absence of exploitation and the presence of 
social justice." See Hugh Miall, Oliver, Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary 
Conflict Resolution, (Malden MA, Blackwell Publisher, 1999), 43, and Carolyn 
Stephenson, "New Approaches to International Peacemaking in the Post-Cold War 
World," Michael T. Klare (edJ, Peace and World Security Studies, sixth edition, (Boulder, 
CO, Lynne Rienner, 1994), 20 
80 Fen Hampson, Nurturing Peace, 210; Stedman, "Introduction," Stedman, Donald 
Rotchild and Elizabeth Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace 
Accords, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2002),9; Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's 
Panel of the Wise," 2 
81 Nathan, "Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise," 4 











Based on these mediators' efforts, how can we measure the success of peace 
implementation, which is the process of carrying out a peace agreement?83 As the 
objective of mediation is to create positive peace, an important indicator of whether this 
is achieved should be whether a relapse of violent conflict takes place within five years, 
since half of post-Cold War era conflicts reignite within this period.84 
In order to avoid this relapse and solidify the peace settlement, it is important to 
examine a peace agreement in which mediators have a great degree of responsibility to 
facilitate its implementation. Donald Rothchild and Stephen Stedman argue that 
several main recurrent problems plague the implementation of peace agreements. 85 
These include vague and expedient agreements, a lack of coordination between 
mediators and implementers of agreements and the presence of spoilers. 86 
Many peace agreements tend to focus on quick-fix solutions without analysing 
root causes, fundamental issues and characteristics of the conflict. If these problems 
are not addressed, concerned parties continue to "put out fires," only treating symptoms 
d d· .. 87 an respon mg to cnSlS. The peace agreement process is more important than the 
result "because of the importance that the parties attach to their positions and because 
individuals and groups resent being treated as the object of some other body's plans.,,88 
83 Stedman, "Introduction," 2 
84 Tim Murithi, "Towards a Symbiotic Partnership: The UN Peacebuilding Commission 
and the Evolving AU/NEPAD Post· Conflict Reconstruction Framework," Adekeye 
Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds.), A Dialogue of the Deaf. Essays on Africa and the 
United Nations, (Auckland Park, the Center of Conflict Resolution, Fanele), 245. Mr. 
Murithi uses the footnote from "High· level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change," 
A More Secure World: Our shared Responsibility, (New York: UN, 2004). However, this 
quote could not be found. He has been contacted for clarification without success. 
85 Stedman, "Introduction," 8 
86 Ibid 
87 Laurie Nathan, "Africa: Five Questions and Challenges," Helene Grandvoinnet and 
Hartmut Schneider (eds.), Conflict Management in Africa: A Permanent Challenge, 
(Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, 1998),46·47 











If peace agreements leave important matters undecided, then "the warring parties are 
much more likely to hedge their bets, take advantage when provisions of an agreement 
are not specified and interpret ambiguous terms in ways that benefit them during 
. I . ,,89 Imp ementatlOn. A ceasefire or peace agreement that focuses only on conflict 
resolution and neglects preventive diplomacy will ultimately fail. 
Efforts should therefore never focus solely on gaining the signatures of the 
belligerent agents. The content of the agreement's provIsIons should instead take 
precedence, which would help establish a durable peace.90 It is also vital that all 
stakeholders participate in decision-making so that they can own and respect the 
agreements. For this, mediators should facilitate problem-solving between the 
concerned parties themselves rather than solving problems for them. 91 
2.5 Literature Review on South Africa's Peacemaking in the DRC 
The following texts describe South Africa's mediation and peacemaking experiences in 
the ORC and Africa. The texts can be divided into four subjects: South Africa's 
peacemaking style, the export of South Africa's own peacemaking model, South 
Africa's issues surrounding neutrality, and the separation within the SADC on its 
peacemaking approach, which influenced South Africa's peacemaking during the 
Second Congo War. 
On South Africa's style, Kuseni Dlamini identifies two schools of thought; the 
first is to impose hegemony on the region (i.e. South Africa's invasion of Lesotho), 
while the second suggests that South Africa must avoid being perceived either as a big 
89 Stedman, "Introduction," 9 
90 Ibid, 10 











brother or a regional bully (i.e. its relationship with Zimbabwe).92 In the case of the 
DRC, South Africa used a mixture of UN and Western powers, as well as regional and 
domestic leaders to facilitate diplomatic persuasion and dialogue following the Second 
Congo War. 93 Greg Millers argues that during the Zaire/Rwanda refugee crisis in 
1996, South Africa "adopt[ ed] a less apologetic and more assertive regional/continental 
role.,,94 Christopher Landsberg compares two different styles: while President Mandela 
assumed a cautious and diplomatic peacemaking posture, President Mbeki supported 
·1· d 1 95 ml ltary ep oyment. . 
Instead of tailoring a peacemaking strategy for the context of the Great Lakes, 
South Africa exported its own peacemaking model to region. Mahmood Mamdani 
points out that South Africa failed to understand the regionalised and militarised nature 
of the Zairian conflict by reading "the Zaire situation through South African lenses.,,96 
According to Millers, South Africa's transition was exceptional with a high degree of 
international involvement and the willingness of all actors to compromise. Therefore, 
this unique model cannot necessarily be applied elsewhere.97 Landsberg claims that 
Foreign Minister and senior diplomats "continue roving the continent seeking to 
promote peace and selling the virtue of the South African-style negotiated option.,,98 
92 Dlamini, "Assessing South Africa's Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution," South African 
Yearbook ofInternational Affairs, 2001102, (Johannesburg, SAIIA), 62-67 
93 Dlamini, "Assessing South Africa's Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution," 68 
94 Millers, "South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Year in Review," South African Yearbook 
of International Affairs, (Johannesburg, SAIIA, 1997), 2 
95 Landsberg, 'The Impossible Neutrality?: South Africa's Policy in the Congo War," 
John F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes of the Congo War, (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), 178-9 
96 Mamdani, "NaIve SA must not adopt missionary position," Mail & Guardian, May 
23-29 1997 
97 Greg Mills, "South African Foreign Policy and Africa: Where to at the Millennium?," 
South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 2000/01, (Johannesburg, SAIIA, 2000), 
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Besides South Africa's projecting its own bias onto the ORC, Hussein Solomon raises 
three other issues in peacemaking: Pretoria's habit of over-simplification, its dearth of 
analytical skills, its lack of understanding regarding peacemaking processes and the 
coordination problem within the South African foreign policy establishment.99 Devon 
Curtis also indicates that the South African model ignores important political and 
economic questions that are central to conflict in the Great Lakes region. 100 
Examining South Africa's neutrality, Adekeye Adebajo and Landsberg argue that 
South Africa's neutral stance has been heavily questioned due to its history of supplying 
arms to Rwanda and Uganda. IOI According to Ian Taylor, Paul Williams and Sandra 
MacLean, South Africa is an unsuccessful peace-broker because the government failed 
to initially condemn Rwanda and Uganda's entry into war and South Africans served as 
mercenaries on both sides of the conflict. 102 The International Crisis Group claims that 
South Africa imposed a Rwandan solution to the conflict during the dialogue. 103 Anthoni 
van Nieuwkerk and Deon Geldenhuys state that President Mbeki's gradual shift of 
foreign policy from human rights to wealth and security influenced South Africa's 
ak· . h G L k . 104 peacem mg process m t e reat a es regIOn. 
99 Solomon, "The Poverty of Pretoria's Preventive Diplomacy in the Great Lakes 
Region," South African Yearbook of International Affairs, 200213, (Johannesburg, SAlIA, 
2002), 141·143 
100 Curtis, "The South African Approach to Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa," Veronica Federico and Carlo Fusaro (eds.), Constitutionalism and Democratic 
Transitions: Lessons from South Africa, (Firenze University Press, Firenze Italy, 2006), 
153 
101 Adebajo and Landsberg, "South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons," 187 
102 Taylor and Williams, "South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis: 
African Renaissance Meets Vagabondage Politique?," African Affairs (2001), 100,281; 
MacLean, "New Regionalism and Conflicts in the DRC," J. Andrew Grant and Fredrik 
Soderbaum (eds.), The New Regionalism in Africa, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003), 117 
103 ICG, "Storm Clouds Over Sun City: The Urgent Need to Recast the Congolese Peace 
Process," Africa Report, No.44, 14 May 2002, 15 
104 Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, "Foreign Policy-Making in South Africa: Context, Actors, 











South Africa's peacemaking role was also problematised by the separation within 
the SADC on its peacemaking approach. Nathan describes the SADC's difficulty in 
establishing a common security regime due to two decision-making bodies: the Summit, 
led by South Africa, and the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, which was run by 
Zimbabwe. IDS In addition, there were two separate approaches within the SADC: the 
peacemaking and the military cooperation groups, which were led by South Africa and 
Z · b b . I 106 1m a we, respectIve y. Mwesiga Baregu raises questions about the SADC's 
authority and legitimacy to intervene during the Second Congo War. l07 Katharina 
Coleman argues that the SADC lacked functional institutional structures to deal with 
regional peace and security issues. IDS 
Summary 
As part of peacemaking efforts, mediation is a dialogue that searches for durable and 
peaceful solutions to create the conditions that lead to conflict de-escalation and finally 
to positive peace. Since conflict is a matter of perception, mediators have to develop 
the ripeness for negotiation to reach a better understanding of the conflict's dynamics. 
Mediators need to pay greater attention to peace agreements, which tend to focus on 
quick-fix solutions without properly analysing the causes of conflict. 
Foreign Policy after Apartheid, (Midrand, Institute for Global Dialogue, 2006), 41; Deon 
Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Role as International Norm Entrepreneur," In Full Flight: 
South Africa s Foreign Policy after Apartheid, 100 
105 Nathan, "SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992·2003, Journal of 
South African Studies, Vo1.32, No.3, September 2006, 610 
106 Nathan, "Consistency and inconsistencies in South African foreign policy," 
International Affairs, 81. 2, 2005, 365 
107 Baregu, "Economic and Military Security," Baregu and Chris Landsberg, From Cape 
to Congo: Southern Africa s Evolving Security Challenges, (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 
2003),24 
108 Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: the Politics of 











Mediation, which is more than persuasion, is a specialised activity. Mediators' 
ability to build trust among parties, as well as their quality and credibility are critical to 
effective peace implementation. Due to the complexity of the Great Lakes conflict, a 
mediator should act as a manipulator and use non-coercive or coercive tactics. This 
principle applies especially when identifying and managing spoilers based on its full 
analysis, whose presence can destroy the peace process. 
Negotiation works well when reaching the point of a mutually hurting stalemate, 
although it is not enough to create conditions that lead to productive negotiation. 
Timeliness of negotiation or diplomatic intervention is important before issues are 
multiplied with a higher degree of grievance. Early intervention has significant 
advantages, as it can motivate parties and decrease the likelihood of relapse of conflict. 
In order to measure the success of peace implementation, one can examme 
whether the conflict relapsed within a five-year timeframe. 
****** 
In the following chapters, South Africa's peacemaking will be judged based on its 
style and technique. This includes the timing of its intervention, the type of mediation 
it employed, the management of spoilers, the content of the peace agreement, and the 
country's application of its own peacemaking style. It will also be judged based on its 
understanding of the key issues of conflict, its neutrality, and its coping mechanism to 












The Great Lakes Region Conflict before the Rwandan Genocide of 
1994 
"Eastern Congo is so fertile. Bury a brick in the ground alld the next day you'd probably find a 
brick-tree. " 
--Jean-David Levitte, Head of a United Nations Security Council mission to the region, 
10 May 2002 
This chapter presents a brief history of eastern Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, the causes 
of the Great Lakes region conflict before 1994 and the background and aftermath of the 
1994 Rwandan genocide. The Rwandan genocide must be understood in the context 
of regional history and population movements. This chapter also highlights nationality 
and land issues in the Congo, which are inter-related and part of the major causes of 
conflict. 
The first section discusses the special character of eastern Congo with respect to 
its migration history with Rwanda and Burundi. The second section deals with ethnic 
problems in Rwanda and eastern Congo. The third section examines Rwandaphones' 
nationality issues, which aggravated ethnic tensions in eastern Congo and the land 
ownership problem. The fourth section illustrates the development with the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front in Uganda and the Arusha Peace Accord. The last section describes the 












3.1 The Special Character of Eastern Congo and its Migration History 
The Kivu Provinces 109 in eastern Congo have been the site of endless cycles of conflict 
involving neighbouring countries. The Kivu provinces have experienced close 
economic, social and cultural relationships with Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. The 
Congolese war and the Rwandan and Burundian civil wars are intricately linked, as the 
Congo's internal dynamics are heavily influenced by the actions and internal politics of 
its neighbours, particularly Rwanda. I 10 The Kivus, along with the northeastern (Ituri) 
and southeastern (Katanga) provinces, are the richest in the country in terms of mineral 
and agricultural resources. It is this wealth that makes these areas of great interest to 
W d I A · . III estern an more recent y, SIan countnes. 
The first migration account was documented in the sixteenth century, before the 
Independent State of Congo was formed in 1885 by King Leopold of Belgium. ll2 The 
Convention signed by Belgium, Germany and the UN in 1910 made the Belgian 
colonial administration recognise the Banyarwanda 113 as indigenous if they had 
migrated to the Congo prior to 1910. 114 The convention also granted the 
109 There are two provinces in the east, North and South Kivu, whose provincial 
capitals are Goma and Bukavu respectively. 
110 Michael Nest, Francois Grignon and Emizet Kisangani, The Democratic Republic of 
the Congo: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, (Boulder Colo. International Peace 
Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner, 2006), 20-21 
III UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exp-Ioitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, 12 April 2001 (S/20011357), 23 
October 2003 (S/2003/1027), hereafter the UN Panel of Experts. 
112 Koen Vlassenroot and Chris Huggins, "Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern 
DRC," Chris Huggins and Jenny Clover (edsJ, From the Ground Up': Land Rights, 
Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), 
2005), 128; However, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja argues that the Banyamulenge settled 
in South Kivu around 1881. Nzongola-Ntalaja, "The Politics of Citizenship in the 
DRC," Annual International Conference, "State, Borders and Nations: Negotiating 
Citizenship in Africa," Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, May 19·20 
2004,4. 
113 It literally means "those from Rwanda" in Swahili. 











B d ' th . 115 anyarwan a s own customary au onty. Native Congolese groups, who feared a 
reduction of their influence on social issues, land ownership and political power, 
d · d h' d .. 116 lspute t IS eClSlon. 
Present day Rwanda and Burundi 117 were placed under a Belgian mandate that 
lasted until 1962. The decree of 19 July 1926 created job opportunities for Rwandans 
outside the country and accepted labour recruiters to enter from surrounding areas. I 18 
The Belgian authorities therefore regarded overpopulated Rwanda as a valuable 
reservoir of labour for the wealthy parts of the Congo. I 19 In 1937, the Belgian colony 
established the Mission d'Immigration des Banyarwanda (MIB), or Immigration 
Mission of the Banyarwanda, to facilitate, or forcibly transplant 120 a cheap and 
controllable workforce to the mines and plantations of the Kivu and Katanga 
. 121 6 . provillces. By 1955, around 1 0,000 Hutu and Tutsl Rwandans consequently 
. d h . 1?2 mIgrate to t ese provillces. - Apart from the overpopulation, labour opportunities 
and the 1959 social revolution, frequent famine also motivated Rwandans to immigrate 
1'3 to eastern Congo. -. 
115 Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern DRC," 129 
116 Ibid 
117 In 1922, the Rwanda-Urundi was part of the German dominion. 
118 Mahmood Mamdani, W'hen Victims Become KlJJers: Colonism, Nativism and 
Genocide in Rwanda, (Oxford, James Currey, 2001), 240 
119 Vlassenroot and Huggins, "Land, Migration and Conflict in Eastern DRC," 129 
120 Mamdani, W'hen Victims Become Killers, Colonism, 240-1 
121 ICG "The Congo's Transition is failing: Crisis in the Kivus," No, 91, 30 March 2005,8 
122 Ibid 
123 In Rwanda alone, eleven famines were recorded between 1895 to 1945. The latest 
occurred in 1990, only four years before the genocide. The famine in 1988-9 was not only 
due to the extreme marginality of Rwandese agriculture in a context of deforestation, 
soil erosion, demographic increase, under-fertilization and difficult crop selection, but 
was also caused by the political vagaries of food marketing and pricing policies. See 
Rene Lemarchand, "The Crisis in the Great Lakes," John W. Harbeson and Donald 
Rothchild (eds.), Africa in World Politics: The African state system in Flux, (Boulder 
Colo., Westview Press, 2000), 330; Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a 











3.2 EthnicI24 Problems in Rwanda and Eastern Congo 
The situation in Rwanda was further complicated by ethnic purges in the 1950s. The 
Hutus and Tutsis were originally not ethnic categories, but were determined rather by 
"social rank associated with occupation, cattle ownership, and proximity to the royal 
court." 125 Gerard Prunier confirms that "there is no trace in its pre-colonial history of 
. . I b T' d H h "P6 systematic VIO ence etween utSI an utu as suc . - Despite the commonality of 
language, Kinyarwanda, and culture between Tutsi and Hutu, this did not prevent the 
rise of an ethnic consciousness between the two groups and a catastrophic process of 
ethnic mobilistion. 127 
The Belgian colonial policy transformed this social rank into a more rigid ethnic 
division, which favoured Tutsis in education and managerial positions such as civil 
servants until the mid-1950s.1 28 As members of the Tutsi elite became heavily involved 
in the struggle for independence, the Belgian government decided to upgrade Hutu 
people's status. 129 As a result, the Hutu used this new recognition of status to gain 
increased access to the church and ultimately end Tutsi superiority in Rwanda in 
1959. 130 The Rwandan social revolution took place in the same year and was 
characterised by outbreaks of violence against Tutsis who formerly sidelined the 
majority Hutus. Between 1959 and 1962 when Rwanda gained independence, 150,000 
124 Mamdani explains ethnicity "as a political identity, it marked an internal difference, 
whereas race signified an external difference." See Mamdani, Hi'llen Victims Become 
JUJJers, 231. Ethnicity connotes shared cultural, linguistic, behavioural or religious 
traits, but in this dissertation, it will be used as personal or group identity. 
125 George Nzongola-Ntalaja, "Civil War, Peacekeeping, and the Great Lakes Region," 
Richard Rene Laremount (ed.), The Causes of War and the Consequences of 
Peacekeeping in Africa, (Portsmuth, NH, Heinemann, 2002), 93 
126 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 39 
127 Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to Kablia, 219 
128 Nzongola-Ntalaja, "Civil War, Peacekeeping, and the Great Lakes Region," 93 
129 Ibid 











Rwandan refugees, mostly Tutsis, fled to neighbouring countries. These included 
60,000 Rwandans who fled to eastern Congo (KiVUS).13I 
Most of the refugees were educated and united within Zaire and within 
Diasporas 132 in the region. 133 In Zaire, many of them were marginalised and 
vulnerable due to their refugee status. They were therefore welcomed by President 
Mobutu into his party, the Movement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), or the Popular 
Movement of the Revolution. 134 One of the refugees, Barthelemy Bisengimana, 
became "probably the second [most] influential man (cabinet director) in Zaire after 
President Mobutu,,,135 while other Tutsis obtained positions in his central office. I36 
Indeed, the Banyarwanda became important figures in Congolese politics. According 
to one Congolese government official, President Mobutu did not have any other choice 
but to accept the United States' advice to favour the Tutsis, who had a close relationship 
with the United States. 137 
131 UNHCR, The State of the Worlds Refugees, 49-50. Congolese Tutsi are a small part 
of the larger group of Rwandophones, numbering several hundred thousand and 
constituting between one and two percent of the total Congolese population of some 60 
million. HRW, "Renewed Crisis in North Kivu," 23 October 2007,9 
132 Paul Collier's following argument on Diasporas corresponds to the Great Lakes 
context; "Diasporas sometimes harbor rather romanticised attachments to their group 
of origin and may nurse grievances as a form of asserting continued belonging. They 
are much richer than the people in their country of origin and s·o can afford to finance 
vengeance. Above all, they do not have to suffer any of the awful consequences of 
renewed conflict because they are not living in the country. Hence, they are ready 
market for rebel groups touting vengeance and so are a source of finance for renewed 
conflict." Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy," 
Crocker, Hampson, and Aall (edsJ Thrbulent Peace: The ChaJJenges of Managing 
International Conflict, 155 
133 Lemarchand, "The Crisis in the Great Lakes," 333-334 
134 ICG, "The Congo's Transition is failing: Crisis in the Kivus," 8 
1:35 Prunier, The Rwandan Crisis, 379 
136 ICG, "The Congo's Transition is failing: Crisis in the Kivus," 8 











3.3 Rwandaphones' Nationality138 and Land Issues in Eastern Congo 
The politicised nationality law of Rwandaphones has changed several times. This has 
aggravated ethnic tensions in eastern Congo due to land competition, and become one 
of the major causes of the present conflict. 
The 1960s and 1970s 
After the Congo gained independence in 1960, Banyarwanda immigrants were granted 
nationality equal to other inhabitants of eastern Congo. Those who had resided in the 
Congo for more than 10 years were allowed to vote in the national elections in May 
1960. 139 Therefore, "they were for all practical purposes citizens of the Congo, but 
legally their citizenship status remained uncertain.,,140 
The nationality issue originated with the Congolese Constitution of 1 August 1964, 
which denied Congolese nationality to Rwandophones who were transplanted to the 
Congo between 1930 and 1954. 141 In the 1970s, Bisengimana sought to reverse the 
1964 Constitution: "firstly, a 1970 decision of the ruling MRP party's political bureau; 
then a 1971 law accorded nationality specifically to 'persons originating from 
138 When discussing identity of the Rwandaphone (those who speak Kinyarwandan· 
mother tongue of Rwanda) caseloads, scholars and analysts use either the term 
"citizenship" or "nationality." Nationality has broader rights, such as the right to live 
and work permanently in a country, the right to social security and the right to exercise 
some legal or political professions. Citizenship, however, provides only the right to 
vote at elections (and sometimes the right to be elected). It does not offer the right to 
live in a country. In this dissertation, the term "nationality" will be used because 
Rwandaphones are seeking various rights. 
139 Nzongola' Ntalaja, "The Politics of Citizenship in the DRC," 4 
1-10 Ibid 
1-11 Immigration Refugee Board of Canada, Country of Origin Research, 
www.irb.cisl".gc.ca/en/research/rirlindexe.htm ? action =record. viewrec&gotorec=44918, 











Rwanda-Burundi established in Congo since [the] independence date of 30 June 1960'; 
thirdly, a 1972 law moving the cutoff date to 1 January 1950.,,142 
The thoroughly politicised 1972 decree expanded the rights of the Banyarwanda, 
and the rights of those Rwandans who became refugees between 1959 and 1963. 143 
They became entitled to purchase land and participate in political activities. 144 Like 
many of his kinsmen, Bisengimana became one of the largest landowners in the 
KiVUS. 145 Locals, who considered themselves an "indigenous" majority, were fearful 
and resentful of the Tutsis' influence. 146 The decree was not merely a nationality issue, 
but "it would surely turn Kivu into an open sanctuary for the surplus population from 
Rwanda and Burundi.,,147 The year 1972 also saw the movement of 200,000 Hutu 
Burundian refugees into the Kivus following the massacre in Burundi. 
The 1980s 
The new influx of Rwandans in the 1960s and 1970s aggravated tensions and ignited 
campaigns to exclude them during the 1980s.148 Many attempts to resolve this issue 
by the Congolese state failed. Beginning in 1981, after Bisengimana fell from power 
in 1977, President Mobutu needed more support from the local Kivu population 
compared to the Banyarwanda and thereby introduced a law to revoke the 1972 
142 Stephan Jackson, "Sons of Which Soil? The Language and Politics of Autochthony in 
Eastern DRCongo," African Studies Review, Vol. 49, No.2, September 1996, 104 
14;3 Nest et aI, The DRC: Economic Dimensions of War and Peace, 21-22 
144 Ibid 
145 Lemarchand, "The Crisis in the Great Lakes," 333-334 
146 Jackson, "Sons of Which Soil?" 104, and Mamdani, VVhen Victims Become Killers, 
243 
147 Mamdani, VVhen Victims Become K1Jlers, 244 
148 Kendal Nezan, 'Power Struggle in Kivus: Congolese Flashpoint,' Le Monde 











· . h' I 149 cItizens Ip aw. The qualifying date for the Congolese nationals was set back from 
1908 to 1 August 1885, the date of the Berlin Conference. 150 In 1983, President 
Mobutu then succumbed to popular pressure and repealed the blanket citizenship decree, 
which required each application to be considered individually.151 Not only did these 
Banyarwanda become victims having lost their sense of personal security, but they also 
became legally stateless persons. 152 
This caused greater tension in the regIOn. By the late 1980s, violent clashes 
began between the pastoralist and agricultural communities in North Kivu. 153 
Consequently, Rwandaphone elites withdrew from active politics and concentrated on 
the local economy, particularly on the vast agricultural concessions, coffee plantations 
and cattle ranches that were amassed during Bisengimana's powerful reign. 154 
The disintegration of Banyarwanda identity into separate Hutu and Tutsi identities 
solidified in the 1980s when the Banyarwanda organisation, Umoja, formed in the 
aftermath of the 1981 Nationality Law and separated into two separate bodies. 155 The 
Hutu community in North Kivu rallied behind the Mutualite des Agriculteurs de 
Virunga (MAGRIVI), or Agricultures Mutuality in Virunga, an organisation formed in 
149 Jackson, "Sons of Which Soil?," 105 
150 Ibid 
151 See footnote from ICG, "The Congo's Transition is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus," 8 "To 
qualify, an applicant had to demonstrate that his or her tribe had been present at the 
demarcation of the boundaries in 1885, a condition that was thought to disqualify the 
Tutsi. However, most scholars date the Tutsi presence in South Kivu to before that date, 
to immigrations related to the wars in Rwanda under the regime of Mwami Ruabugiri 
Kigeri. By first bestowing citizenship on the group and then removing it, Mobutu's 
dictatorship politicised their identity and entrenched in the community a profound 
suspicion of Kinshasa politics." 
152 The definition of a stateless person is "a person who is not considered as a national 
by any State under the operation of its law." See UN Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, www.ohchr.ch/english/law/stateless.htm#. accessed on 12 October, 
2007 
153 lCG, "The Congo's Transition is failing: Crisis in the Kivus," 8-9 
154 Jackson, "Sons of Which Soil?," 105 











1989-1990. 156 As a lobbying force, which soon became a militia,157 it received 
financial support from Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana and political support 
from President MobutU. 158 Its agenda was to identify indigenous Hutu in order to 
. 1· 1';9 grant them natlOna lty. - For MAGRIVI, there were no indigenous Tutsis in the 
Zaire. 160 On the other hand, Tutsis formed Syndicat d' Initiateive pour Ie 
Developpement de la Zone de Ruthsuru, 161 or the Syndicate' Initiative for the 
Development in Ruthsuru Zone. 162 These Hutu and Tutsi associations in Zaire soon 
formed regional networks. 163 
The Post-Cold War Era 
President Mobutu contributed significantly to the single, national identity that was 
accepted by most Zairean people. l64 This achievement was ruined, however, toward 
the end of his regime when he could no longer rely on the support of his foreign allies at 
the end of the Cold War. 165 President Mobutu then decided to retain power by 
encouraging ethnic tensions and antagonism towards Zairean Tutsi. 166 He was 
partially responsible for anti-Tutsi sentiment, as he permitted a campaign that led to the 
156 Thomas Turner, The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality, (London, Zed Books, 
2007) 118 
15i Jackson, "Sons of Which Soil?," 121 
158 Mamdani, iji7Jen Victims Become Killers, 252 
159 Ibid 
160 Ibid 
161 Ruthsuru is one of the territory or zone in North Kivu Province. 
162 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 252 
163 Ibid 
16.! Herbert Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis, "Reconstructing the Congo," Journal of 













expulsion of Tutsis from North Kivu and to threats of mass expulsion of the 
Banyamulenge l67 from South Kivu. 168 
The issue of Banyarwanda nationality therefore remained a dividing line in 
Congolese society until President Mobutu started his half-hearted democratisation 
process 10 the early 1990s. This process began in 1991-1992 with the Conference 
Nationale Souveraine (CNS), or the National Sovereign Conference, which pitted 
communities against each other even further. Local representatives demanded that 
"foreigner" Hutus and Tutsis should be barred from the conference. 169 In North Kivu, 
this was perceived as a warning of imminent ethnic cleansing. 170 Hutus and Tutsis 
fought together against the autochthon's (local population) hostility. 
Following an outbreak of civil war in Rwanda later that year, the hostility between 
h h . . d 171 t e two et mc groups 10crease . The CNS also reaffirmed the 1981 Nationality 
Law at the same time, which astonished the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda 
communities and fostered a strong sense of insecurity. Lacking state protection, each 
community created tribal militias for self-protection during the following two years. 172 
Many young Zairean Tutsis joined the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)I73 in Uganda 
167 The Banyamulenge, literally meaning "the people of Mulenge," is not an ethnic 
group but the Rwandan Tutsi living in the high plateau of Mwenga, Fizi and Uvira 
zones of South Kivu. Its name was likely adopted in the 1960s by earlier Tutsi settlers 
to distinguish themselves from more recent refugees from Burundi and Rwanda. See 
Lemarchand, "The DRC: From Collapse to Potential Reconstruction," Occasional Paper, 
Center of African Studies, University of Copenhagen, September 2001,56, and Jackson, 
"Sons of Which Soil?," 108 
168 Weiss and Carayannis, "Reconstructing the Congo," 105-142 
169 Jackson, "Sons of Which Soil?," 105 
170 Ibid, 106 
171 Willie Breytenbach, et aI, "Conflicts in the Congo: From Kivu to Kabila," African 
Security Review, Vol. 8, No.5, 1999 
172 ICG, "The Congo's Transition is failing," 9 
173 RPF was formed in December 1987 with a view of returning Rwandan refugees 
home. According to one Congolese government official, a movement called 











after its invasion into Rwanda in 1990. The authorities' attempt to organise a census 
of "foreigners" in North Kivu in March 1993 174 led to inter-ethnic violence in North 
Kivu, which lasted more than six months. 175 Between 6,000 and 10,000 people were 
killed and more than 250,000 people were displaced. 176 
Land Ownership Issues 
Land lies at the centre of conflict in the region since "attach[ment] to ones' community 
and, through it, to the soil of the ancestors or the homeland, is a fundamental dimension 
of the notion of citizenship in Africa.,,177 Traditionally, the local customary chief had 
the authority and capacity to distribute land. 178 However, Belgian colonial rule 
allocated Banyarwanda newcomers plots of land that had been purchased from the local 
chief. 179 The subsequent placement of this area under the authority of a Rwandan 
chief disrupted the transitional land-holding pattern. 180 The Banyarwanda were placed 
back under local authority, and eventually, the Rwandan chiefdom was abolished before 
. d d 181 III epen ence. The change of land ownership, as well as the broad mobilisation of 
the Rwandan labour forces, aroused resentment and resistance from the local population 
over land and resources. 182 This was due to decreased land availability and increased 
the creation of RPF. See Appendix 3 on its interview. 
174 Mamdani, Wflen Victims Become Killers, 245 
175 UNHCR, The State of the Worlds Refugees, 258 
176 Overseas Development Institute, March 2005, Conflict in the Great Lakes region: 
How is it linked w.ith land and migration? www.odi.org.ukinrp/96.pdf, accessed on 30 
June 2006 
177 Nzongola- Ntalaja, "The Politics of Citizenship in the DRC," 3 
178 Amnesty International (AI), "Democratic Republic of Congo, North Kivu: Civilians 
pay the price for political and military rivalry," 28 September 2005, 8 















competition among the state, immigrants, refugees and existing land holders (traditional 
authorities) for land control. I83 
This tension led to conflict called the Kanyarwanda war in 1963-1965. The local 
population revolted against the Banyarwanda, who were seeking greater political 
. h· 184 autonomy 10 t elr area. The Bakajika Law of July 1966 specified that "all public 
land belonged to the state, and that all land-grants and concessionary powers delegated 
to colonial corporations by the Belgian colonial state were to be annulled.,,185 The new 
land law in 1973 further eroded traditional authority by abolishing customary control of 
land and nationalising the country's foreign-run industries and plantations. 186 As a 
result, many acres of land were sold to Tutsi refugees, who converted them from crop 
agriculture into ranches and plantations, evicting peasant families from their traditional 
landholdings. 187 
Tutsis were also recruited into the civil service and promoted from elected 
officials to senior ranks of President Mobutu's regime. 188 These changes aggravated 
the tension between the autochthon, whose authority was undermined, and the 
Banyarwanda. It also exacerbated tensions between the Hutu and Tutsi populations. 189 
What was seen at the time as a solution to Rwanda's overpopulation therefore gave rise 
to the present politicised and regionalised inter-ethnic problem in the Kivus. 
18;3 Nest et aI, The DRC, 21 
184 AI, "DRC, North Kivu," 8 
185 Crawford Young, "Zaire: the Anatomy of a Failed State," David Birmingham and 
Phyllis Martin (eds.), History of Central Africa: The Contemporary Years Bince 1960, 
(New York, Longman, 1998),114 
186 Ibid; AI, "DRC, North Kivu," 8 
187 Lemarchand, "The Crisis in the Great Lakes," 333-334 
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3.4 Developments with the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Arusha Peace 
Accord 
While there was argument over nationality and land ownership with Rwandaphones in 
Zaire, similar movement was observed in Uganda. Tutsis who had become refugees in 
1959, especially those who resided in Uganda, were the most politically organised and 
planned to use all means to return home. 190 The Banyarwanda's significant 
contribution to the victory of Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in 
1986 191 led to the Ugandan government's decision to naturalise Banyarwanda 
refugees. 192 President Museveni, in a reversal of the previous policy of the Gabiro 
Accords of October 1982,193 decided that Banyarwnda who had been residents in the 
country for more than 10 years would be granted Ugandan nationality. 194 
However, there was a parliamentary debate on preclusion from owning land by 
non-Ugandans. 195 This factor, as well as a prohibition against non-Ugandans who 
wished to hold state positions, was said to have triggered the Rwandan refugees' 
invasion of Rwanda in order to regain the right of nationality and right to land. 196 
Apart from the question of ethnicity, a crisis of indignity also contributed to this 
development. 197 At the same time, Rwandans living in the Diaspora became 
increasingl y united and militant. A World Congress of Rwandan Refugees was held in 
190 For this purpose, Rwandese Alliance for National Unity was set up in Kampala in 
1980, which rechristened itself the RPF. See Mamdani, ~en Victims Become Killers, 
166 
191 A quarter of NRA's ranks were composed of Banyarwanda. Mamdani, When Victims 
Become /Vllers, 170 
192 Ibid, 173 
193 In this accord, Uganda authorities had insisted that no one could acquire citizenship 
without proof that the individual's father, grandfather, and great-grandfather were in 
Uganda. Mamdani, ~en Victims Become Killers, 173 
194 Ibid, 173-4 
195 Ibid. 181-183 
196 Ibid, 183 











Washington D.C. in August 1988 with a strong resolution to bring about the "right to 
" 198 I··· R d' f· d 199 return, or natura lsatlOn 10 wan ans country 0 resl ence. 
The RPF launched a military invasion in Rwanda in October 1990 with the 
facilitation of President Museveni,200 the United States, the European and American 
Tutsi Diasporas,201 and many active Tutsis in North Kivu.202 Jones argued that "both 
'push' factors-the increasing tensions around the Banyarwanda population in Uganda on 
their rights to return home-as well as 'pull' factors- the mounting tension in Rwanda 
itself- appear to have been salient.,,203 However, the invasion failed due to France, 
Belgium and Zaire's military support of the Rwandan government. 
Following this invasion, Belgium, France, the United States and neighbouring 
countries initiated peacemaking efforts?04 In addition to the single-party dictatorship, 
the Habyarimana regime faced many problems, induding the fluctuation of the coffee 
price,205 which led to an economic crisis, and eventual poverty and famine stemming 
from the food price policy?06 The RPF's invasion was consequently perceived as a 
political threat, which reinforced Habyarimana's decision to instill an ideology based on 
198 Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 74 
199 Mamdani, VVhen Victims Become Killers, 174 
200 Mamdani argues that although the refugee crisis that led to the invasion was the 
outcome ofpost-1959 developments in Rwanda, the crisis itself was very much Ugandan 
in the making with NRA in power. See VVhen Victims Become Killers, 184. Jones also 
mentions that NRA provided support to the RPF inside Uganda. See Peacemaking in 
Rwanda, 29 
201 Issac Kamola, "The Global Coffee Economy and the Production of Genocide in 
Rwanda," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No.3, 2007, 585 
202 Turner, The Congo Wars, 118 
203 Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, 28 
204 For more detail, see Jones, Peacemaking in Rwanda, 53-66 
205 For more information, see David Renton, David Seddon and Leo Zeiling, The Congo: 
Plunder & Resistance, (London, Zed Books, 2007), 175; Kamola, "The Global Coffee 
Economy and the Production of Genocide in Rwanda," 578 












Hutu power.- By June 1992, the Rwandan government and the RPF had reached a 
political stalemate, which led to the beginning of the Arusha peace talks in August 1993. 
These talks were mediated by Tanzania with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). 
The Arusha peace agreement included the rule of law, power-sharing, integration 
of the two armed forces, resettlement of displaced persons, the provision of 
parliamentary governance rather than presidential, as well as the repatriation of 
. '0X· d" Rwandan refugees. - The content 01 the agreement was considere to be 111 favour of 
the RPF,20l) without having addressed the root causes of the contlict such as land and 
resource rights. 2lO The agreement was therefore merely a temporary solution between 
the two enemies. 
Following the assassination of the Burundian Hutu president in October 1993, 
simultaneous mass killings of both Tutsis and Hutus in Burundi helped to bolster the 
. T' .. R d '11 antl- utSI campaIgn 111 wan a.- The Burundi experience taught the Hutu hardliners 
in the Rwandan military that co-existence between the two ethnic groups was 
impossible and that genocide would not necessarily trigger an international response. 212 
Instead of ending the three-year civil war and the Hutus' 20 year hegemony over the 
Tutsis, the peace agreement led to genocide. 
:!07 Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 189. "At the core of the ideology of Hutu 
Power was the conviction that the 1\ltsi were a race alien to Rwanda, and not an 
indigenous ethnic group .... they (Hutu) were the nation." (190) 
:!OH Arusha Peace Agreement, www.grandslacs.net/cloc/240:3.pdf. accessed on 28 
December, 2007 
:!O!J For detail, see Linda Melvern, Conspirac,v to Jl,furdel': The Rwandlll1 Genocide, 
(London, New York, Verso, 2004), 59 
:!IO Jean Bigagaza et ai, "Land Scarcity, distribution and Conflict in Rwanda," Jeremy 
Lind and Kathryn Sturman (eds,), ScaJ'ci~v and Surfeit: the Ecology of AfricCl S Conflicts, 
(Pretoria, ISS, 2002), 52 
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3.5 Movement During and the Aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide 
On 6 April 1994, the presidential jet carrying President Habyarimana and his BunlI1dian 
counterpart was shot down in Kigali, as they were returning from Dar-cs-Salaam's 
summit on the implementation of the Arusha Peace Accord. The genocide of Tutsis 
and Hutus modernists immediately followed. The Forces Armces Rwandais (FAR), or 
Rwandan Armed Forces, instigated the violence alongside Hutu extremists, the 
Interahamwe. 213 Some Burundian Hutu refugees in Rwanda were also active during 
h 'd ')14 t e genocl e.- The genocide resulted in more than 800,000 deaths and only ended 
once the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) gained victory in July 1994. 
The RPF's new regime was followed by a massive influx of 1.2 million Rwandan 
Hutu refugees215 and defeated FAR and Interahamwe into the neighboring countries. 
Th .. I Z' )16 e maJonty entere( eastern alre.- French troops intervened in June 1994 in 
Rwanda and Zaire on a "humanitarian mission," Operation Turquoise, which protected 
and led the genocidaires with arms to hiding places among the genuine refugee hostages 
in eastern Zaire. 217 The international community failed to respond to the UN's request 
to send an international force to separate armed groups from the civilian refugees. 
While it was known that the genocide was initiated by Hutu extremists, the RPF 
also took its revenge and re-started their military operation on 8 April, just after the 
beginning of the genocide. 21R According to the Oersony Report,21lJ the RPF murdered 
21~ Literally, "those who stand together" in Kinyarwanda, who participated 111 the 
genocide. 
211 UNHCR, The State of World's Refugees. 259 
21" Ibid, 2·16 
21G Armed soldiers and militias were reported to be some 20,000 111 Bukavu and 
:)-400,000 in Goma. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 25-1 
21i Ibid, 2·16 
218 Prunier, The RWc111da Crisis. 268 
~w This report was written by Robert Gersony, a UNHCR consultant. However, the 











30,000 Hutu civilians in revenge killings between July and September 1994. 
Numerous sources confirmed that the RPF killed a large number of people from the 
beginning of the genocide until early 1995. 220 These facts were known to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, but no RPF slispect had been indicted by 
2006. 221 
To recall, there have heen three different distinctions between Rwandaphones in 
Zaire: nationals, who had resided there since the late nineteenth century before the 
demarcation of the country; migrants, who crossed into the Congo forcefully or 
voluntarily; refugees, who were categorised in the post-independence periO((~22 The 
relationship between nationals, migrants (who outnumbered refugees before its influx) 
and refugees changed in 1994 as the number of refugees swelled. It hrought additional 
tension to the already existing political and social instahility between earlier Hutu and 
Tutsi immigrants, exilesn~ and native Zairean people. It literally put the Kivus "at the 
heart of a national and regional geopolitical struggle,,,22-l with "double tension in Kivu, 
both external and internal, both a tension between Kivu and the power in Rwanda and a 
tension within Kivu society.',225 
This report was embargoed by the UN "to give the new (Rwandan) government a chance 
to stabilise." See Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis. 360; Sadako Ogata, The Turbulent 
Decade: ConfrontJ'ng the Refugee Cl'lses of the 1990s, (New York, Norton, 2005), 
190-194; Prunier, Africa s World ~r, 16. 
~~() See Prunier, The Rwandil Czisis, :359, and AI, "Reports of Killings and i\bd uctions by 
the Rwandese Patriotic Army," (London, October 1994), 4, 
http://www.amnestv.org/en/librarvlinfo/AFR-17 10 lGIl9!H. accessed on 10 September 
2007 
2~ I Filip Reyntjens, "Post-I994 Politics in Rwanda: problematising 'liberation' and 
'democratization," Third World QlIader~v. Vol. 27. No.6, 2006, 1111 
~~~ Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, 2:36 
~2:! There were also some 80.000 Burundian refugees in eastern Zaire Slllce October 
199:3. 
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At this time, the Alliance Democratiques du Peuple (ADP), or the Democratic 
Alliance of People, was created by a Zairean Tutsi.226 The ADP aimed to defend itself 
from the HutllS and Rwandan refugees who were supported by the Zairean army.227 The 
ADP requested that the Zairean state recognise the Zairean nationality of the 
,'x 
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge. -- This regional tension hetween eastern Zaire and 
Rwanda, as well as the nationality question of the Rwandaphone community, 
contributed to the present day conllict. 
Summary 
Access to land is closely related to perceptions of national identity. As the solution to 
Rwanda's overpopulation in the 1920s and 1930s, the fluctuating laws regarding 
Rwandaphones' nationality and land ownership issues in eastern Zaire and Uganda 
greatly contributed to the Great Lakes region conflicts. 
For a long period of time, there have been many Rwandan and Burundian 
nationals, immigrants and refugees in eastern Congo, which is rich with mineral and 
agricultural resources. The Rwandaphoncs, who actively participated in the Mobutu 
regime, manipulated nationality law in order to gain access to lal1d. This caused 
resentment among the local population. With a change of nationality law years later, 
the Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge became stateless persons. External factors, such 
as the Cold War and the outbreak of the Rwandan civil war, also aggravated tensions 
between the Rwandaphone and local communities, and between Hutus and Tutsis in 
eastern Zaire. 
~~(; Jean-Fran<;ois Hugo, L<'1. Repllbiiqllf' democr[ltiqlle dll Congo: Une gllerre inCOnnllf', 













Rwandan refugees in Uganda contrihuted to Museveni's takeover of the regime. 
Despite their military and political conlrihution, they were denied the right to own land. 
This compelled the Rwandan refugees to return to Rwanda. which led to conflict 
hetween Tutsis (RPF) and Hutu Power with the Rwandan former government. 
The Arusha Peace Accord hetween the former Rwandan government and the RPF 
failed in 1993. As a result, genocide was launched in 1994 and spilled over into 
eastern Zaire. It exacerhated existing douhle tensions in Kivu (tension hetween Kivu 
and Rwanda, and tension within Kivu society) with the new arrival of Rwandan 












South Africa's Involvement in the Great Lakes Region 
Before and During the Rwandan Genocide 
"The COl/go region is no(oriolls/i)/' diliJ//o/1l/ (rading. glll/ rIIl/l/il/g, ('il'i/II'lir 1I1/d ('(I\'er( oll('ra(iol/s 
/Iv (he CIA. " 
--Article (Knight Ridder) in the Columhus Dispatch, I () March 11)1)1) 
This chapter examll1es the relationship between South Africa and the Great Lakes 
region before and during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The first section analyses 
South Africa's foreign policy before 1994 with an emphasis on security and economic 
expansIOn. The second section illustrates South Africa's interest in the mineral 
business in southern Africa and the Congo. The third section deals with South 
Africa's arms industry, which was against South Africa's foreign policy to protect and 
uphold human rights, and South Africa's response to the Rwandan genocide. The 
fourth section reviews South Africa's arms supply to Rwanda and eastern Zaire. 
4.1 South Africa's Foreign Policy Before 1994 
South Africa had an interest in expanding its political and economIc influence 
northward, in addition to expanding its territory. It also had an interest in playing a 
leadership role on the African continent before the National Party came to power in 











foreign policy within the Commonwealth and wider Western context. 229 In addition, 
South Africa had close military ties with the United Kingdom and Israel. 23o 
During the Apartheid E'ra 
South Africa became politically, economically and militarily isolated following its 
adoption of apartheid 111 1948. The country had to abandon its membership in the 
Commonwealth in 1961, while the UN Security Council (UNSC) called for punitive 
measures against South Africa in 1963. Several sanctions were imposed on South 
Africa in the mid-1980s, including an arms cmbargo. 231 In the midst of worldwide 
marginalisation, South Africa focused its foreign policy on the country's significance to 
h W Id ' d . . ')P t e estern wor 111 or er to ensure Its protection. - -
The way in which South Africa was globally situated between 1966 and 1981 
changed dramatically and was unfavourable to its interests under the apartheid 
),~ 
system. -. . In the late 1960s, some countries in southern Africa became independent 
under decolonised leadership and became highly antagonistic toward apartheid South 
Africa.23 -1 South Africa learned that the possession of "two credible and effective 
instruments, economic and military muscIe,',2Yi was critical to address its concerns 
b . I . 2,6 a out reglOna secunty .. 
~~!) Deon Geldenhuys, South Afi·im s Search for Secllri~v Since the Second World Wc71; 
SAnA. Occasional Paper, (Braamfontein, September 1978), 2 
~:!O Ibid, 1 
~:ll Ibid. 12 
~:l~ Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy a/Isolation: South AliicRn Foreign Policy lvIaking, 
(SAnA. Johannesburg, Macmillan, H)84), 211 
~:;:l Ibid. 38 
:!J4 Geldenhuys, South Afi·jca s Search lor Secllri~v Sjnce the Second World Wal: 12 
~:H') Deon Geldenhuys, "The Destabilisation Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk 
Foreign Policy Option for South j-\frica," Pohtikon. Vol. 9, No.2, December 1982.27 











In 1990, nine countries 111 southern Africa formed the Southern African 
Development Cooperation Conference (SADCC; this was transformed to the SADC in 
1992), which itself was built on the Frontline States (FLS) in the liberation struggIes.~37 
The SADC's objective was to reduce other African states' dependence on the South 
At' . I k \.. .. I h' h . )1X ncan economy anc transport networ' uy .I0ll1t y strengt enIng t elr own.-· 
Obviollsly, South Africa preferred to maintain the dccolonised states' economic 
dependence on the country, as well as their military vulnerability, so that they would not 
be able to pose a threat to South Africa's security.23'J This ignited resentment toward 
SOllth Africa among some SADC countries. 
The Post-Cold War alld Post-Apartheid Eras 
Following the release of political prisoner Nelson Mandela in 1990, South Africa's 
position once again changed dramatically, as it was recognised by the rest of the world. 
South Africa reestablished relations with the international community with its proactive 
I · . I . I d Id I" '-iO N .. I d f" ro e 111 reglona, contll1enta an wor po ItICS.- ew pnnclp es an new orelgn 
policy had to be formulated. Mandela's article in Foreign A.lTairs in November 1993 
stressed that Africa's concerns and interests would reflect in the foreign policy, since 
"South Africa cannot escape its African destiny.',2-i1 This was not only due to the 
support that the African National Congress (ANe) received from African countries 
:!:17 For more information on FLS, see ISS, "The Legacy of the Front-line States," 
Monograph NoA:3: Building Security in Southern Afi-ica, November 1999, 
www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monogl"aphs/N()c{:3fl·hcLcgacy.html. accessed on 30 July 2008 
:.!:l!{ SADe. www.sadc.int/about sadc/history.php, accessed on 6 January, 2008 
:.!:l!) Geldenhuys, "The Destabilisation Controversy," 27 
:.!IO Roger Pfister, "Studies on South Africa's Foreign Policy after Isolation," Walter 
Carlsnaes and Philip Nel (eds.>, In Full Flight: South Africc1l1 Foreign Policy aRe}" 
Apartheid. (Institute for Global Dialogue, Midrand, 2006), 2:3 











d · h l'b' I 242 unng t c 1 eratlon strugg e. Stabilising Africa was also important to improve the 
image of Africa and attract foreign investment and trade. 243 Mandela also underlined 
the importance of restructuring regional economic relations and promoting regional 
.. hAt" '.t.t prospenty 111 sout ern nca.-
Othcr forcign policy pillars to maintain pcacc includcd respect for human rights 
and international law, the promotion of democracy, the need for regional and 
international economic cooperation for its development, and the creation of 
internationally recognised non-violent mechanisms, such as effective arms control.245 
Furthermore, Mandela demonstrated South Africa's future commitment to peacemaking 
by promoting "the creation of regional structures for crisis prevention and management" 
and the "facilitation, mediation and arbitration of interstate contlicts.,,2.t(i Expectations 
grew that the new government would resolve Africa's conflicts with its economic and 
military might, in addition to international goodwil1.2.t7 
Although the ANC won the first democratic election in )994, President Mandela 
was obliged by the constitutional settlement to form a Government of National Unity 
(GNU) with other parties. 2.tx President Mandela ensured that the ANC represented the 
government at international forums. 249 Mbeki, the First Deputy President, was 
involved in foreign policy while F.W. de Klerk, the Second Deputy President, was 
:!12 Peter Kagwanja, "Power and Peace: South Africa and the Refurbishing of Africa's 
Multilateral Capacity for Peacemaking," JOllJ'nal of Contel11pOrc71~V A/hean Studjes. 
Vo1.24, No.2, May 2006, 161 
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I d h -d I- 7~il pus lC to t C SI e mes.--
In 1994, President Mandela' s stature hclped the country to join the Non-Aligned 
Movemcnt (NAM) in May, the OAU in June, and rejoin the Commonwealth in July 
1994. Upon joining the SADC in August, South Africa came into conflict ovcr trade 
with Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe was the political and economic powerhouse at that time 
and lost its status with President Mandela's political entry in the region. 2)1 Soon after, 
the two leading regional statesmen, President Mandela and Zimbabwean President 
b I I·, I' I 1~1 Robert Muga e, encounterec a po Itlca nva ry.---
4.2 South Africa's Interest in Minerals in Southern Africa and the Congo 
Since the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in the late I 860s, mining has been a major 
force for the South African economy.25_1 However, South Africa's keen interest in 
mining and its experience was not confined within its own national borders. 
Beginning in the 1990's, South Africa's mining interests also extended to the Congo, 
which possessed more than one-third of the world's known reserves of copper. 2)4 A 
supranational system of so-called "Cape-to-Katanga Miners," as described by Alvin 
Wolfe, included several hundred companies operating in southern Africa that were 
integrated through a series of relationships.255 Key companies that dominated the 
mineral exploitation of southern Africa included: Union Miniere du Haut-Katanga 
:!!iO Barber, "The New South Africa's Foreign Policy," 1080 
:!!i! Kagwanja, "Power and Peace," 165 
:!!i:! Ibid 
:!!i:! Christopher Saunders and Nicolas Southey, Historical DichoflaJ:v of'South Africa, 
(Landam, Maryland, Scarecrow Press, 2000), 175 
:!!il Walter Fitzgerald, ''The Impact of Western Civilization on Negro Africa," 
Geographical Review. Vol. 26, No.1, January, 19:36. 8:3 
:!!i" Alvin W. Wolfe, ''The African Mineral Industry: Evolution of a Supranational Level 











(UMHK), Tanganyika Concessions, British SOllth Africa Company, Anglo American 
Corporation of South Africa, De Beers Consolidated Mines, Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investment Company, Rhokana Corporation, Mufulira Copper Mines, and the 
Rh d . S I . T 1';(, o eSlan e ectlon rust.-· 
These corporations and states have long been closely interconnected. 257 [n 
particular, the role of the South African government in the Cape-to-Katanga Miners was 
exceptional: 25X minerals "made South Africa, minerals maintain[ed] South Africa, and 
South Africa r was] the axle on which [fit] the hub of the mineral industry of all southern 
Africa:,2.'i'J The South African government and mining industry, in collaboration with 
the United States and United Kingdom, established the base for a new industry, supplied 
the capital and guaranteed to purchase the product in order to receive reasonable 
f · 2()() pro It. [n addition to mining, South African transport industries also created deep 
. K . I' I' "61 roots 111 atanga sll1ce co ol1la tlInes.-
Among these Cape-to-Katanga Miners corporations, UMHK was the largest 
I11l11l11g company. The British and South African partners were involved in its 
b . h . h K P' 16" esta lis ment 111 t e atanga rovll1ce. - - It not only produced copper, cobalt, zinc 
and various precious metals whose assets were valued at US$ 430 million, but it also 
provided 50 percent of Zaire's state revenue and 70 percent of its foreign exchange.26J 
By the middle of the Second World War, UMHK had become the world's chief supplier 
~'i(; Alvin W. Wolfe, "The African Mineral Industry," 154 
~'ii Ibid, 156 
~'iH Ibid, 157 
~'i!J Ibid, 157 
~(;(J Ibid, 158 
~(il Prunier, Afhca s World ~11: 202 
~(;~ Nzongola- Ntalaja, The Congo ll'OJ]] Leopold to f{abjla, 32 
~f;:l Young, "Zaire: the Anatomy of a Failed State," 11-1. Half of the internationally 











of cobalt and uranium, and one of the ten largest suppliers of copper and tin. 2()4 Due to 
these mineral interests, the United Kingdom and South Africa supported the Belgians 
during the Katanga secession between 1960 and 1963. 2(,5 During the same time, UMHK 
also "bankrolled the Katanga rebellion ... in exchange for future mineral rights:,2!l1l In 
1966, President Mobutu transformed UMHK into a state-owned firm, Gccamines. 
Between 1967 and 1974, Zaire became one of Africa's main economic powers.267 
Despite Zaire's official condemnation of apartheid,26x trade relations continued 
between the two countries. One half of Zaire's mineral exports were shipped through 
Zimbabwe to Durban until the 1990s.26lJ De Beers' presence and privilege in the DRe 
was due to favourable relations between the apartheid and Mobutu regImes for an 
d d . d t" '70 exten e peno 0 tlme.-
4.3 South Africa's Arms Industry and its Response to the Genocide 
While the genocide raged in Rwanda, the first dcmocratic presidential election took 
place in South Africa in April 1994, followcd by President Mandela' s inauguration in 
May. President Mandela made the first statement about Rwanda on 13 June 1994 at 
the OAU meeting in Tunis. He said "Rwanda stands out as a stern and severe rebuke 
~G·I Raymond Dummett, "Africa's Strategic Minerals during the Second World War." 
Journal ofAfricfl11 Hl~.,tOl:Y; Vol. 26, no. L1, 1985,402'403 
~(j:; Nzongola -Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to /(ablJa ,10 1 
~(jG World Bank Research Report, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil Wc7r fwd 
Development PoJjC.l~ (Washington, World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003), 128 
~(ii Ingrid Samset, "Conflict of Interests or Interests in Conflict? Diamonds and the War 
in the DRC," Review of African PoliticC1l Economy, 93194 (2002). 463-480 
~(;I! However, Zaire often abstained on UN resolutions condemning the Pretoria 
government and did not support the move to expel South Africa from the organisation in 
1975. See F. Scott Bobb, Historical Diction<7(v of Congo. (Maryland. London. Scarecrow, 
Press, 1999).39:3 
:!(j!) Ibid, 39·1 
:!.o Claude Kabemba. "South Africa in the DRC: Renaissance or Nco-Imperialism?," 
Sakhela Buhlungu. John Daniel, Roger Southall and Jessica Lutchman (eds.>. Stide of 











to all of us for having failed to address these inter-related matters ... we are ready to 
contribute what we can to help end the genocide that is taking place in Rwanda and 
b . h 1-.1 I . ,,171 nng peace to t at troUlI e( sister country. - South Africa, however, had already 
contrihuted to setting the stage for the genocide since 1990. It had also prolonged the 
genocide through its arms supply and fueled post-genocide contlict, despite the arms 
embargo to Rwanda and Zaire. 
President Mandela acknowledged that South Africa's democratic transition was 
violent mainly due to the proliferation of small arms throughout southern Africa. 272 
But this same prohlem was transferred to the Great Lakes region following the RPF's 
invasion in 1990, when South Africa started selling arms to Rwanda and Zaire. The 
UN Panel of Experts pointed out that the proliferation of arms was part of the vicious 
cycle of the Congo contlict27l (see Chapter 6). A brief historical overview of the 
South African arms industry will be described to understand this significance. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, apartheid South Africa's defense manufacturing arm, 
Annscor, was forced to become self-sufficient by producing a great deal of local 
t' II . UN . ~74 armament 0 oWll1g sanctlons.- However, the arms industry drastically lost its 
demand at the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, the new government in 1994 
reduced the defense budget by 40 percent while reducing the arms procurement by 60 
~7~ Th" d h . d ~76 percent. - , IS lorce t e arms 111 ustry to restructure.- Some became global arms 
~71 ·"Statement of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, at the 
OAU Meeting of Heads of State and Government," 1\mis, 1:3-15 June 1994, 
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/199·I/sp9·IO(j1:3.html. accessed on 13 February, 
2007 
~7~ Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy," 89 
~'i;l UN Panel of Experts, 2:3 October, 2003 (S/200311027) 
~71 Roger Southall, "Introduction: South Africa, an African peacemaker?," Southall (ed'>, 
South Afh'ca 50 Roles in Conflict Resolution and PeclCemaking in Akica: Conference 
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sellers, which were facilitated by the posture of the market economy in the post-Cold 
W . d 777 ar peno .- This was when the genocide in Rwanda took place, and when South 
Africa was involved in an arms supply to Rwanda and Zairc. In other words, South 
Africa found suitable clients to keep its arms industry thriving. 
This anns proliferation did not coincide with the Mandela governmcnt's policy on 
human rights. Two weeks after his inauguration, President Mandela stated that he saw 
"nothing wrong" with arms sales "for the purpose of defending the sovereignty and the 
integrity of a country:,27S 
Following criticism of the arms sale, the government established the National 
Conventional Armaments Control Committee (NCACC) in 199527() and acceded to the 
Convention on Inhumane Weapons of 1995. 2S() The objective of the NCACC was to 
"ensure transparency in the procurement process and compliance with official policy 
d h 'bl" d' . I I d "ox I an t e country s 0 Igatlons un er mternatlOna aw an agreements.- Under the 
guidelines on arms exports, the NCACC sought to avoid: 
• contributing to the escalation of contlicts and to regional instabil ity by 
negatively influencing the balance of power; 
Southall (ed'), South Afhca s Roles in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking in Africa: 
Conference Proceedings. 256 
~7r; Ibid 
~77 Ibid 
~7H James Hamill, "South Africa's Regional Security Dilemmas," Jim Broderick, Gary 
Burford and Gordon Freer (eds.), South Africa s Foreign Policy: Dilemmas of a New 
Democrac.~~ (Hampshire, Palgrave, 2001),;3.1 
~'j!) HRW, "South Africa. A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights," Vol. 
12, No.5 (A) October 2000 www.hrw.ol'g/rcpol'ts/1995/Rwancla l.htll1#P21O·18609, 
accessed on 15 February 2007 
~H() Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Role as International Norm Entrepreneur," /11 FilII 
Flight: South Afhca:.,. Foreign Policy <lfter Apartheid. (Institute for Global Dialogue, 
Midrand, South Africa, 2006), 103 











• arming oppressive regimes; 
• contributing to countries' illegitimate defense and security needs; 
• endangering peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities2R2 
The NCACe had, nonetheless, violated these principles by exporting arms to 
war-torn countries, including Rwanda and Zaire. Rather than becoming a 
""responsible" arms producer, South Africa allowed its arms exports to fuel conflicts, 
even though the arms industry simultaneously developed its capacity to support 
peacebuilding efforts, notably through mine c1earance. 2x3 This act of arms sales 
seemed to be driven by the marketisation of the arms industry, or in other words, war 
profit. The Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives' report also claimed that the 
government was more concerned with maintaining employment in the arms industry 
than its commitment to human rights principles. 2x.. Some also argued that President 
Mandela's intention to promote democracy and human rights was hugely ambitious and 
could undermine South Africa's economic interests. 2x5 
4.4 South Africa's Supply of Arms to Rwanda and Eastern Zaire 
It is worthwhile to note that Rwanda, one of the poorest countries in the world, became 
the third largest importer of weapons in Africa. 2x6 FAR purchased arms and 
:!8:! For detail, see Naidu, "The South African Arms Industry," 257 
:!8:l Naidu, "The South African Arms Industry," 260 
:!1l1 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiatives, "Over a Barrel: Light Weapons and 
Human Rights in the Commonwealth," 1999, H)2-195, 
www.humallrightsillitiative.org/publications/default.htm, accessed on 1::3 November 
2006 
:!MG Pfister, "Studies on South Africa's Foreign Policy after Isolation," 28 











ammunition worth US$5.9 million from France, South Africa and Egypt,2X7 as Egypt 
had arranged foreign contracts with France in 1990.28x This already took place in the 
period after Mandela's liberation when demand by the South African arms industry 
started to decrease domestically. At the time, there was no international arms embargo 
on Rwanda, as the UNSC had imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda only on 17 May 
1994--40 days after the genocide began. 2XlJ The three formal ceasefire agreements 
signed between 1991 and 1992 prohibited the infiltration of war material,2')() but all had 
been violated by one signatory or the other. 
Rwanda was attracted to South Africa's arms manufacturing and standardised its 
infantry forces with South African arms by late 1993. 291 Eventually, South African 
. b h I' R d "P manufacturers ecame t e top arms supp lers to wan a. - - Despite the arms embargo 
on Rwanda, arms purchases from South Africa continued. These purchases were made 
despite UNSC Resolution 558 of December 1984, which prohibited arms imports from 
h f · d h 'd "H Sout A rIca ue to apart el . - . 
South Africa continued its arms supply to Zaire, despite the fact that the South 
African armaments industry was forbidden to supply lethal weapons beginning in 
1993.294 According to Human Rights Watch, Willem Ehlers, the private secretary of 
:!H7 Prunier, The Rwcwdan Crisis, 113 
:!HH Stephen D. Goose and Franc Smyth, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda," Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 73, No.5, September/October 1994, 89-90. See also Augusta Muchai, "Arms 
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War, (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002),190 
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former president PW Botha, was involved in arms sales to Rwanda's Hutu forces in 
June 1994. They were transported from Seyc helles to eastern Zaire. 29'i Between 
February and March 1995, "several planeloads of arms were flown directly from South 
Africa to an airstrip in the Kivu region.',2% South Africa, China and France allegedly 
. d I R did' . Z' "17 contll1ue to supp y wan an so lers 111 atre.- On 9 June 1995, the UNSC added 
another embargo on arms transferred to Zaire, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi if the 
. '9K arms were to transfer through Rwanda.-
The UN Commission's second report in March 1996 criticised the South African 
government for not having provided information on Ehlers and other apparent violations 
of the embargo, which implicated South Africa. 2')') Furthermore, while South Africa's 
arms industry was brought under increasing government control, "individuals involved 
in the arms trade during the apartheid era were still active in an individual capacity or in 
. . d ,,30() prIvate 111 ustry. 
Summary 
South Africa had a strong desire to be an economic and military powerhouse in Africa. 
South Africa's isolation from the world during the apartheid era compelled the country 
to strengthen its mining and defense industries for its own security. 
~!):; Stefaans Brummer, "How Ehlers sold arms to the Hutus," Mail & Guardian, 
November 15'21 1996,6 
~!)(j HRW, "Rwanda/Zaire." The airstrip is suspected to be in Goma. which has the only 
international airport in eastern Zaire. 
~!l7 Stedman, "Conflict and Conciliation in Sub-Saharan Africa," 250 
~!)H AI. "Democratic Republic of Congo: Arming the east," 5 July 2005. 21, 
http://www.amnestv.org/en/librarv/info/AFR62/00G/2005, accessed on 8 September 2007 












South Africa's long history with the mineral business, an important pillar of its 
foreign policy, was found in the whole of southern Africa, particularly in the cohalt-helt 
Congo since the 1900s. South African government and South African mmmg 
corporation also supported Katanga secession in exchange of mineral rights. 
In the late 1960s, some countries in southern Africa that gained independence 
became highly antagonistic toward apartheid South Africa. The SADC aimed to 
reduce decolonised African states' dependence on the South African economy. 
However, South Africa preferred to maintain the decolonised states' economic and 
military dependence on South Africa for its own security. This hred resentment 
toward South Africa among SADC countries, which continues today. 
South African foreign policy experienced many changes in the post-Cold War and 
post-apartheid eras. South Africa reestablished its relationship with the international 
world. As soon as South Africa joined the SADC, Presidents Mandela and Mugabe, 
the two leading regional statesmen, encountered a political rivalry. 
South Africa sustained its arms industry by expanding its business opportunities 
outside the country, notably to war countries, including Rwanda and Zaire. SOllth 
African manufacturers became the top arms suppliers to the Habyarimana regime and 
FAR. This arms sale took place in spite of South Africa's human rights principles, an 
arms embargo against these countries, and the establishment of the NCACe. South 
Africa therefore became a significant contributor to the instigation and continuation of 












South Africa's Debut as a Peacemaker after the First Congo 
War in 1996 
"The /Jig hole ill 1!1l' I/Iiddle lifAfi"ica h(/s heellfillcd lip {flld 1I0W 1\'(' ('(/11 Imild /"IJ{fds/i"()J1I C(/st 10 \\'esl" 
We 11"([111 {I COIIIIIIOII I/Iarkel ji"ol/l ('asllli west (/I/{I/i"ol/l SOllfh l\.fi"ica Iii Ihe Wi'sl" .. 
--Ugandan PresiLient Yoweri Museyeni sreaking aftcr the downfall of Moolltll Sese Scko of Zaire 
This chapter analyses South Africa's initiatives as a peacemaker following the First 
Congo War from October 1996 to May 1997. The first section focuses on the 
background of the rebellion's invasion in eastern Zaire. The second section examines 
South Africa's peacemaking initiatives, followed by the failure of these initiatives in the 
third section. The fourth section analyses South Africa's behaviour and questions the 
country's neutrality based on three acts: South Africa's close relationship with the 
rebellion, its arms sales to Rwanda, and its amoral approach toward the rebellion and 
Rwanda as reflected by its gross human rights violations. The fifth section illustrates 
South Africa's economic interests behind its peacemaking efforts. 
5.1 Rebellion's Invasion in Eastern Zaire 
By early 1995, the conflict in the Kivus rekindled between ex-FAR, their allies of the 
F A f Z · h M' M "1()! d h Z" T' l' 1()' orces rmy 0 alre, t e aJ al" an t e alrean utSI popu atlon. - In May 
1995, new legislation was passed that forbade Tutsis from acquiring homes and land in 
Zaire. J03 The Army Chief of Staff then announced in December 1995 that the local 
:lOl They are the local militias in eastern Zaire. 
:!O:.! UNHCR, The State of the Worlds Refilgees. 258 











ethnic group had the right to expel Tutsis from the land.H)-t In September 1996, the 
Commission on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Zairean parliament 
concluded that Rwanda had forged an alliance to create a Tutsiland that would cover the 
. . I d' f' U I I Z' ~()., two countrIes, mc u mg parts 0 ganl a anc eastern Lure."" Thus, the Commission 
recommended the unconditional expulsion of all Rwandaphones from Zaire. lO() 
On X October 1996, the governor of South Kivu warned the Banyamulenge to 
f' I' "~()7 leave in seven days or ace expu sIan. The Head of the Zairean armed forces 
declared war on them, whom he claimed were backed by Rwanda, Uganda and 
Burundi,30X The constant harassment of the Banyamulenge compelled them to join the 
Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour Ie Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL), or the 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation in Congo-Zaire, the rebellion 
established in October 1996 in South Kivu. The AFDL was supported by the 
Rwandan and Ugandan governments as the Banyamulenge's presence provided Rwanda 
"the excuse it needed to intervene in Congolese affairs with the pretext of trying to 
prevent another genocide."J09 The AFDL was headed by Laurent-Desire Kabila, a 
Lumumbisr~ 10 and Congolese revolutionary leader since the mid-1960s, so that the 
Id b .. f' . hb' . ~ II movement wou not e seen as an mvaslOn rom nelg oUrIng countrIes: 
The motives of the war were supposedly to defend Tutsis who were fighting for 
:lOl Breytenbach et aI, "Conflicts in the Congo" 
:lO;; Tatiana Carayannis and Herbert Weiss, "The Democratic Republic of Congo, 
1996-2002," Jane Boulden (ed.), Dealing with Conflict in AIi-iea, (New York, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 200:3), 259 
:WG Ibid 
:;0, Adelman, ''The Use and Abuse of Refugees in Zaire," 120 
:HlH Ibid 
:lO!J Nzongola -Ntalaja, ''The Politics of Citizenship in the DRC," 6 
:llO Lumllmbist is a supporter of Patrice Lumllmba in the civil war that took place 
during Lumumba's prime ministry of the Republic of the Congo. 
:111 Kevin Dunn, "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa: Lessons of the Father, Passed down to 











their nationality,312 overthrow the 32-year Mohutu regime, and fight against the 
ex-FARIInterahamwe. 31' In addition to Rwanda and Uganda, other neighhouring 
countries including Angola, Burundi, and to some extent Tanzania, Zamhia, the 
Repuhlic or Congo, Eritrea, Sudan and Zimhabwe were also motivated to take part in 
overthrowing President Mohutu, who destahilised their own countries and the region. 31 .J 
The AFDL was also diplomatically supported by the United States?l) 
Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame declared in 1995 that "we should prepare 
ourselves for any kinds of events, given the fact that there is the presence of these guys 
outside the country, who [have 1 intention to destablise Rwanda ... we have to study their 
political voice to solve the problem and at the same time, continue to prepare ourselves 
'j' 'j Th" h d . ,,116 ml Han y. IS IS W at we are OIng now .. However, it became apparent at a later 
stage that there was an economic interest hehind this rehellion (see Chapter 4.5). 
Rwanda also aspired to annex a portion of the Kivus. m 
The AFDL first attacked the Burundian refugee camps in South Kivu, which was 
infiltrated by Hutu guerrillas.·1IX A similar act ensued northward in the camps of 
Rwandan refugees, who were forced either to move to the interior of Zaire or return 
:ll:! Hussein Solomon, "From Zaire to the ORe: Towards post-Mobutism," Africa Insight. 
Vol. 27, no.2, 1997 
1I:3 Ibid; Dunn, "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa," 56 
:111 Saidi Koko, "The 'One-Plus-Four' Formula and Transition in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, AIi-iean Security Review. VoLl6, No.1, ISS, 2007, 36; see also Annex 
:3 for interview with a Congolese government official. According to Prunier, President 
Museveni called a meeting in November 1994 to discuss the idea of overthrowing 
President Mobutu. In early 1995, former Tanzanian President Nyerere relaunched the 
idea but did not ask South Africa to join as he assumed its relationship with Zimbabwe 
and Angola might be difficult. Prunier, Africa s World Wc71: 68 
Wi Colette Braeckman, "Congo: a War without Victors," Le AlIonde Diplomatique. April 
:WOl. In total. 12 countries were involved in the First Congo War. 
:ll(i Hugo, La Republique democratique du Congo, 47-·18 
117 Weiss and Carayannis, "Reconstructing the Congo," 105-142. Hugo also argues 
that an independent "Republic of Volcano" was to be created with this annex. Hugo, L7 
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home to Rwanda. 3 ]'! AFDL and Rwandan allies continued launching a seven-month 
'1' . I PO ml Itary campaIgn across t le country. - Kinshasa eventually fell to the AFDL in May 
1997. who assumed control over the government from President Mohutu. 
During the AFDL's advance, the Mohutu regime tried to compromise with the 
Tutsis by recognising the right of nationality for all people within its horders. heginning 
in Decemher 1996.321 The Banyamulenge. however, already had high expectations for 
Kahila. 322 Kahila, having appointed the commander of the Rwandese army as the 
commander of the Congolese National Army, allowed the Rwandese army to intervene 
directly in the affairs of the Congolese state. 32.1 
5.2 South Africa's Debut to Initiate Peacemaking Efforts 
South Africa launched a "peace offensive" in Africa after undertaking the SADC's 
chairmanship role in 1996.32-+ Peacemaking had hecome Pretoria's favourite phrase to 
I . I fl' PS app y to reglona con IctS.--· South Africa's peacemaking efforts started with Deputy 
President Mbeki' s visit to President Mohutu in France, which was followed hy a 
telephonic discussion hetween Presidents Mandela and Mohutu on 14 November 
1996.-'26 
Just before South Africa launched peacemaking initiatives, the SADC's Summit 
introduced the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security (the Organ) in September 1996 
:IW UNHCR, The 8tl1te of the Worlds Refugees, 26:3-264 
;1:!O Ibid, 268 
1:!1 Breytenbach et at. "Conflicts in the Congo" 
;l:!:.! Ibid 
l:.!;l Mamdani, When Victims Become KiJJers. 259 
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'h P 'd M b ' I' \17 wIt resl ent uga e as Its claIr. ,- Although the Organ's objective was to 
strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security, its functional 
system brought confusion and tension in the years that followed. 12K The decision that 
the Organ would function at the SADC's summit, ministerial and technical levels 
independently of other SADC structures meant that two separate forums for heads of 
state had been created to address conflicts in the region,32lJ President Mandela, who 
was irritated by President Mugabe's rival authority, threatened to withdraw from the 
SADC in 1997 if the Organ was not made accountable to the Summit.,no This incident, 
as well as South Africa's launch of bilateral negotiations with President Mobutu, 
contributed to dissent within the SADC. B1 
Apart from this visit to France, South Africa tried to join three Great Lakes 
summits between November 1996 and January 1997, Two of the summits took place 
in Nairobi and were attended by neighbouring countries and the OAU. The summits 
aimed to propose a neutral peace force to protect millions of refugees"m Despite its 
attempt to participate, South Africa's envoy was excluded at one of the meetings.-H ] 
Nevertheless, starting in early 1997, South Africa displayed a greater commitment 
to negotiations, The South African government and its business community hosted 
numerous political delegations from the region. In January 1997, a meeting on the 
;l~7 For more detail on the Organ, see Mark Malan and Jakkie Cilliers. SADe Organ on 
Politjcs. Defence and Securi~y: Future Development. ISS, Occasional Paper No. 19, 
March 1997 
;l~1l Nathan, "SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992'2003," Journal of 
Southern Afhcan Studies. Vol. 32, No.:3, September 2006, 609 
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;l;ll Chris Alden and Garth Ie Pere, "South Africa, SADC and the Great Lakes: the 
Challenge of Conflict," Alden and Ie Pere (edsJ, South Afhca:., Post-ApartiJeid Foreign 
Policy: !roJ]] Reconcllic7tion to Revival?, (Oxford, Oxford University Press of the 
International Institute for Strategitic Studies, 2003), 39 












Great Lakes region crisis was held in Pretoria with the Foreign Ministers of Cameroon, 
Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Zaire and Zimbabwe:j3.j The meeting reaffirmed its 
full suppor1 for the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zaire and welcomed 
Zaire's assurance to grant full citizenship rights to all of its nationals. 3)) In February 
1997, President Mandela invited Kabila to South Africa, where Kabila said that direct 
.. . h h Id b 'bl n6 negotiations wit t e government cou soon e POSSI e." Deputy President 
Mbeki's visit to Kinshasa in March 1997 led to President Mobutu's proposal for 
negotiation with the AFDL. .'1.17 Five days later, South Africa confirmed the opposing 
Zairean parties' willingness to again facilitate the proposed negotiations.33x In April 
1997, Kabila and President Mobutu finally accepted South Africa's mediation.W ) 
5.3 The Failure of South Africa's Peacemaking Attempts 
Despite several talks and visits, South Africa's efforts were not successful. Pretoria's 
limited leverage revealed itself during President Mandela's mediation on 4 May 1997, 
which took place on the South African warship, Olltelliqu((, off international waters 
'd P' N' ,40 outs I e OInte OIre: On 17 May, just two weeks after South Africa's oceanic 
diplomatic efforts, President Mobutu relinquished his power. After Kabila declared 
himself to be the head of state, the country was renamed the ORe. 
:I:H SAG I. "Press Release on the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Cameroon, the 
Congo, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe on the Current Crisis in the Great 
Lakes Region, 27-28 January 1997" 
:1:1;; Ibid 
:!:!(i Chris McGeal. "Zaire rebels hint at Peace," lVhHi & Guardian. February 28-March 6 
1997, 11 
:1:17 Chris McGeal, "Rebels set to reject Mobutu ploy," lV/ail & Guardian. March 27-April 
3 1997, 12 
1:18 DFA, "Regarding the announcements by the opposing parties in eastern Zaire on the 
Commencement of Negotiations to Bring an End to the conflict," 28 March 1997, 
www.info.gov.za/speeches/1997/0GO:314797.htm. accessed on 2 February, 2007 
:1:1D Landsberg, "South Africa," 125 











South Africa's mediation failure stemmed from the poor timing of its intervention. 
South Africa started its peacemaking mission in November 1996, a few weeks after the 
AFDL's invasion, which according to the South African government "contributed to 
contlict resolution in eastern Zaire.
ql 
However, while all the meetings such as the 
Great Lakes region summit and bilateral talks with stakeholders were taking place, the 
AFDL's military campaign spread rapidly from eastern Zaire to Kinshasa. The speed 
at which the rebellion expanded destroyed the opportunity for a lengthy peacemaking 
process. 
By the time President Mandela tried to convince Kabila in May 1997 to acquiesce 
to a President Mobutu-Ied transitional authority,3--12 it was obvious that Kabila would 
assume control over the regime. The timing of South Africa's intervention was 
therefore neither appropriate nor logical, as the power relations between the two actors 
were unequal and the issues that needed mediation were unclear. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, it is unlikely that parties will negotiate a compromise when one side is on the 
verge of victory and the other on the edge of defeat. 
The delayed preventive tactics made both parties lose their motivation to engage 
in dialogue. Due to his health, President Mobutu was ready to give away power to the 
Council of the Republic Transitional Parliament, which Kabila rejected . ."I--I3 On the 
other hand, Kabila apparently accepted an invitation to attend the talks merely because 
of President Mandela's international stature. Pushing belligerents towards an 
agreement against the tide of political will inevitably led to negative results: Kabila did 
:lll SAG!, "Press Release by the Office of the Executive Deputy President TM Mbeki" 
:ll~ Kagwanja, "Power and Peace," 16:3 
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0 not ta 'e resl ent an e as' assertive 0 ea ers 11p senous y an was unyle lmg 111 
his insistence to become the Congo's president. ol.tS 
Mahmood Mamdani also argues that South Africa failed at its mediation efforts 
due to the following reasons: 
"South Africa emerging from apartheid is not the same as Congo emerging from Mohutuism. 
At least two political difTcrences arc worth noting. The South African transition was a 
compromise hetween forces for and against apartheid: the Congolese transition is marked hy 
military victory of the anti-Mohutu forces. Whereas the South African transition was worked 
out mainly through an internal engagement, with foreign inlluence limited to an indirect role, 
the transition in Congo was heing worked out through a much more direct regional involvement. 
These diflerences explain why South African diplomacy failed to achieve its intended 
objectives over the past few weeks. South African diplomats puhlicly sought a transitional 
authority led hy forces other than Laurent Kahila and the Alliance, and tried to convince Kahila 
to acquiesce in this. The initiative asked Alliance forces to turn from the hrink of victory and 
sign a compromise! Was this hreathtakingly naOlve hecause South African diplomats read the 
Zaire situation through South African lensesT'.j(, 
During the peacemaking process, South Africa did not consider the issue of 
extensive regionalised dynamics of the Great Lakes conflict (See Chapter 6). South 
Africa simply exported its own mediation skills outside the country without analysing 
the local dynamics. South Africa needed to acknowledge the significant differences 
:lll Millers, "South Africa's Foreign Policy," 2 
:lol:'j Landsberg, "South Africa," 126 
:lHi Mahmood Mamdani, "Na'ive SA must not adopt mISSIOnary position," !vIm] & 











between South Africa and the Great Lakes region in regard to their potential for conflict 
resolution; unlike the DRC, peacemaking in post-apartheid South Africa was based on 
the willingness of all parties in the conflict, as well as the international community's 
exceptional attention and involvement during the country's transition. South Africa, 
however, did not acknowledge the fact that its model of peaccmaking could not 
nccessarily be applied to the Great Lakes region.",47 South Africa also maintained a 
superior tone in its mediation in Zaire and could have been seen as a hully.34K President 
Kabila consequently began to accuse South Africa of generally promoting its 
d .. I' h G L k l4'J emocratlsatlon stye 111 t e reat a ·cs. 
5.4 South Africa's Behaviour: Questioning its Neutrality and Morality 
South Africa's neutrality while it played its peacemaking role has been questioned. 
South Africa had a serious moral problem since it had a close political partnership with 
Rwanda and the AFDL throughout the regime-making process and arms sales; South 
Africa also overlooked the AFDL and Rwanda's gross human rights violations in 
eastern Zaire when it played the role of the peacemaker. 
South Africa's Ties with the AFDL 
Deputy President Mbeki had prior knowledge of Zaire's political transformation in early 
1997. The following speech, which he made in the United States on 19-22 April 1997 
to address the Corporate Council on Africa's Attracting Capital to Africa summit on the 
"New Birth of Zaire," clearly illustrates this fact: 
:Iii Mills, "SA Foreign Policy and Africa: Where to at the Millennium?," 6 
! 18 Dlamini, "Assessing South Africa's Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution," 6:3 











"We are privileged to he witness to a gripping and epoch-making contest which assumes many 
forms and involves all layers among the people of Zaire, to give a new hirth to their country. 
As Africans we have a vision. a hope. a prayer ahout what will cOllle in the end. We see a 
new Zaire. perhaps with a new name. a Zaire which shall he delllocratic. peaceful. prosperous. 
a defender of hUlllan rights. and exemplar of what the new Africa should he. occupying the 
geographic space that it does at the heart of our Arrica . 
... . And yet. as Africans. we would like to helieve that we know thaI. at the end. what all of us 
sec. thanks to the wisdom of the people of Zaire themselves. is not the heart or darkness. hut 
the light or a new African star. Once more out or Africa. out of these towns which have 
joined the voeahulary of places that are part of our eommon knowledge- Goma, Kisangani. 
Luhumhashi and Kinshasa- a new miracle slouches towards it hirth.,,\)iJ 
This speech, which was made before President Mandela's oceanic diplomacy and 
the AFDL's arrival in Kinshasa, demonstrates the AFDL's connection with South 
Africa. This explains two facts: first, Deputy President Mbeki was aware that Zaire 
would be newly named, and second, he and some cabinet ministers were able to visit 
Zaire on the day following Kabila's regime takeover on 17 May 1997 to discuss the 
d . f· .,. h K b·l ,';1 .. emocratlc trans ormatIon process wIt a I a ... South Africa was deeply 
involved in Zaire's new regime-making process alongside other influential countries 
including the United States. It had provided extensive military support to the 
Rwandan military since 1995 . .152 By September 1996, one month before the AFDL's 
IGO Thabo Mbeki, Afhca: The Tjme 1ms Come, (Johannesburg, Mafube, 1998),200-201 
IGJ SAGI, "Statement on Visit to Zaire" 











invasion in Zaire, the UN lifted its arms embargo on Rwanda as a result of pressure by 
the United States?53 
South Africall Arms Sales to Rwanda 
Apart from the United States, South Africa also assisted Rwanda with arms sales. 
Deputy President Mbeki stated in July 1997 that South Africa would review its 1996 
policy to suspend weapons sales to Rwanda following the raid by Rwanda's troops in 
Zaire, as he feared that South African arms might be used by Rwandan forces to commit 
abuses. I).. This 1996 policy also helped to restore the country's image of neutrality. 
However, despite continued contlict in Zaire, Deputy President Mbeki authorised the 
transfer of 87 million rand worth of light arms and armored personnel carriers soon 
after.')) 
The government justified the sale by declaring that" I) a void would have been 
more dangerous, 2) Rwanda was a legitimate and internationally recognised government, 
and 3) that South Africa's ultimate goal in the Great Lakes region was complete 
demilitarisation.,,356 Deputy President Mbeki was "very concerned" with the Rwandan 
government's capacity to protect itself against attacks by the returning Rwandan Hutu 
f t' Z' Vi7 re ugees rom mre.· . According to him, these refugees had resumed their fight 
against Kagame' s government. 35X 
:lii:1 Renton et ai, The Congo: Plunder and Resistance, 179 
:Iiil "Mobutu fell to US-trained troops," lI1ail & Guardian, July 18-2:1, 1997, 14; HRW, "A 
Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights," October 2000, 
www.hrw.org/l'eports/2000/safrica, accessed on 3 September, 2006 
:liiii Stefaans Brummer, "SA takes back seat in Zaire crisis," Alail & Guardi,m. November 
9-1·t, 1996,6 
:lG(; HRW, "A Question of Principle: Arms Trade and Human Rights" 












SOllth Africa's Response to AF DL and Rwanda's Human Rights Violations 
In June 1998. the UN Secretary General concluded that the RPA committed huge-scale 
war crimes and crimes against humanity against tens of thousands of Rwandan and 
Burundian Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians from late 1996 to May 1997. '5,) The 
report reads: "the systematic massacre of those remaining in Zaire was an abhorrent 
crime against humanity, but the underlying rationale for the decision is material to 
whether these killings constituted genocide, that is. a decision to eliminate. in part, the 
H h 
. ,. .160 
utu et I11C group. One of the Rwandan refugee survivors, Marie Beatrice 
Umutesi, also confirmed this massacre in Surviving the Slaughter: the Ordeal (~l (/ 
R I R t· . z· ,61 won{ {Ill e. ugee III (If re.-
Moreover, "two of the main players 1J1 the 1996 war, Laurent Kabila and Paul 
Kagame, were implicated in war crimes and possibly genocide by a UN investigating 
team in 1998.,,:162 Kabila, who had a Swahili or Kinyarwandan-speaking Tutsi 
entourage, evidently received orders from Kigali, as the RPA was far more involved in 
the massacres than the AFDL.-'6:1 The United States chose to publicly downplay the 
situation, having reportedly instructed Kabila not to cooperate with the UN 
:\,,!) Filip Reyntjens, "Post· 1994 Politics in Rwanda," 1111 
HiO UNSC, "Report of the Secretary-General's Investigative Team charged with 
investigating serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo," SI1998/581, 29 June 1998, Chapter 96. However, the 
Permanent Representative of the DRC rejected that the AFDL had pursued an official 
policy of genocide against the Rwandan Hutus. See UN Press Briefing, "Press 
Conference by Permanent Representative of DRC," 1 July 1998 
:l(;! Published by University of Wisconsin Press, 2004, 196-232 
:H;:! Filip Reyntjens, "Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, From Kabila to 
Kabila," Afi-ic;w Affairs (2001),100, 317; UNSC, "Report of the Secretary-General's 
Investigative Team" 
:Hi:l Lemarchand. "The Crisis in the Great Lakes," 339. Kagame also told the 
Wc7shington Post not only that RPA had participated in the civil war against the Zairean 
army, the ex-FARlIntemhamwe, and local population alliance, but also that his army 
had done most of the fighting. See John Pomfret, "Rwandans led revolt in Congo," 











· .. I \h.J Investigations over t le massacres.' 
Although human rights were the central pillar of President Mandela's foreign 
policy, South Africa as a peacemaker decided not to criticise Kabila and Rwanda on 
their gross human rights violations. On the contrary, Deputy President Mbeki 
strengthened existing bilateral relations with Rwanda by inviting Vice President 
Kagame to South Africa in September 1997 to "bring about lasting peace and stability 
in the region.,,·~65 This type of South African peacemaking involved South Africa 
acting superficially as a communicator, but in effect, it was a negative manipulator 
behind the scenes. 
South Africa's attitude during peace negotiations stands in stark contrast to 
President Mandela's aggressive threats toward Nigeria, which executed nll1e Ogoni 
minority-rights activists in November 1995. President Mandela campaigned for 
Nigeria's expulsion from the Commonwealth and called on Western states to hoycott 
Nigerian oil. No states responded to President Mandela's invitation due to Nigeria's 
elevated status as a continental leader and major contributor to the OAU. \(,(, 
Eventually, African states accused President Mandela of breaking African unity.,h7 
Following this experience, President Mandela might have hesitated to accllse a 
new generation of African leaders, including those in Rwanda and Uganda, who were 
supported by the United States. Besides that, due to the international community and 
the OAU's failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda in 199-1-, they presumahly became 
more tolerant of Rwanda's interventions in eastern Zaire given the pretext of its 
;lGl Kevin Dunn, "A Survival Guide to Kinshasa," 58-59 
;l(iS SAG!. "Statement on the Visit of Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame to South 
Africa: 9-11 July 1997" 













5.5 South Africa's Economic Interests 
It became apparent that the Great Lakes region was crucial to South Africa, which was 
one of the few countries that demonstrated a strong commitment to resolve regional 
Issues. The South African task team, led hy then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs 
(DMFA) Aziz Pahad, made the following statement on 26 June 1997 on a visit to the 
DRC, one month after Kabila look over the regime: 'The South African government 
regards the DRC as key in Central Africa, the stahility of which is important, not only 
for the region, hut for our entire continent."J6~ What was South Africa's interest in the 
region? 
Behind the peace process, South Africa had a clear economic ambition to 
proactively pursue mining deals in the DRC, as it had since the 1900s. This was part 
of the reason why South Africa insisted that it be included as a memher of the SADC in 
September 1997. 369 South Africa claimed that it would have better control over 
President Kabila inside the SADC for its central foreign policy pillars, reconstruction 
and democracy.J70 However, this justification was not acceptable because the DRCs 
problem did not only lie internally, but also with Rwanda (see Chapter 6). Rwanda 
should therefore have been included as a member of the SADC if South Africa had been 
highly committed to the peace process in the region. 
There was also another argument that Zimbabwe approached the DRC to join the 
SADC, as it wanted to use the SADC as an ally in order to help halance South Africa's 
;IGH SAGI, Statement on visit by South African Task Team to the DRC, 26 June 1997" 
;IG9 Landsberg, "The Impossible Neutrality," 173; Alden and Ie Pere, "South Africa, 
SADC and the Great Lakes," 11-1 











. I d' 371 reglOna omInancc. Zimbabwe was keen to sign mining contracts and supply the 
DRC with basic commodities. '72 In addition, there was a political incentive to use the 
DRC for revenge on Zimbabwe's rival, South Africa, in order to snatch the 
M b· k ,n ozam Ique mar ·ct.· . 
As Deputy President Mbeki madc the "new birth of Zaire" spcech in the United 
States toward the end of April 1997, he urged American and South African companies 
not to make deals with the AFDL, but instead to await the creation of a transitional 
h 
. ,74 
aut onty.· He feared "the scramble by outside mining interests could trigger 
dormant secessionist tcndencies,,,n5 like those that occurred in Katanga in 1960. 
Much of Zaire's vast mineral wcalth was concentrated in the Katanga Province under 
AFDL's control. 
In reality, as the AFDL advanced towards Kinshasa from the east, Kabila signed 
. h b j" . . '76 contracts wIt anum er 0 lorelgn compal11es: As reported, "Numerous accounts 
and documents suggest that by 1997 a first wave of new businessmen speaking only 
English, Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili had commenced operations in eastern DRC:,·m 
On 16 April, the AFDL made a few million dollar deals with the American Mineral 
Field·m; in Katanga, which also receivcd a monopoly over the diamond-buying counters 
of Kisangani to finance the war. 37lJ By the time Kabila arrived in Kinshasa, he 
;371 Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcements. 136-1:37 
;17:! Braeckman, "Congo: a War without Victors" 
.17;1 Ibid" 
;171 Stefaans Brummer, "Business at war for Zaire's wealth," Afail & Guardian, April 
25-May 1, 1997, 11 
;17" Ibid 
Ii!; UN Panel Report, 12 April 2001 (S/20011357), paragraph 26 
;li7 Ibid 
;I7H US-Canadian Corporation was based in Arkansas, former U.S. President Bill 
Clinton's home statetown. 
;17!J Colette Braeckman, ''The Looting of the Congo," New Intel1Jationalist. May 200"1, 











reportedly arranged $500 million worth of deals. 1XII Rwanda and Uganda's deep 
involvement in mining and other economic activities in the Congo since 19961K1 
coincided with the re-entry of South African husinesses into the country. South Africa 
was the first country that the new ORC government called upon to assist it in the 
. . ~X'· economic reconstructIon of the country.' - Pretoria offered President Kahila some 
post-conflict reconstruction aid, provided that the Congo began a process of 
democratisation, which would have naturally served South Africa's economic 
. ~~n mterests. . 
South African compaJ1les, including Anglo-American, De Beers, Spoornet, 
G d h d . I I . . h C ~X--I enscor an Iscor a partlcu ar y strong mterests m t e .ongo.· Colette 
Braeckman views "a new development in Congo's mining sector in 1996-7, namely the 
emergence of minor firms (including South African) acting as fronts for the majors, 
such as ... (South African) Ashanti Goldfields ... .',.1X5 This shift reflected the fact that 
war societies tend to become opportunistic, which "affects business practices, so that 
some firms will thrive through sharp practices while others become their victims.,,·~x6 
Paul Collier also argues that "if economic agendas are driving conflict, then it is likely 
accessed on 2 August, 2008 
;1110 Paul Colliers, The Bottom BHlion: Why the Poorest Countries are Falling c'wd What 
Can Be Done About it, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 21 
lill Nzongola-Ntalaja, The Congo from Leopold to f{abihl, 237 
lll:! SAGI, "Statement on visit by South African Task Team to the ORe, 26 June 1997" 
;lll;l Landsberg, "The Impossible Neutrality?," 173 
1111 Mamdani, "Native SA must no adopt missionary position, oolll<1ij & Guardian. May 
23-29, 1997, 10; Braeckman, "The Looting of the Congo" 
lll:; Guy Martin, "Review Essays: Conflict in the Congo. Historical and Regional 
Perspectives," African Studies Review, Vo1.48 No.1, April 2005, 1:33 
lllG Paul Collier, "Doing well out of war: An Economic Perspective." Mats Berdal and 
David M. Malone (edsJ, Greed and Griev<7nce: Economic "lgendas in CiVll Wars. 











that some groups are benefiting from conflict and that these groups therefore have some 
interest in initiating and sustaining it.,,3ll7 
Behind these mining deals, South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
had helped set up a meeting between a South African businessperson and an AFDL 
delegation, which was headed by Kabila's foreign minister, Bizima Kamha .. 'SH 
According to the DFA, there was a clear distinction between South Africa's 
involvement in the peace talks and "normal bilateral relations" with Zaire. W) The 
former entered in the context of a UN peace plan, while the latter included contact with 
the AFDL.)l)() Then DMFA Pahad, co-chair of the peace initiative, said "we act as a 
facilitator and cannot be partial in the matter. But if we receive requests from South 
African businesspeople to talk to Kabila's people, we pass them on.,,3')1 This shows 
that South Africa had no coherent policy except to pursue its own economic ambitions. 
Summary 
The Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge's pending nationality issue was undoubtedly one 
of the trigger factors of the 1996 War. Besides that, the objectives of the Rwandan and 
Ugandan invasion included liberation from President Mobutu, defense from Hutu 
extremists, and the exploitation of natural resources. The invasion could have also 
allowed Rwanda to a possible annex land. 
Despite its earlier efforts, South Africa failed as a peacemaker due to its mediation 
between President Mobutu and Kabila. While several lengthy peacemaking meetings 
lHi Collier, "Doing Well out ofWal<An Economic Perspective," 91 














took place, the AFDL's military campaign spread rapidly from eastern Zaire to 
Kinshasa. Therefore, the timing of South Africa's mediation was illogical, largely due 
to the unbalanced power relationship between the two actors and subsequent lack of 
issues to discuss. South Africa also applied a mediation form that was appropriate 
within the South African context upon a regionalised contlict in the Great Lakes. The 
creation of the Organ inside the SADC brought confusion over the functions of the 
Summit and the Organ. President Mandela's bilateral negotiation with Zaire also 
exacerbated tensions between Presidents Mandela and Mugabe, who acted as Chairs of 
the SADC and the Organ respectively. 
South Africa's neutrality was also questioned during the peace process. It had a 
close political and economic relationship with the AFDL, which was supported by 
R wanda and Uganda, through a regime-making process and the exploitation of 
resources. It was accused of favouring Rwanda through arms provisions during the 
war, and it did not condemn Rwanda and the AFDL's gross human rights violations. 
Presumably, South Africa and other states also tolerated Rwanda's interventions in the 
name of ensuring its domestic security after the international community failed to stop 
the Rwandan genocide. South Africa's lack of neutrality led to its amoral approach to 
pcacemaki ng. 
Ultimately, South Africa was committed to the peace process insofar as it was 
able to obtain easier access to mining. Mining deals were subsequently made with 
South African enterprises, as well as with the governments of Rwanda and Uganda. 
Zimbabwe also entered the mining market due to the political incentive to use the DRC 
to seek revenge against South Africa. Gradually, natural resources became the centre 











As Landsherg argues, Deputy President Mheki's approach to the Congo involved 
a comhination of a "stick and carrot." It included armed support to Rwanda (this time 
to the RPF government), hrokered peace deals and assistance for post-conflict 
reconstruction for South Africa's benefit in exchange for acceptance of these peace 
1lP pacts." -












South Africa's Continued Peacemaking Efforts in the Second Congo 
War in 1998 
"'( YOII C{[II 111 o/J i' i::,c rcsoll rcc jill' W([ r, wit y call' ( rOil lIIohi Ii z.l' rl'SO/l rces for' !II' ? " 
--Gra~a Machel. Mozamhican educationist as quoted hy Kofi Annan on l) Decemher 20()2 
This chapter provides an analysis of South Africa's in-depth peacemaking efforts in the 
aftermath of the Second Congo War, which started in August 1998 and gave rise to the 
estahlishment of the ORe transitional government in 2003. The first section descrihes 
the hackground of the Second Congo War with Rwanda and Uganda and the SAOC's 
military intervention. The second section deals with the split within the SAOC 
hetween South Africa and Zimhahwe's groups following the Second Congo War. The 
third section examines the agenda hehind Zimhahwe, Angola and Namihia's 
interventions. The fourth section illustrates South Africa's initiatives in the 
peacemaking process, which produced several dialogues and agreements. The fifth 
section analyses South Africa's contradictory hehaviour during the peace process, while 
the final section focuses on economic interests regarding mining, arms and 
telecommunication support to the ORe. 
6.1 Background of the Second Congo War 
[n return for Rwanda's support to topple former President Mohutu, President Kahila 
was expected to prioritise efforts to address the Kivu insecurity caused hy 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe .. ~ln President Kahila's appointment of some Tutsi AFOL leaders 











to key government positions increased anti-Tutsi feeling among thc population, who 
suspected that President Kabila had betrayed the country's sovereignty by allowing 
, 1" " I Id . . . \')4 'orelgners to 10 strategic positions. In order to gain popularity, President 
Kabila replaced his chief of stall, James Kabarebe, on 14 July 1998 with a Congolese 
officcr.~<J) The subsequent depm1ure of all Rwandan soldiers from the DRC was 
I Y)6 announced on 27 Ju y. 
Rwanda and Uganda's Illtervention 
Rwanda and Uganda felt deceived by a non-compliant President Kabila aftcr having 
assistcd him to remove former President Mobutu in 1996-1997. They therefore 
decided to launch an attack against the DRC government on 2 August 1998.~97 The 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), or thc Rally for the Congolese 
Democracy, was formed to ovcrthrow and replace President Kabila with a reliable and 
submissive authority that could meet the RCD's financial interests. 39x The RCD 
included Congolese politicians and soldiers, in particular Banyamulenge, and former 
anti-Mobutu alliance leaders. Backed by the Rwandan and Ugandan government and 
'1' . 199 ml Itary torces, the ReO quickly took control of the main towns in the Kivu 
Provinces. 
;1!lI Timothy Longman, "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo," 
John Clark (edJ, The African Stakes of the Congo Wc'l1', 13"1 
;mG John Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War," The African Stakes of the 
Congo Wcll: 146 
;l!l(j Ibid 
;l!I7 Osita Afoaku, "Congo's Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations and Strategies," The 
A/i-ican Stakes of the Congo War, 115 
;mH Brackman, "The Looting of the Congo" 











The two countries justified their intervention to secure their national borders.40o 
Reportedly, at the request of President Mandela, Vice President Kagame admitted 
Rwanda's involvement to advance peace talks. ·WI However, the fact that they 
penetrated he yond the horders and into the ORe territory implies that South Africa had 
a different agenda related to its economic interests,-I02 including the exploitation of 
I -101 f "I . I f' h 'Id' ,,-104 natura resources - as part 0 a ong-term, ratIOna process 0 statc- UI mg. The 
Rwandan army was in fact in Mbuji Mayi, the major diamond town, which is located in 
the middle of the country.405 Arguably, both countries were motivated to huild a Tutsi 
empire and to Anglicise the Great Lakes region with Anglo-American interests in 
mind.406 Another justification, according to Rwandan priest Alexis Kagame, was that 
a large portion of the North Kivu Province was previously under Rwandan territory, as 
stipulated at the Treaty of Brussels of 1910.407 Therefore, Rwanda's invasion sought 
to redraw the boundary.40x 
100 On 6 November 1998, Vice President Kagame admitted that Rwandan troops were 
helping the DRC rebels. Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, "Peacekeeping in the DRC: 
MONUC and the Road to Peace," Monograph No.66, (Pretoria, ISS, October 2001) 
101 "DRC: IRN Chronology of the Rebellion" 
Ill:! Braeckman, "Congo: a War without Victors," 
10:1 Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War," 152. 
IIlI William Reno, "Stealing Like a Bandit, Stealing Like a State," paper presented to 
the Department of Political Science, Makerere University, 14 April 2000 
10" Braeckman, "Congo: a War without Victors" 
10(; Longman, "The Complex Reasons for Rwanda's Engagement in Congo," 139 and 
Clark, "Museveni's Adventure in the Congo War," 147 
107 1\lrner, The Congo War, 62; Mel McNulty, "From Intervened to Intervenor: Rwanda 
and Military Intervention in Zaire/DRC," Oliver Furley and Roy May, African 
Interventionist States, (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001), 173. However, this argument has no 
conviction from Rwandan historical point of view. Shinichi Takeuchi, "The Peace 
Process in the DRC: International Community's Initiatives and Issues." Shinichi 
Takeuchi (edJ,Senso to Hejwll no Ajda: Funso-boppatsu-go no Aflllika to 
Kokusaj-shakai (Between War and Peace: The Intel'l1ationai Socie~v 111 A/i-ican Peace 
Process), (Chiba, Institute of Developing Economies), 2008, 160. 











to two summit-level bodies with no clear delegation of authority between them.43u 
Tension also increased due to the legal framework in which the Organ operated, as well 
as hegemonic power struggles between Presidents Mugabe and Mandela in the 
l'b . h'd -HI post I eratlon, post-apart el era. 0 
Both Presidents Mandela and Mugabe continued to lead separate initiatives 
through dialogue and military intervention. In 1999, Angola, the DRC, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe signed a mutual defense treaty without notifying the SADC:l32 According 
to Nathan, "the lack of an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing 
high intensity contlict contributed to a collective inertia, divergent and parochial 
approaches by individual states, ill-conceived interventions and a confused mixture of 
k
o d f' "on, peacema 'mg an peace en orcement. 00 It also contributed to a split within the 
SADC, which led to the SADe's poor peacemaking record:B4 Obviously, this heavily 
intluenced South Africa's peacemaking process in the Great Lakes contlict. 
6.3 The Interests of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for their Intervention 
Patrick Bonds argues that the rationale for these SADC countries' support for the 
unelected DRC government was based on the "mercenary-type looting of minerals.',·B5 
Therefore, there was an economic interest on both sides: the side of the three SADC 
l:lO Nathan, "SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992-2003," 608 
I:ll Landsberg and Baregu, "Introduction," Bagel'll and Landsberg {eds.}, From Cape to 
Congo. 7; Coleman, International Org"tlllisations and Peace Enforcements. 119 
I:l:.! Nathan, "SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992-2003," 615 
t:l:l Ibid, 612 
nt Ibid 
t:lG Bond, Fanons Warning, 127. Zimbabwe was also heavily involved in the diamond 
trade in Mbuji Mayi, the major diamond mining town via the Osleg company (Operation 
Sovereign Legitimacy). Braeckman, "Congo: a War without Victors." However, Michael 
Nest argues that in the case of Zimbabwe, economic involvement was the result of 
military involvement, and not vice versa. Nest, "Ambitions, Profits and Loss: 
Zimbabwean Economic Involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," Afiiclln 











Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia's Interventioll 
President Kabila appealed for assistance from the SADC after Rwanda and Uganda's 
. . -tOll 
lI1VaSlon . As the chair of the SADC, South Africa initially supported the need for 
. I -tIO dla ogue. South Africa presumably took a cautionary lesson from the diplomatic 
failure and personal affront to President Mandela during the mediation between 
President Mobutu and Kabila in 1997, as well as his failed diplomacy in Nigeria and 
East Timor.-tll On 8 August, the presidents of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Namibia, 
the DRC, Uganda and Rwanda met in Victoria Falls.-t12 President Mandela was 
excluded because of the tension over the Organ.-t13 
Then chairperson of the SADC Organ, President Mugabe, announced that the 
SADC had come to a "unanimous" decision to assist the DRC while speaking at the 
SADC Defense Ministers Meeting in Harare on 18 August.-tl-t Zimbabwe, Angola and 
Namibia, later joined by Chad, Sudan and Libya,-t15 justified their military interventions 
on behalf of the Organ. In total, there were at least 18 nations involved in this war as 
to!} Patrick Bond (edJ, Fanon s Wc71Wllf{, (New Jersey, Africa's World Press, 2002), 127 
110 Malan and Boshoff, "A 90-day plan to bring peace to the DRe?," 2 
III David Black, "Lever or Cover? South Africa, Multilateral Institutions and the 
Promotion of Human Rights," Philip Nel, Ian Taylor, and Janis van del' Westhuizen 
(eds.), South Aflica s Jl;Iultjlatenll Djplonwcy cwd Global Change, (Aldershot, Ashagate, 
2001),79. President Mandela failed to hold a meeting between his close friend, 
then-Indonesian President Suharto and East Timorese leader Gusmao. Geldenhuys, 
"South Africa's Role as International Norm Entrepreneur," 99-100 
II~ Nathan, "SADC's Uncommon Approach to Common Security, 1992-200:3," 61:3 
Il:l Ibid 
III Mark Malan, "Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SA DC: Running Amok with a 
Mythical Organ," Occasional Paper No.35, ISS, October 1998,4 
ll'i Sudan has accused Uganda of supporting the southern Sudan rebel group, the 
Sudan People's Liberation Army. Therefore, the alliance between Uganda and Rwanda 
could have negated the joint strike in southern Sudan. Since Chadian President Idriss 
Oeby obtained power with a coup d'etat that was launched from Sudan, President Deby 
was afraid that the strike in southern Sudan may eventually lead to rebel invasion of 
Chad. Chad and Libya are allies. Gerry Cleaver and Simon Massey, "ORC: Africa's 












countries, and the side of Rwanda and Uganda. Besides the economic motive, there 
was also a political incentive for the SADC countries. 
The SADCs military interventions and South Africa's refusal to join must he 
understood within the context of the SADC's history. As discussed, the SADC 
succeeded the SADCC. which was originally built upon the liberation struggles of the 
FLS:nb At the same time, the SADCC was founded to fulfill economic objectives, 
which included reducing decolonised African states' dependence on South Africa's 
economy. Therefore, the SADC had a "double heritage," having been sandwiched 
between "being defensive toward South Africa and seeking closer cooperation with 
it." .. m 
The three SADC countries' solidarity may have stemmed from the fact that they 
were the most recently liberated southern African states, besides South Africa and 
. ·nx Mozambique. . Their strong resentment towards their regional enemy, hegemonic 
South Africa, may still have remained due to the history of apartheid and alleged 
military incursions into neighbouring African states. This alliance of three countries 
reminded South Africa of the liberation struggle in the past with images of "total 
I h " h' h h P ., d d . h 'I .... 19 ons aug t, to w IC t e retona regime respon e wit a' tota strategy. . 
There were also economic factors. South African corporations had aggressive 
foreign investments in African states that benefited the South African government.4 .. () 
Among the three SADC countries that intervened in the DRC, Angola and Zimbabwe 
1:1(; Baregu. "Economic and Military Security," From Cape to Congo, 20 
1:17 Ibid 
W! Geldenhuys. "South Africa's role as International Norm Entrepreneur," 101 
·I:I~) Baregu. "Economic and Military Security," 20; Agostinho Zacarias, "Redefining 
Security," From Cape to Congo, 34 












were the two most economically important countries in the region after South Africa.441 
South Africa accounted for 80 percent of the SADC's gross national product, and had a 
six-to-one trade balance with its neighbouring countries.442 Such economic dominance 
by one country constituted a threat. 
President Mugabe therefore wished to demonstrate the SADC's integrity, his 
prominence and leadership by sending troops to the DRC with the intention to upstage 
President Mandela who was half-way through his term (1994-1999).443 This was why 
he had to persuade the rest of the SADC that the SADC's military intervention was 
legitimate.444 In addition, President Mugabe had a personal and economic interest. He 
financed President Kabila US $200 million during the 1996 war; and President 
Mugabe's second commitment in the 1998 war was "to defend the integrity of the 
country, support his old friend Kabila and, not least, protect his investments.,,445 
Zimbabwe's presence was most visible in the mining industry in the DRC. 
President Kabila appointed Zimbabwean entrepreneur, Billy Rautenbach, as the head of 
Gecamines mining company and several other large concessions; the Zimbabwean 
company received a 37.5 percent share of the DRC state mining company.446 This 
took place in exchange for an arms sale to the DRC by the Zimbabwe Defense 
Industry.447 By 1999, South Africa and Zimbabwe exhibited increased military and 
. I' . 448 economIC po ansatlOn. 
441 Dlamini, "Assessing South Africa's Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution," 68 
442 Adebajo and Landsberg, "South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons," 187 
443 Nest, "Ambitions, Profits and Loss," 470-471 
444 Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement, 140 
445 Braeckman, "Congo: a War without Victors"; Swart and Solomon, "Conflict in the 
DRC," 15 
446 Ibid; Gerrie Swart and Hussein Solomon, "Conflict in the DRC: A Critical 
Assessment of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement," SAIIA Report, No.40, 2004, 15 
447 Swart and Solomon, "Conflict in the DRC," 15 











Angola intervened in the DRC for security considerations, while it was at war 
against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNIT A) on DRC 
soi1.449 Distrust remained between Angola and South Africa, which was suspected to 
support UNITA.45o Similarly, Namibia doubted South Africa's continuing domination 
. h 451 
In t e country. - The country also had its historical alliance with Angola and feared 
that UNIT A would destablise Angola.452 President Kabila was a long-standing ally of 
Namibian President Sam Nujoma, whose brother-in-law was awarded a stake in the 
MIBA Diamond Mining Company.453 
6.4 South Africa's Greater Involvement in Peacemaking Efforts 
Since the outbreak of the Second Congo War, South Africa held many meetings and 
discussions to resolve the conflict. The first visit was made by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) Alfred Nzo and the Minister of Defence to Lubumbashi on 7 August 1998 
to meet with President Kabila, followed by a visit to Rwanda and Uganda 10 days 
I 454 Th . k 1·· 1 1 . d ·1· . 455 ater. e aim was to see a po Ihca so utlOn as oppose to a mi ltary VIctory. -
Following these visits, at least twenty efforts by the UN, OAU, the SADC and 
individual mediators to stop the Congo war failed. 456 Military engagement only ended 
when a stalemate emerged, as each party realised that war was not the best solution.457 
·H9 Malan, Regional Power Politics Under Cover of BADe, 4 
450 Zacarias, "Redefining Security," 41 
451 Ibid 
452 Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement, 127 
453 Swart and Solomon, "Conflict in the DRC," 16 
454 SAGI, "Crisis in the DRC' to the National Assembly issued by the DFA," 
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The Change of Foreign Policy under President Mbeki 
Newly inaugurated president Mbeki accelerated the peacemaking process in May 1999, 
as he was eager to resolve the conflict in the Great Lakes region.458 This included 
Burundi's peace process, whose mediator was replaced with former President Mandela 
after the death of former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere at the end of 1999.459 
President Mandela shied away from imposing a Pax Pretoria on the conflict not only 
due to his failed diplomacy between President Mobutu and Kabila and elsewhere, but 
also due to South Africa's historic use of power for the sake of destruction.46o As a 
result, President Mandela assumed a cautious and diplomatic peacemaking posture.461 
However, President Mbeki's administration demonstrated a radical change in 
foreign policy compared to President Mandela. President Mbeki supported military 
deployment or peacekeeping462 with an emphasis on African unity with his slogan 
"Africa Renaissance" and "NEPAD." He also became the founding father and first 
chairperson of the AU in 2002. He started to use a mixture of UN and Western powers, 
as well as regional and domestic (DRC) levels, to facilitate diplomatic persuasion and 
dialogue.463 
More importantly, while human rights were central to President Mandela's policy, 
South Africa learned from the human rights fiascos in Nigeria and East Timor that these 
idealist principles were difficult to implement in a free world.464 President Mbeki 
458 Landsberg, "South Africa," 129 
459 Ibid, 125 
460 Adebayo and Landsberg, "Pax Africana in the Age of Extremes," 16 
461 Landsberg, 'The Impossible Neutrality?," 178-9 
462 Ibid 
16;3 Dlamini, "Assessing South Africa's Diplomacy in Conflict Resolution," 68; 
Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Role as International Norm Entrepreneur," 101 












therefore gradually shifted the emphasis on human rights, stating that "where 
appropriate, South Africa's advocacy of and support for human rights should occur 
through multinational institutions and quiet bilateral diplomacy.,,465 The 1998 foreign 
policy review identified "wealth creation" and "security" as a promotion of South 
Af · . I· 466 [lcan natlOna mterests. This heavily influenced South Africa's peacemaking 
process in the Great Lakes region. 
The Lusaka Agreement 
The political deadlock led to a meeting in Pretoria on 17 June 1999 with Rwanda, 
Uganda, Libya and Kenya and 14 members of the SADC.467 This paved the way for a 
DRC summit on 25 June in Lusaka; a ceasefire agreement was signed on 10 July 1999 
by the governments of the six states who were party to the conflict.468 The signature 
was witnessed by the Zambian government, the OAU, UN and the SADC but not by the 
South African government. 
The agreement included a ceasefire among all forces in the DRC, the deployment 
of a UN peacekeeping force and the withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC.469 
Herbert Weiss and Tatiana Carayannis lauded the agreement, stating that "the genius of 
the Lusaka Agreement [was] that it recognised the overlapping layers of interstate and 
intrastate actors involved in the war, and it legitimated the serious concerns of Rwanda, 
Uganda and Angola regarding insurgency movements aiming to overthrow their 
465 van Nieuwkerk, "Foreign Policy-Making in South Africa," 41 
466 Geldenhuys, "South Africa's Role as International Norm Entrepreneur," 100 
467 Malan and Boshoff, "A 90-day plan to bring peace to the DRC?," 3 
468 Ibid 
469 Lusaka Agreement, www.iss.co.za/AF/profilesIDRCongo/cdreaderlbin/2Iusaka.pdf, 











governments based in the Congo.,,470 However, the agreement was merely a ceasefire 
signed only by the governments without involving the rebel groups. 
MF A Dr. Dlamini-Zuma announced in 1999 that "securing peace in the DRC 
would rank as [her] top foreign policy priority," dealing with all sides to the conflict, 
including rebel leaders.47I Following the signing of the Lusaka agreement, she met 
with the leadership of Uganda, Rwanda and the RCD to stress the need for a negotiated 
settlement and persuade the rebels to sign the agreement.472 It was signed later by two 
primary armed rebel movements, the Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo (MLC) 
or the Movement for the Liberation of Congo,473 and the RCD. 
Despite this effort, there was very little progress on the peace front following the 
agreement. The Mai Mai and Interahamwe, who were and still are involved in the 
conflict, were branded as "negative forces" and were unable to participate in the peace 
process. The agreement, which was hastily prepared for immediate cessation, focused 
only on conflict resolution and neglected preventive diplomacy; suspicion among the 
parties remained as they showed no political will to implement the ceasefire.474 As a 
result, it did not lead to a cease fire or a state of peace. 
The fact that South Africa intervened militarily in Lesotho in September 1998 
without having done the same in the Second Congo War made President Kabila 
suspicious of South Africa's neutrality and double standards.475 President Kabila may 
470 Weiss and Carayannis, "Reconstructing the Congo," 105-142 
471 Landsberg, "South Africa," 136 
472 Ibid; Malan and Boshoff, "A 90-day plan to bring peace to the DRC?," 3 
473 MLC was created in September 1998, backed by Uganda, led by Jean-Pierre Bemba. 
474 Swart and Solomon, "Conflict in the DRC," 19 











have also felt hostility toward the UN based on its experience in the 1960s in Katanga. 
Therefore, he may not have favoured the arrival of UN peacekeepers in the DRC. 476 
More rapid progress toward peace developed after Joseph Kabila's inauguration 
as the DRC President in January 2001 following the assassination of his father, Laurent 
Kabila. The change in leadership created ripeness for negotiation. President Mbeki 
was the first head of state to visit the DRC on 30 January after President Kabila's 
inauguration.477 He opened markets to foreign investors with mining and logging 
concessions478 and bilateral relations between South Africa and the DRC improved 
tremendously from that point forward. 479 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue (leD) 
The lCD, which emerged from the Lusaka Agreement, was conducted against the 
background of continued war in eastern DRC.480 Its purpose was to end the war and 
serve to establish a transitional authority as a process of democratisation.481 There was 
little progress during the ICD at the Gaborone pre-dialogue meeting in August 2001, the 
Addis Ababa meeting in October 2001 and the Abuja meeting in December 200l. 
This was due to the parties' desire to maintain the war option as well as political and 
logistical reasons at the Addis Ababa meeting.482 The process then moved to South 
476 Turner, The Congo Wars, 149 
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179 The Presidency, "President Thabo Mbeki arrives in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo state Visit, Tuesday-Wednesday, 13-14 January" 
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Africa between February and April 2002, as South Africa agreed to host the next 
session and pay 50 percent of the envisaged costS.483 
Discussion focused only on position and authority. Former President Mbeki 
presented two plans. Mbeki Plan I proposed a GNU with Kabila holding the post of 
.. ·d 484 mtenm pres} ent. The RCD and the leading Congolese party believed the plan 
favoured Kabila.485 Mbeki Plan II included offering the RCD a first vice-presidency, 
putting it in charge of the ministries of defense and the interior, the security services and the 
organisation of elections.486 The second vice-presidency for MLC was in charge of 
economy, finance and reconstruction.487 President Mbeki simply used the same model 
from South Africa's GNU in 1994. As this plan was clearly advantageous to the RCD's 
demands, it was rejected by the government and the MLC, who were eager to avoid 
power-sharing solutions dictated by the RCD and above all, its ally Rwanda.488 
An amended Mbeki Plan for power-sharing during the DRC transition was 
presented in August 2002. This plan formula, "one-plus-four," outlined a presidency 
including President Kabila and four vice presidents (the RCD, MLC, Government, and 
an unarmed opposition group). 489 Each vice president would supervise several 
government commissions, parliament and a number of institutions.49o This new Mbeki 
Plan was accepted by the DRC government, but the formula was not suitable for the 
483 Boshoff and Rupiya, "Delegates, Dialogue and Desperadoes," 33·34 
484 Mbata Mangu, "The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Protection 
of Rights under the African Charter," African Human Rights Law Journal, 2003, 
248-249 
485 Ibid, 249 
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Process," Africa Report, No.44, BrusselslNairobi, 14 May 2002, 5 
487 Koko, "The 'One-Plus·Four' Formula and Transition in the DRC," 40 
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C 1 1·· 1 . 491 ongo ese pO Ihca experIences. Since the DRC and neighbouring countries used 
only war or repression, "the notion of power-sharing was foreign to the parties and the 
prospect of a national unity government in the DRC [did] not appeal.,,492 Moreover, 
the plan was unfamiliar in the context of Congolese post-colonial history, which was 
characterised by political agreements and constitutions that were never respected by the 
. . 493 SIgnatOrIes. 
The Pretoria Agreement 
In July 2002, President Mbeki arranged a meeting with Presidents Kabila and Kagame 
and the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. This resulted in an agreement to withdraw 
Rwandan troops from the DRC, disarm the ex-FAR forces and the Interahamwe by the 
DRC and repatriate them to Rwanda with a 90-day implementation programme.494 
The agreement placed most of the responsibility for the Pretoria peace deal's 
implementation and verification on the Third Party Verification Mechanism, the UN 
Secretary General and South Africa.495 South Africa had a dual role as the Chair of the 
AU and facilitator of this process. Deputy President Jacob Zuma was appointed as the 
facilitator to promote peace between the DRC and Rwanda.496 
491 Koko, "The 'One-Plus-Four' Formula and Transition in the DRC," 34 
492 ICG, "The ICD: Political Negotiation of Game of Bluff?, " 23 
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assignment in 2007-2008. HRW also states that "while timely intervention from the UK, 
USA and South African governments twice pulled Rwanda back from new military 
operations in Congo, such efforts were sporadic and in the end, Rwanda temporarily 
sent its troops back across the border in November 2004." HRW, "The Curse of Gold," 
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The Institute of Security Studies praised the agreement, stating "the agreement 
brings Rwanda back in the peace process and appears to open the door to the severing of 
the linkages between the RCD-Goma497 and Rwanda.,,498 However, this agreement 
focused only on the military and physical issues (withdrawal, disarmament and 
repatriation), and did not address the main causes of conflict. Mirroring the failed 
Lusaka Agreement, the Pretoria agreement focused only on conflict resolution, 
neglected preventive diplomacy, and was therefore destined to fail. Moreover, 
Rwandan militias, who were to disarm and repatriate to Rwanda within a 90-day 
timeframe, were not part of the discussion. This timeframe was also unrealistic, as the 
problem had existed since 1994. Imposing time limits for agreements had risks, which 
could have worked to the disadvantage of the party that determined them.499 
Between August and October 2002, after Angola facilitated talks between the 
DRC and Uganda, most of the Ugandan, Zimbabwean, Angolan and Burundian troops 
began to withdraw from the DRC.500 On 5 October 2002, Rwanda announced the 
complete withdrawal of its 23,000 troops, which was witnessed by the UN Monitoring 
Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and South African observers. 501 
The Global and All-Inclusive Agreement 
Under President Mbeki's facilitation, Pretoria's Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on 
power sharing, the creation of a GNU, and the conclusion of the four-year war was 
497 RCD was split in 1999 into a few factions, one of which was RCD-Goma. Rwanda 
became its primary supporter. Another faction is RCD- Mouvement de Liberation 
(RCD-ML), assisted by Uganda. 
498 Malan and Boshoff, "A 90-day plan to bring peace to the DRC?," 10 
499 Swart and Solomon, "Conflict in the DRC," 31 












formed on l7 December 2002.502 South Africa was to support the DRC's transitional 
government until elections, government members, five rebel groups (including the Mai 
Mai), members of the political opposition and civil society.503 
After reaching an agreement, all Congolese delegates returned to Sun City in 
February 2003 to ratify all accords within 52 days.s04 On 29 June 2003, the Chair of 
the AU and President Mbeki welcomed the signing of the agreement on the DRC's 
GNU and transition, commenting that "the final obstacle to movement towards peace in 
the DRC has been removed."sos However, despite the disarmament efforts, rebel 
groups continued to operate while the illegal exploitation of minerals by foreign forces 
remained unchecked in eastern DRC.s06 
6.5 South Africa's Continued Neutrality and Morality Problems 
As South Africa supposedly brought stability and development to the DRC, Claude 
Kabemba noted that South Africa was widely considered to be the "godfather" of the 
C I 
.. S07 ongo ese transItlon. However, many analysts note that South Africa was in fact an 
unsuccessful, partial and amoral peace-broker for the following reasons: 1) South 
Africa's sold arms to Rwanda and Uganda since 1996;508 2) the government failed to 
condemn the entry of these two countries into war;509 and, 3) South Africans served as 
502 Ibid, Landsberg, '''South Africa," 131 
503 Ibid, 132 
504 Boshoff and Rupiya, "Delegates, Dialogue and Desperadoes," 29 
505 SAGI, "Statement on the Agreement between the Government and Rebel Groups on 
the DRC" 
506 Patricia Daley "Challenges to Peace: Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes region 
of Africa," Third World Quarterly, Volume 27, Number 2,2006,312 
507 Claude Kabemba, "South Africa in the DRC: renaissance or neo-imperialism?" 
Sakhela Buhlunga et aI, State of the Nation: South Africa 2007, (Pretoria, HSRC Press, 
2007),533 
508 For the case of Rwanda, the arms sales started in 1990. 











mercenaries on both sides of the conflictSIO despite the fact that South Africa was a 
leading contributor to an anti-mercenarism declaration at NAM's summit in 1998, and 
steered the Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998 through 
1· 511 par lament. 
South Africa's Reinforcing Relationship with Rwanda and the ReD 
Following their intervention in 1998, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia criticised South 
Africa for promoting "regional apartheid policies"Sl2 and siding with Uganda, Rwanda 
and the RCD in their efforts to topple Kabila. sl3 President Mugabe refused to allow 
the DRC government to hold any negotiations in South Africa. He feared that this 
would give an unfair advantage to the RCD, which had a close relationship with South 
Africa.sl4 In June 2003, a preparatory meeting for the first summit on peace and 
development in the Great Lakes region was held in Nairobi.sls Burundi, the DRC, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda attended the summit, but South Africa did not 
Hugo, La RepubJique democratique du Congo, 38 
510 See MacLean "New Regionalism and Conflicts in the DRC," 117; Talyor and Williams, 
"South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis" 281; Landsberg, "Promoting 
Democracy," 111. South African Executive Outcome's involvement in petrol 
exploitation in Lake Albert and in Semliki valley is mentioned in Hugo's La RepubJique 
democratique du Congo, 80. Like the mining industry, the change of regime in South 
Africa in 1994 led to decreased need of National Force. As a result, a high number of 
manpower moved to private company. Gerry Cleaver, "Interventionist Companies: 
Privatising the Military Option," African Interventionist States, 271 
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attend.516 Since it had a tendency to use its own brokering skills for other settlements, 
South Africa caused resentment and suspicion among other states.517 
During their illegal occupation into eastern DRC, Rwanda and Uganda continued 
to commit gross human rights violations including their involvement in the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources, mass killing of civilians and fighting. SI8 RP A and its 
proxy, the RCD-Goma, have attacked and killed tens of thousands of Congolese 
civilians in many areas rich in minerals.519 Instead of receiving any condemnation by 
the great powers let alone the peacemaker, South Africa, then United States President 
Bill Clinton praised the two countries as leaders in bringing about an "African 
Renaissance."s2o Uganda continued receiving important international aid, including 
approximately US$800 million per year, and benefited from a Debt Reduction 
Initiative.521 
South Africa also reinforced its relations with Rwanda, with President Mbeki's 
visit to Rwanda in October 2000, which was the first official visit to Rwanda by a South 
African Head of State.S22 Accompanied by a large delegation of cabinet ministers and 
the business community, including Eskom, the largest electricity utility in Africa, 
President Mbeki sought to increase bilateral trade and enhance economic and political 
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development of the region.523 On 5 July 2004, South Africa and Rwanda also signed a 
memorandum of understanding to facilitate military cooperation in joint training, 
exchanges of experience in peacekeeping operations and procurement of military 
equipment. 524 Taylor and Williams argue that "whether alone, or in a strategic 
partnership with the United States, only South Africa is capable of exercising the 
leverage over Rwanda and Uganda to convince them to reign in the Congolese 
rebels. ,,525 
South Africa's Manipulating Agreements 
South African leadership, particularly President Mbeki, demonstrated its amorality by 
manipulating some agreements. Although South Africa was not a signatory to the 
I d h I . h· . ,,526 Lusaka Agreement, "Pretoria... p aye more t an a cameo ro e In s apIng It. . 
According to Ludo Marten's analysis, this agreement was "drafted by South Africa with 
Ugandan assistance and on U.S. instructions ... [it] was a legal trap that sealed the 
political fate of Laurent Kabila and his regime. ,,527 
RCD, which was the ally of South Africa, had an overall objective in the lCD to 
establish a local government that was favourable to Rwanda and the legalisation of 
R d . fl . h Ki 5
7 8 wan an In uence In t e vus:- This included identifying an economic partnership 
to exploit the resources, and obtaining dual citizenship for the Rwandaphones in the 
Ki 529 vus. This was to help strengthen their presence by allowing Rwandans or 
523 SAGI, "Statement on the Official Visit to Rwanda by President Mbeki" 
524 AI, "DRC: Arming the East," 5 July 2005,24 
525 Taylor and Williams, "South African Foreign Policy and the Great Lakes Crisis" 266 
526 Malan and Boshoff, "A 90·day plan to bring peace to the DRC?," 3 
527 Guy Martin, "Review Essays," 135 












Rwandan allies to hold local government positions.53o Former President Mbeki's plan 
contained the RCD's ambitions by providing for an all-powerful vice presidency similar to 
that of Rwanda (i.e. Vice President Kagame under President Pasteur Bizimungu).531 Not 
only did former President Mbeki submit the proposed second draft agreement to the 
Rwandan government for approval in Sun City, he also "tried to manoeuvre the 
negotiations ... in order to place the priority on Rwanda's security interests."s32 
Luanda claimed that South Africa imposed a Rwandan solution to the conflict.533 Former 
President Mbeki, who failed to create a feeling of equality and confidence between 
parties, lost some of his credibility through this act. 
6.6 South Africa's Economic Interests 
At the opening of Sun City, President Mbeki clearly stated the country's motivations to host 
and finance a major portion of the ICD.534 The International Crisis Group argues that the 
rCD's objective was merely to recognise President Kabila as Head of State.535 The 
intention of Western governments, including that of South Africa, was to "resume 
normal diplomatic and economic relations with the DRC ... to resurrect international aid 
that had been suspended under [Presidents] Mobutu and Kabila the elder.,,536 This was 
certified by a loan agreement between the World Bank and the DRC government, which 
amounted to US $450 million immediately after the rCD.537 
Some South African investors were standing by to enter the country as soon as the 
530 rCG, "Sun City Clouds Strom," 12 

















political future of the DRC was certain. 538 One of the investors included the 
telecommunications company Vodacom, which was launched in May 2002. President 
Mbeki made a statement that "you (Vodacom) have made a significant contribution to 
the realisation of the dream of an African Renaissance and the implementation of 
NEPAD."S39 It was clear that former President Mbeki's vision of the African 
Renaissance and NEP AD depended on stability in the DRC in order to facilitate 
Western investment. 
Braeckman argues that "the current Western strategy, in which the 'rebellions' 
replace the 'secession' of the 1960s, aims to use liberalisation, privatisation and 
structural adjustment to create a weak and powerless central government, making it 
easier for Western (rather than Belgian) multinational firms to freely and cheaply 
exploit Congo's vast mineral wealth."s4o Influential states and their private sectors, 
including South Africa with its closely linked private sector, used the rebellion as a new 
strategy to benefit from the war economy. Apart from minerals, this war economy 
also included arms sales and the installation of a telecommunications network. 
South Africa's Interest in Minerals 
Collier argues that "conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities 
(greed) than by grievance (political interest)."S41 According to a UN Panel Report, 
fifteen South African companies, such as Anglo-American, were involved in the 
exploitation of the resources during the 1996 and 1998 Wars.S42 South Africa was the 
5:38 lCG, "Storm Clouds Over Sun City," 15 
539 SAGl, "Message from President Thabo Mbeki on the Launch of VODACOM in the 
DRC" 
540 Guy Martin, "Review Essays," 132 
541 Collier, "Doing Well out of War," 91 











second greatest violator after Belgium.543 South Africa failed to act in spite of UNSC 
Resolution 1457' s demand that all states conduct investigations.544 
On the contrary, some of these enterprises accompanied former President Mbeki 
on a business trip to Kinshasa in January 2004.545 Tokyo Sexwale was one of the 
delegation members, and signed two memoranda of understanding with investments of 
more than US $100 million, including the Kilomoto Gold Project.546 Presidents Mbeki 
and Kabila signed Bilateral Commission agreements to promote political, economic, 
security, cultural and other ties between the two countries. 547 This Commission 
represented a new strategy for South Africa to engage with the DRC for the first time 
since 2004.548 Business Unity South Africa's signature of cooperation allowed South 
African companies to boost black economic empowerment. 549 This visit was reported 
as "one of Mbeki's most significant diplomatic achievements on the continent.,,55o 
543 UN Panel Report named 21 Belgian companies. 
544 UNSC Resolution 1457 (SIRESI1457/2003), 24 January, 2003, 3, 
Ildaccessdds.un.org/docIUNDOC/GEN/N03/222/55IPDF/N0322255.pdf?OpenElement, 
acccessed on 6 January, 2008. 
545 Patrick Bond, 'The George Bush of Africa: Pretoria chooses Subimperalism', July 13, 
2004, Foreign Policy in Focus. www.fuif.org, accessed on 3 February, 2007. The author 
asked Mr. Bond the names ofthose companies, but he was unable to provide the details. 
The author also contacted a South African diplomat in Kinshasa for the details but was 
unsuccessful. 
546 Julie Bain, "Sexwale strikes gold in mining deal in Congo," Business News/Company 
News, 15 January, 2004, 6. HRW reports that "As of September 2004, eleven mining 
companies had signed contracts with Kilomoto to explore or mine the gold in 
northeastern Congo, the majority of them from South Africa. One of them, AngloGold 
Ashanti, provided both financial and material support to the Nationalist and 
Integrationist Front, an armed group responsible for widespread human rights abuses." 
HRW, "The Curse of Gold," 82. 
547 "Mbeki in Congo to consolidate peace," Business News, 14 January 2004,3 
548 Landsberg, "South Africa," 132 
549 Patrick Wadula, 'SA, Congo in business pact' Business News, 16 January, 2004 












To provide one example of mineral exploitation, coltan, a metal essential for making 
mobile phones and computers, was the largest export by the late 1990s. In 1999 and 
2000, tantalum's sharp rise in world prices led to a large increase in coltan production in 
eastern DRC55l The illegal exploitation allowed the Rwandan army, rebel groups and 
businessmen to force farmers to work as artisans in the mines.552 
As soon as the RCD took over eastern DRC, they took control of most of the 
concessions that belonged to the Societe Miniere du Kivu (SOMINKI)'S,553 or Kivu's 
M· IS· 554 mera oClety.- In November 2000, the RCD created a new mining firm called the 
Societe Miniere des Grands Lacs (SOMIGL), or the Great Lakes' Mineral Society, 
which received an export monopoly on all coltan produced in RCD territory. 555 
SOMIGL exported all of the ore to Rwanda, which channeled it to Europe and the 
United States through three different companies, one of which was South African 
Cogecom.556 
South Africa had another link to RCD through a South African smelting company, 
the Metal Processing Association (MP A), which was founded in 2001 in Gisenyi across 
the border in Rwanda.557 This city used to be the rebel RCD-Goma's headquarters. 
The MP A had a sister company in Goma, called Mining Processing Congo (MPC), 
551 UN Panel of Experts (S/2003/1027), 23 October 2003,5 
552 Ibid 
553 SOMINKI is a Belgian·Zairean firm, formed in 1976 as a result of a merger between 
several Belgian mining firms whose origins go back to a major concession granted to the 
Belgian Baron Empain by the Belgian King Leopold II in 1902. SOMINKI owned most 
of the extensive mining concessions in eastern DRC with gold mining. Pole Institute, 
"The CoItan Phenomenon in War-Torn North Kivu Province," Revue Trimestrielle, 
September 2002, No.007, 9-10 
554 Pole Institute, "The CoItan Phenomenon in War-Torn North Kivu Province," 11 
555 Ibid, 14 
556 Braeckman, "Congo: a War without Victors" 












which was the mam exporter of cassiterite and a major buyer of artisanal mmmg 
d . K' 558 pro ucts m IVU:- Reportedly, the MPA signed contracts with RCO rebels in 2003, 
monopolising cassiterite that was produced by artisanal miners. 559 South African 
investors used their connection with the RCO to obtain a mining contract for the 37 
concessions in 2001.560 
South Africa's Arms Sale in the Region 
South Africa pursued initiatives in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. It 
also banned anti-personnel landmines through a variety of multilateral organisations 
with the clear objective to play "a leading role internationally."S61 However, as the 
sole major arms producer on the continent, South Africa also sold arms to any profitable 
countries. These countries included both pro- and anti-Kabila Governments,S62 which 
may have contributed to mistrust among the stakeholders. 
South Africa approved the sale of military equipment for Rwanda in 2002, 
justifying it as unspecified, "non-sensitive" military equipment.563 After the UNSC 
imposed a mandatory arms embargo in eastern ORC in July 2003,564 the UN Group of 
Experts reported in July 2004 that a "newly manufactured South African R-5 rifle" was 
discovered in the ORC.565 This was discovered among a weapons cache that belonged 
558 Stefaans Brummer, "South Africa's War Vultures,"; Dominic Johnson and Aloys 
Tegera, Digging Deeper: How the DR Congo's Mining Policy is Failing the Country, 
Revue Trimestrielle No.15, (Pole Institute, Goma, December 2005), 52, 
www.pole-institute.org, accessed on 1 August, 2007 
559 Johnson and Tegera, Digging Deeper, 69 
560 Ibid, 62-63 
561 DFA, Thematic review: Strategic plans, Pretoria, 1998 
562 Landsberg, "The Impossible Neutrality?," 174 
563 AI, "DRC:Arming the East," 24 
564 This was considerably applied to the whole country in April 2005. AI, "DRC: Arming 
the East, "51 











to RCD-Goma, which was "part of an inventory previously supplied to Rwanda by 
means of a licensed purchase from South Africa. ,,566 
South Africa's Telecommunication Support to the Rebel Force 
Apart from Vodacom, which had the widest network coverage in the DRC since it 
opened in May 2002, the South African business community assisted the rebel group 
with telecommunications equipment. In 2002, the president of the RCD-Goma 
reportedly inaugurated Supercell himself.567 This was the sister cell phone company of 
Rwandacell, which was "licensed" by the RCD-Goma's president to operate a network 
in eastern DRC.568 Rwandacell was South Africa's own MTN group, which won the 
first cell phone network license in Rwanda in 1999.569 R wandacell' s partner, Tristar 
Investments, was reportedly founded and owned by the RPF.570 This was why MTN 
Rwandacell was able to do business in a RCD area, as it was backed by the Rwandan 
government and operated in an area where a number of Tutsi Congolese reside. 
The Exporter, a South African company, also shipped 50 two-way radios Via 
Uganda to the RCD-Goma Vice President and the Governor of North Kivu, Eugene 
Serufuli.571 Hand-held Motorola radios, which were supplied by South Africa in 2003, 
were allegedly used to recruit members of Seufuli's Local Defense Force.572 
2004 (S/2004/551) 
566 Ibid UN Group of Experts, resolution 1533, dated 15 July 2004 (S/2004/551) 

















The fact that President Kabila ordered the Rwandans holding strategic government 
positions as well as foreign soldiers to leave the country led to the Second Congo War. 
The rebel force called RCD was born, which was comprised of locals, in particular 
Banyamulenge, and backed by Rwanda and Uganda forces. It fought against President 
Kabila, who deceived Rwanda and Uganda after having assisted him to remove former 
President Mobutu. 
R wanda and Uganda stated that their intervention in the war was due to security 
concerns. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia became involved in the war not only to 
protect the ORC, but also to show defiant behaviour toward South Africa. However, it 
became apparent that this war essentially centred on access to mineral resources not 
only by these African and other states, but also by a number of foreign companies. 
This was exactly the reason why many states and organisations were eager to establish 
the ICD to have easier access to resources. 
South Africa was also part of these greedy states. While promoting 
peacemaking efforts, it was involved in the exploitation of resources and fueled conflict 
by trading arms to irresponsible states, including both pro- and anti-Kabila governments 
and rebel forces. President Mugabe also had a personal and economic interest to 
protect his own investment from the First Congo War. 
Following its failed diplomacy in 1997, South Africa tried to prioritise dialogue at 
the onset of the Second Congo War. However, without South Africa's previous 
knowledge, President Mugabe, who was Chair of the SADC's Organ, decided to 
intervene militarily with his allies. This split of peacemaking and military groups 











be understood from the SADC's history, which affected the peacemaking in the DRC. 
At a later stage, President Mandela condoned military intervention, ostensibly to show 
unity within the SADC. As soon as President Mbeki was inaugurated, he, unlike his 
predecessor, started to use coercive diplomacy and put less emphasis on human rights in 
foreign policy. 
The political deadlock in the DRC led to the Lusaka Agreement. However, since 
it was hastily prepared for the immediate cessation without using any methods of 
preventive diplomacy, it produced neither a ceasefire nor a state of peace. President 
Laurent Kabila also failed to be cooperative in the peace process, as he doubted South 
Africa's neutrality and the UN mission's performance. Most importantly, both 
President Kabila and the RCD stood to gain from their war profit. 
With the change of leadership in the DRC in 2001, the time was npe for 
negotiation. President Mbeki accelerated the peace process by facilitating dialogue 
that produced two agreements. Yet the peace process was not highly respected by 
stakeholders who continued to benefit from the war economy. 
Apart from illegal arms sales and the exploitation of resources, South Africa's 
actions raised serious doubts about its morality and the sincerity of its peacemaking 
efforts. These actions included its failure to condemn Rwanda and Uganda for its 
continually poor human rights records; its support to Rwanda to strengthen economic, 
military and political relationships; President Mbeki's imposition of South Africa's own 
style of GNU, in addition to Rwanda's solution that was based on the manipulation of 
ceasefire and peace agreements. The South African government also protected those 
companies that were involved in the illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC by 











publication of the UN Report. These acts caused resentment and mistrust by the 












Major Failures in South Africa's Peacemaking Efforts 
in the Great Lakes Region 
"Africa's civil wars are really political conflicts. All the civil wars ill Africa erupted as a result of 
dispute over some aspect of the electoral process-or a struggle for power. " 
--George BN Ayittey, Ghanaian economist, Africa in Chaos, 1998 
Based on my main argument that South Africa was not a successful peacemaker due to 
four main factors, this chapter examines exactly how South Africa failed to play this 
role. The first section deals with three major problems related to South Africa's 
mediation style: its application of its own mediation model, its timing of intervention 
and its failure to identify and manage the spoiler. The second section deals with nature, 
main causes and aggravating factors of the conflict, such as the conflict's extensive 
regionalised dynamics, nationality and land issues, and the link between conflict, the 
exploitation of natural resources, arms trafficking and international business. The third 
section describes South Africa's questionable neutrality, which led the country to 
neglect Rwanda's problems; this includes Rwandan government's tension with the 
FDLR and the DRC government. The fourth section reviews the development of the 
SADC's internal politics since the pre-apartheid era. 
7.1 South Africa's Mediation Style 
Mediation is a specialised activity based on several techniques and regulations, but the 
principles of effective mediation are often undermined. South Africa demonstrated 











model to the DRC peace process, it did not choose an appropriate time of intervention, 
and failed to identify and manage the main spoiler of the DRC peace process. 
The Application of South Africa's own Peacemaking Model 
Following its transitional success in 1994, or Pax Pretoria, South Africa had a tendency 
to generalise and apply its peacemaking model to different situations.573 Pax Pretoria 
cannot necessarily be applied to other situations since each case is different and requires 
distinct mediation approaches and solutions. For the mediation following the First 
Congo War, South Africa did not examine the extensive regionalised dynamics of the 
DRC conflict (see section 6.2 for details). Even during the post-Second Congo War 
period, President Mbeki continued to recognise the DRC conflict as a civil war. 
Therefore, the ICD and the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement were established, 
which were both Congolese-inclusive and did not involve the rest of the region. 
At the lCD, a power-sharing, one-plus-four formula GNU government was 
imposed by President Mbeki despite a lack of consent among the belligerents. 
President Mbeki did not take local dynamics into consideration and did not facilitate 
problem-solving by the concerned parties themselves. He was a negative and biased 
manipulator, acting as a bully through his use of coercive diplomacy. President Kabila 
consequently accused South Africa of generally promoting its democratisation style in 
the Great Lakes region. 












The Timing of South Africa's Intervention 
Early intervention has significant advantages In regard to motivating parties, its 
effectiveness and the likelihood that there will not be a relapse of conflict. South 
Africa was not able to grasp the right moment to intervene due to several reasons; by 
the time it intervened, a "we-they" enemy structure was created between the two actors 
in the First and Second Congo Wars, which became too complex for the mediator to 
move the peace process forward. 
Once it assumed the SADC's chairmanship role in 1996, South Africa started to 
launch peacemaking initiatives in the aftermath of the First Congo War. Nevertheless, 
South Africa failed in its peacemaking role due to its inadequate mediation efforts 
between President Mobutu and Kabila. The peacemaking process that began in 
November 1996 was initially led by Kenya and South Africa, but was very lengthy and 
slow. By the time the two actors agreed to meet in May 1997, the AFDL was nearly 
ready to capture the capital. Thus, the timing of this mediation was illogical due to the 
unbalanced power relationship (victory vs. defeat) politically and economically between 
the two actors, and the absence of issues to discuss. 
For the Second Congo War, South Africa tried to facilitate an early political 
solution (five days after and again 15 days after the RCD launched an attack) with 
stakeholders. Soon after, and without South Africa's prior knowledge, South Africa's 
rival, Zimbabwe and its SADC allies decided to stage a military intervention. At this 
point, South Africa's legitimacy as a peacemaker was severely questioned. South 
Africa also lost its trust due to its intervention in Lesotho while it refused to join SADC 










In 1999, the change of South African leadership that focused on coerCIve 
diplomacy, as well as the development of a political hurting stalemate among 
stakeholders, seemed to present an appropriate opportunity for new negotiation. As a 
result, the Lusaka Agreement was established under external pressure, but ultimately, it 
did not produce any results. According to Zartman's argument, this was because both 
sides faced no prospects of either victory or defeat, and the conflict was not costly to the 
DRC government or the RCD.574 On the contrary, the war option was beneficial for 
both adversaries. There was therefore no incentive to negotiate due to the absence of a 
painful deadlock. 
Ripe timing for another negotiation arrived in 2001 with a change of Congolese 
leadership. From that point onward and with the collaboration of President Joseph 
Kabila, President Mbeki was able to fully implement his peacemaking initiatives. 
However, negotiation at the ICD proved difficult due to continued war profit made by 
the stakeholders. 
Identification and Management of the Main Spoiler 
Handling spoilers based on an analysis of their problems IS crucial for mediators 
because a spoiler's presence can enormously complicate the peace process. Previously, 
the major spoilers for the DRC peace process were considered to be former 
ex-FARIInterahmawe, which is branded as a "negative force," as well as Laurent 
Kabila,575 but Kabila was merely a puppet of the Rwandan government. Particular 
attention should be paid to the Rwandan government, which was one of the key actors 
574 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Resolution," 276 











in the three inter-related wars and one of the main spoilers in the DRC peace process 
apart from the Rwandan militia. 
Rwanda and its government are understood to have been the epicentre of the Great 
Lakes conflict. A massive displacement of Rwandans was observed in eastern Zaire, 
where Rwandan genocidaires controlled the refugee camps. The Rwandaphones' 
nationality had been the main issue in eastern Congo and Uganda. Rebel groups, such 
as the AFOL, the RCD, and the Forces Oemocratiques de Liberation du Rwanda 
(FDLR),576 or the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (former 
ex-FARfInterahmawe), were all created by Rwanda and heavily influenced the ORC's 
politics. The RCD only "replaced" the AFOL, with the exception of the AFDL's 
leader, Laurent Kabila. The Rwandan army invaded the Congo twice and committed 
war crimes against civilians during the First and Second Congo Wars. It maintained 
its presence in eastern DRC through illegal occupation, fighting and the illegal 
exploitation of resources. To date, the Rwandan government refuses to establish a 
dialogue with the FDLR, who wish to return to Rwanda. 
In the First and Second Congo Wars, the Rwandan government initially denied its 
involvement in fighting in eastern DRC. Eventually, it admitted to its presence in the 
DRC and justified it on security grounds. Rwanda maintained that it had ceased 
arming and aiding rebel groups following the signing of a peace agreement in December 
2002. 577 In February 2003, the former governor of North Kivu, Serufuli, 
acknowledged that he had received arms and uniforms directly from Rwanda in an 
576 The FDLR, comprised of ex-FAR, Interahamwe and post-genocide recruits, has 
claimed to be a military-political group since 2000. Marina Rafti, "South Kivu: a 
Sanctuary for the Rebellion of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda," 
Discussion Paper, 2006.05, Institute of Development Policy and Management, 
University of Antwerp, 1 











apparent breach of the UN arms embargo. 578 Several thousand Rwandan soldiers were 
integrated into RCD-Goma and the militia under Serufuli.579 
7.2 The Nature, Major Causes and Aggravating Factors of the Conflict 
Pretoria has been accused of a tendency to oversimplify and was criticised for its lack of 
analytical skills in the peacemaking process.580 Conflict is a matter of perception, 
which should be changed by mediators to reach a better understanding of the conflict's 
dynamics and find an acceptable solution. Thus, the key issues listed below should be 
well understood and analysed by South Africa. These points were not well cited in the 
cease fire and peace agreements. Instead, the signatures on the agreements were 
prioritised over the content of the agreements themselves. 
Extensive Regionalised Dynamics o! Congo 's War 
The lCD, which was not genuinely "Congolese," may have ansen from a critkal 
misinterpretation of the nature of the conflict. The Congo War was neither a civil war 
. fl· 581 nor an mter-state con ICt. It should be acknowledged as "regionalised," and a joint 
solution should be sought among regional actors. To provide one example, although 
the FDLR is mostly comprised of Rwandan nationals,582 the Rwandan government 
insisted that Kinshasa assume responsibility for its Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR), which is considered a 
578 AI, "DRC: Arming the East," 49 
579 ICG, "Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and 
Reintegration," Africa Report No.63, 23 May 2003, 2 
580 Solomon, "The Poverty of Pretoria's Preventive Diplomacy in the Great Lakes 
Region," 141-143 
581 Carayannis, "The Complex Wars ofthe Congo," 102 
582 Some Congolese nationals have joined the FLDR as well. The author received such 










Congolese affair.583 However, this is a regional problem, as the FDLR was formed 
following the genocide in 1994 and the conflict's spillover into Zaire. 
To complicate these regionalised dynamics, Carayannis highlights the diversity of 
actors in the Congo War, particularly the non-state actors including international 
companies.584 External patrons also assist spoilers with arms, capital and sanctuary.585 
This complex network can be described as follows: 
"The external dimension of the conflict has seen multiple invasions of the territory of a 
sovereign state by various coalitions of African states claiming security threats, while the 
internal dimensions of the wars involve multiple internal rebellions with competing agendas 
and foreign sponsors, and with varying degrees of local mobilisation and support. It also 
includes more localised conflicts that involve indigenous militias, non-Congolese insurgency 
groups operating out of the Congo, and competing ethnic groups fighting over control of local 
resources and population. There is no neat dividing line, however, between the external and 
internal dimensions of this conflict, because while they may be discrete systems of conflict, 
they contain financial, political, and ideological factors that cut across conflict boundaries and 
link them together in global networks of war. The frequency in realignments among the 
numerous state and non-state actors in these wars, sometimes resulting in unpredictable and 
surprising bedfellows, can best be understood when they are analysed within the context of 
the social networks in which they operate.,,586 
583 Rafti, "South Kivu," 20; ICG, "Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: a New Approach 
to Disarmament and Reintegration," Africa Report No.63, 23 May 2003, 3 
584 Carayannis, "The Complex Wars of the Congo," 102 
585 Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," 51 











Therefore, the recognition of the Congo War merely as regionalised does not 
reflect the extraordinary depth and complexity of the conflict; it should be perceived as 
an extensive regionalised war. Considering the degree of internal, external and global 
influence these actors have over producing and prolonging the Congo War, I argue that 
Stedman's definition of spoilers should be broadened in the Congo War context to 
include "states and non-state actors, who directly or indirectly contribute in conflict, and 
make no efforts to attain positive peace." With this extended definition, more spoilers 
can be identified and punished accordingly. While international approaches have 
tended to view the conflict through conventional lenses, recognition of the Congo War 
with a diversity of actors, is therefore critical to create a different peacemaking 
approach. 
Rwandaphones' Nationality and Land Issues 
The Great Lakes meeting in Pretoria in January 1997 welcomed Zaire's assurance to 
grant full citizenship rights to all its nationals. The Lusaka agreement recalled that "all 
ethnic groups, nationalities whose people and territory consulted what became Congo at 
independence (in 1960) must enjoy equal rights and protection under the law as 
citizens.,,587 However, the nationality issue of the Rwandan community, which was 
discussed again at the lCD, was left to debate within the transitional national 
assembly.S88 Similarly, the ICD examined the land right approved in the Final Acts as 
"rights to ancestral territory,,,S89 but future transitional bodies were ultimately left to 
58; Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Preamble, 
www.usip.org/library/pa/drc/drc 0710999.html, accessed on 6 August, 2006 
588 ICG, "Storm Clouds over Sun City," 5 
589 The Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations, The Final Act, 64, www.reliefweb.int, 











address this matter. 590 A 1973 land law has not been well practised and most land 
transactions or arrangements have been settled through customary law.59 ! Very few 
records exist to confirm land ownership.592 
The law of 12 November 2004 on Congolese nationality specifically states in its 
preamble that "(translation) this Act aims to address the provisions of ... the Transitional 
Constitution as well as the pertinent criticism of Congolese legislation on nationality 
expressed by the delegates who sit on the lCD, particularly Order of 28 March 1971, 
Article 15 of Law of 5 January 1972, and Decree-Law of 29 January 1999, which 
amends and completes Law of 29 June 1981 (DRC 12 November 2004, i)." Article 6 
of the 2004 law continues that Congolese nationality can be obtained by "any person 
belonging to an ethnic group or nationality whose people and land were part of the 
territory that became the Congo (on 30 June 1960).,,593 
As this law did not permit dual nationality,594 Rwandaphones must automatically 
regain Congolese nationality. Their status, however, is still precarious and they remain 
as stateless persons. Issues are still pending regarding the extent to which the 
Nationality Act's provisions will be implemented at a local level and whether concerned 
persons will be able to effectively exercise their right to nationality. 
:;90 ICG, 'Storm Clouds Over Sun City," 5 
591 UN-HABITAT, Draft Concept Note, "Addressing Land and Property Issues III 
Eastern DRC," 2008 
592 Ibid 
593 UNHCR, Working Paper on the Problematic of DRC Kinyarwanda Speaking 
Populations' rights to the Congolese Nationality, June 2007 











The Link between the Conflict, Exploitation, Arms and Business 
Following the publication of the UN Panel of Expert reports in 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
many governments acknowledged the relationship between the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources, arms trafficking and conflict: 595 
"Without the wealth generated by the illegal exploitation and the continuation of natural 
resources, arms cannot be bought, hence the conflict, which almost always involves grave 
human rights abuses and large-scale population displacement, cannot be perpetuated. 
Without arms, the ability to continue the conflict, thereby creating the conditions for illegal 
exploitation of resources, cannot be sustained.,,596 
Internal exploitation of resources in the DRC is viewed as a contributing factor to 
major causes of conflict, and arms trafficking, which comes from external sources, 
exacerbates and prolongs elements of the conflict. 597 These three factors are chained 
in a vicious cycle as depicted in the following diagram: 
595 HRW, "The Curse of Gold," 118 
596 UN Panel of Experts (8/2003/1027), 23 October 2003, 19 














Conflict Arms Trafficking 
Source: UN Report on Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other 
Forms of Wealth of the DRC. 23 October 2003 
As discussed in Chapter 1, it is unlikely that parties will negotiate a compromise 
when the conflict is not costly to either of them. The exploitation in the DRC has been 
"systematic and systemic" and has flourished because of the pre-existing structures 
developed with the arrival of the AFDL.598 The massive flow of arms into the region 
in the context of "deliberate state diversion, weak state control and lack of transparency 
of arms stocks" has threatened to undermine the peace process.599 
South Africa claims a high degree of responsibility by having maintained the 
conflict in these two domains. Being the sole arms producer on the continent, it began 
selling arms to war countries in the post-Cold War and post-apartheid eras when the 
South African arms industry lost its domestic demands. This included Rwanda and 
Zaire after the spillover of the Rwandan conflict. It continued doing so to all sides of 
the conflict and thereby fueled conflicts in the Great Lakes region. This was carried 
out against South Africa's human rights principles, NCACC principles and UN 
embargos. South Africa has also been active in the mining industry in the Congo since 
,,98 UN Panel of Experts (S/20011357), 12 April 2001, para. 6 











the 1900s. The practice of using the rebel groups in exchange for mineral rights 
continued and became more common during the First and Second Congo Wars.600 
More attention should be paid to economic factors that contribute to war, which matter 
more than other issues such as ethnicity and religion.601 This is because rebellions 
have gradually changed their character, "becoming less political and more 
. I ,,60" commerCIa. -
Human Rights Watch draws a further connection between the exploitation of 
resources and international business.603 This is related to a violation of business norms 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines 
+ MI' . IE' 604 lor u tmatlOna nterpnses. The OECD Guidelines are the first international 
instrument on corporate social responsibility to provide a government-supported 
mechanism for monitoring and influencing corporate behaviour, such as respect for 
human rights and supporting sustainable development.605 
In this regard, the UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporation and Other Business Enterprises was signed on 15 April 
2005. The resolution outlined global human rights standards for corporate 
'b'l' d b'l' 606 responsl I tty an accounta I tty. This resolution intended to "recognise that 
business could contribute to the enjoyment of human rights ... through investment, 
600 According to World Bank, this approach of using rebel groups to raise finance by 
selling the future mineral rights is not new, but it is becoming more common in Africa. 
World Bank Policy Research Report, Breaking the Conflict Trap, 128 
601 Ibid, 4 
602 Ibid, 82 
603 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Paris: OECD), 2000; and HRW, 
"The Curse of Gold," 118 
604 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 119 
605 Ibid 
606 Forbes, "UN Resolution Mixes Human rights and Business," 5 June, 2005, 












employment creation, and the stimulation of economic growth.,,607 However, South 
Africa, as well as the United States and Australia, voted against the resolution and 
accused it of being "too weak,,608 and of having an "anti-business agenda.,,609 
7.3 South Africa's Neutrality: Neglecting Rwanda's Problems 
As a mediator, South Africa failed to playa neutral role by not creating a feeling of 
equality and confidence. Rather, a "we-they" enemy structure between the two actors 
was aggravated by President Mbeki's favouritism toward Rwanda and the rebel groups. 
He not only failed to identify Rwanda as one of main spoilers, but he was a major 
patron to Rwanda economically, politically and militarily by using manipulation. To 
recall, South Africa's foreign policy shifted its emphasis from human rights to security 
and wealth creation with the inauguration of President Mbeki; this foreign policy 
coincided with that of Rwanda. 
With this background, President Mbeki overlooked the regional dimension of the 
DRC conflict, including Rwanda's internal and external problems, which required 
closer attention. 
607 Forbes, "UN Resolution Mixes Human rights and Business" 
608 Ibid 
609 Global Policy Forum "UN and Business," wwwllglobalpolicy.org/reform/indxbiz.htm, 











The FDLR's Tension with the Rwandan Government 
The "gachacha,,610 process was implemented to address Rwanda's internal post-conflict 
issues, but another reconciliation problem outside the country remains unsolved. 
Despite the Lusaka and Pretoria Agreements, which cited the FDLR's disarmament and 
repatriation to Rwanda, many FDLR members are still not willing to do so and remain 
in eastern DRC. According to Zartman, while the FDLR's problem has been neglected 
for almost 15 years, the FDLR "consolidate[ed] its political organisations, challenge[d] 
the legitimacy of the state, [and] look[ed] for neighbours' (the DRC) support and 
sanctuary." 611 In addition to the Rwandan government, the FDLR, another main 
spoiler, should be closely examined in solving the Congo problem. 
After a series of meetings, FDLR President Ignace Murwanashyaka pledged on 31 
March 2005 that the FDLR would end hostilities and become a political organisation.612 
The FDLR was to be disarmed and repatriated to Rwanda according to the Pretoria 
Agreement. In early 2005, using the mediation of the Sant'Egidio community,613 
President Kabila agreed to begin negotiations to repatriate the FDLR to Rwanda.614 
The "Rome Declaration" of 2005 called to create an international follow-up committee 
610 It is a traditional, local form of justice in Rwanda, meaning green grassy knoll in 
Kinyarwandan language. The gachacha system has been upgraded to meet 
international human rights standards, and the requirements of a fair trial, and has 
been adapted for use in dealing with the huge number of genocide detainees. 
Christopher Miller and Mary King, A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and 
Conflict Studies, (Geneve, University for Peace, 2004), 44 
611 Zartman, "Bargaining and Conflict Resolution," 284 
612 FDLR: Declaration des Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (Rome, 
March 31, 2005) 
61:3 Sant'Egidio is a Rome·based Catholic Church organization, created in 1968, which 
has been involved in peace mediation and reconciliation of parties in conflict. In 1992, 
Sant' Egidio mediated the peace agreement that ended the conflict in Mozambique. See 












· h d' d" 61'i to mom tor t e Isarmament an repatnatIOn. . The FDLR advocated that they should 
be included in the Inter-Rwandan Dialogue with the Rwandan government for 
reconciliation.616 Kigali announced that it would receive and reintegrate the combatants 
into Rwandan society, but bluntly rejected discussions with the FDLR.617 
The Rwandan government marginalised the FDLR since it was treated as a 
"negative force" by the UN and AU and was not perceived as a political actor in any 
agreement.618 They were consequently viewed as unable and unwanted to embark on 
meaningful political dialogue. The international community (UNSC's five permanent 
members and the Group of Eight),619 which accepted the Rwandan government's 
position regarding the FDLR, did not pressure Kigali to negotiate with them. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, apart from the FDLR, the Rwandan 
government's army also participated in extensive killing in Rwanda and eastern Congo. 
Labeling only one party as a negative force was therefore illogical as it assigned an 
already unequal status between the FDLR and the Rwandan government. It hindered 
any actors from participating in the peace process and decreased the likelihood of 
creating a moment that was ripe for mediation. 
615 Rafti, "South Kivu," 20 
616 Ibid, 9-10. This was also confirmed during my meeting with the FDLR leader in 
Walikale, North Kivu on 2 February, 2008 
617 Letter dated April 4 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda addressed 
to the UN Security Council President, S/2005/223. 
618 Moreover, the Pretoria Agreement identifies ex-FAR and Interahamwe as groups to 
be disarmed, but does not mention the newly named FDLR. 
619 The Group of Eight is an international forum for the governments of Canada, France, 










Regional Tension between Rwanda and the DRC 
A regional tension between the governments of Rwanda and the ORC has intensified, 
especially since the aftermath of Rwandan genocide. The only regional agreement 
between the two governments under the leadership of President Mbeki was that of 
Pretoria in 2002. This touched merely on military issues, and not on important 
political (nationality of Rwandaphones) and economic (exploitation of resources) 
questions that were central to conflict in the Great Lakes region.62o 
The objective of mediation is not only to end civil war or simply attain negative 
peace through a military solution. Mediation should focus primarily on building 
confidence between the parties (the ORC and Rwanda) in order to create conditions that 
are likely to prevent new conflicts. This is why a political dialogue, or an 
Inter-Regional Dialogue, is required.62I To date, no diplomatic relationship between 
the ORC and Rwanda, nor any solid conflict prevention and resolution mechanism has 
been established in the region. 
7.4 The SADC's Internal Politics 
The SAOC's politics since the days of apartheid reveal the reason why the ORC peace 
process has been crippled by political and economic rivalries among SAOC members. 
Oue to the southern African countries' resentment toward South Africa during the 
apartheid era, the South African government has been extremely wary of adopting a 
prominent political posture. Apartheid and the liberation movement created a balance 
of power based more on history than on formal power, which has prevented Pretoria 
620 Curtis, "The South African Approach to Peace building in the Great Lakes Region of 
Africa," 153 
621 This was also emphasised by one traditional leader in the DRC during the meeting 











from playing a hegemonic role and enabling Zimbabwe to pose a rival source of 
influence. 
Due to President Mandela's international stature and South Africa's continued 
economic dominance in the post-apartheid era, Zimbabwean President Mugabe 
intensified his rivalry with President Mandela. Both countries benefitted from mining 
contracts during the First and Second Congo Wars. Zimbabwe, however, was a 
regional economic powerhouse at the time and had a political incentive to use the DRC 
to seek revenge against South Africa. 
During the Second Congo War, the SADC was split into two groups, including 
South Africa's peaceful dialogue group and Zimbabwe's military intervention group. 
Disputes over the status and structure of the SADC Organ between the SADC Chair 
(President Mandela) and the Organ chair (President Mugabe) continued because of lack 
of common values among SADC states. In addition, competition for mining contracts 
contributed to difficulties and delays in the ICD. This "we-they" enemy structure 
inside the SADC exacerbated and prolonged similar structures in the DRC between the 
Mobutu government and the AFDL, and between the Kabila government and the RCD. 
Summary 
By analysing the key issues of the DRC conflict, it is understood that the DRC wars 
pivoted on access to resources. South Africa's peacemaking initiatives were 
implemented to achieve the same objective and gain access to resources in the Great 
Lakes region. This is why both adversaries in the Second Congo War, as well as the 











negotiate. Economic Issues were not mentioned at the ICD and within other 
agreements. 
The South African government did not know how to mediate effectively and 
failed to understand the dynamics of the DRC conflict. The morality of South Africa's 
peacemaking approach was also questionable. South Africa kept and reinforced a 
close political (the facilitation of regime-making processes and the prioritisation of 
Rwanda's economic and security concerns), military (arms sales) and economic (the 
exploitation of resources) relationship with the AFDL, RCD, and most importantly with 
one of the main spoilers, the Rwandan government. This relationship continued by 
ignoring human rights principles, the NCACC, various embargoes and principles of 
neutrality, while South Africa manipulated ceasefire and peace agreements. South 
Africa used a coercive approach only for the DRC regarding transitional authority, but 
not for Rwanda in regard to its gross human rights violations. South Africa's morality 
in this process fueled the war in order to meet its economic interests, instead of 












How can South Africa be a Better Peacemaker 
in the Great Lakes Region? 
"It is easy enough to shout slogans, to sign manifestos, but it is quite a different matter to build, manage, 
command, spend days and nights seeking the solution of problems. " 
--Patrice Lumumba, former Prime Minister, My Country, 1961 
"Armchair conflict-resolution experts from the developed world tend to see only primary colors and get 
partisan pretty fast in African conflicts. " 
--Farah Maalim Mohamed, Kenyan member of parliament, 22-24 March 1996 during a colloquium on 
security in Burundi (Daily Nation, Kenya, 28 March 1996) 
This dissertation presents a critical analysis of South Africa's peacemaking experiences 
in the Great Lakes conflicts since the 1990s. In order to prevent the recurrence of 
conflict in the region, peacemaking needs to be thoroughly reviewed as the basis of 
peace settlement. Using primary and secondary sources, as well as my observation as 
a humanitarian worker in eastern DRC and interviews with key opinion makers, this 
study provided a critical analysis. Although the study has several limitations, it may 
make a positive contribution to South Africa's future peacemaking efforts. 
My argument about South Africa's unsuccessful peacemaking efforts centres on 
South Africa's inadequate knowledge of mediation skills, its contradictory foreign 
policy, insufficient understanding of the nature, major causes and aggravating factors of 
the Great Lakes conflict, and the SADC's paradoxical policies. 
South Africa did not fully respect its key guidelines regarding effective mediation. 
The objective of mediation is to create the conditions that lead to conflict de-escalation. 











leadership only focused on conflict resolution and immediate cessation. They did not 
employ principles of preventive diplomacy, which wo~ld have recognised the nature 
and key issues of the conflict. Since South Africa failed to identify the root causes and 
nature of conflict, it simply applied its own successful peacemaking model from 1994 to 
the DRC without fully analysing and understanding the extensive regionalised 
dimension of the DRC conflict. This is probably part of the reason that South Africa 
failed to understand the degree to which the Rwanda was involved in the DRC conflict. 
As a result, South Africa did not identify Rwanda as one of main spoilers and thereby 
failed to manage it accordingly. 
The timing of South Africa's intervention was not appropriate or logical. During 
the First Congo War, the lengthy and slow peacemaking process, which was initially led 
by South Africa and Kenya, did not coincide with the speed at which the AFDL 
expanded. And during the Second Congo War, the rivalry between South Africa and 
Zimbabwe and the unclear authority of the SADC's Organ, interfered with South 
Africa's attempted peacemaking initiatives. Stakeholders' access to war profit 
contributed to the unripe conditions for negotiation. 
South Africa's neutrality as a peacemaker and the consistency of its foreign policy 
has been severely questioned. South Africa neglected to create a feeling of equality 
between the Rwandan government and the FDLR, and between the rival governments of 
Rwanda and the DRC. As South Africa favoured Rwanda, it did not condemn or 
instigate a formal inquiry against Rwanda and Uganda's gross human rights violations, 
which would have been an appropriate mediation tactic. On the contrary, South Africa 











agreements and the lCD, and thereby reinforced its economic, political and military 
relationship with Rwanda. 
Similar behaviour was also observed among South African companies, which 
fueled the conflict and violated human rights by expanding economic opportunities in 
arms and minerals. Direct business deals with the AFDL and the RCD, which were 
supported by Rwanda, became a norm for the South African government and its 
business community. This important economic dimension of the extensive 
regionalised war, as well as Rwandaphones' nationality and land issues, was not 
adequately addressed in any agreements or dialogues, as South Africa prioritised 
signatures over the content of the agreements themselves. 
Finally, the SADC's internal politics also prevented South Africa from playing an 
effective peacemaking role. This includes the history of apartheid and the SADC's 
establishment, an ongoing rivalry between Presidents Mandela and Mbeki over regional 
leadership, a dispute over the function of the SADC's Organ, mining interests in the 
DRC by SADC members, especially South Africa and Zimbabwe, and disagreement 
within the SADC over peaceful dialogue and military intervention in the Second Congo 
War. 
In whole, South Africa demonstrated an amoral approach as a peacemaker. 
While it promoted its peacemaking efforts, it was involved in the exploitation of 
resources and fueled the conflict by trading arms to the irresponsible states. 
Throughout the peacemaking process, President Mbeki acted as an unbiased and 
powerful manipulator and therefore lost his credibility as a mediator. Peacemaking 
processes were carried out in order to fulfill South Africa's ambitious economic 











and non-state actors. The peacemaker's amorality also led to a relapse of conflict, 
which took place within one month after the DRC's presidential election in late 2006. 
Using the "within five-year timeframe" argument to measure the success of peace 
implementation, the DRC's peace process completely failed. 
Based on the lessons learned from South Africa's peacemaking experiences since 
1996, what can South Africa do to act as a better peacemaker in the Great Lakes region? 
This dissertation concludes with the following suggestions. 
8.1 Understanding and Managing Main Issues and Spoilers of the DRe Wars 
In order for South Africa to develop peacemaking strategies based on local dynamics, a 
full analysis of the DRC wars should be conducted. This will allow South Africa to 
properly identify key issues and spoilers of the conflict at the earliest stage and to take 
appropriate, coercive or non-coercive approaches toward concerned parties. 
Arms Control and Resources Management 
The economic dimension of the conflict, which is the key to solving the conflict, should 
be well stipulated in agreements or dialogue. South Africa has a major responsibility 
toward the domain of illegal exploitation of natural resources, arms trafficking, 
international business and the DRC's conflict. South Africa should aim to become a 
responsible arms seller based on NCACC principles and thereby prevent further threats 
to peace. At the same time, a practical agenda for economic development and the 
effective regulation of the mining markets needs to be respected and implemented, 
including the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 622 South Africa took a 











leading role in the development of the Kimberley process, which aimed to halt the 
international trade in illegal diamonds in 2000. This is the most important example of 
international action to reduce rebels' access to commodity markets. 623 A similar 
process can be initiated in the DRC with other commodity markets as well. 
Respect of Human Rights in Business 
In order to ensure that South African corporations' business activities do not have 
detrimental consequences for human rights in the DRC, the South African government 
must respect OECD Guidelines and the UN Human Rights Commission Resolution on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises. The South African 
government, together with the DRC government, can actively monitor and evaluate the 
activities of South African multinationals, while they ensure the development of local 
communities. 
Instead of focusing only on its own economIC development, South Africa is 
encouraged to create win-win situations on a fair commercial basis, which benefit both 
South Africa and the Congolese people and have the potential to lead to regional peace 
and development. The same practice should be applied within the SADC states. 
Enactment of Rwandaphones' Nationality and Land Ownership Laws 
The issues surrounding Rwandaphone nationality and land ownership have been 
pending for a long time. South Africa needs to ensure a thorough analysis of this issue 
and its enactment by the DRC government. 
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The Use of Coercive Skills to Spoilers 
South Africa needs to recongise both the Rwandan government and the FDLR as main 
spoilers of the Congo Wars. Naming other spoilers based on my wider definition of 
spoilers is also important, such as those mentioned in the UN Reports. All the spoilers 
should be seriously condemned and punished accordingly using sanctions, penalties and 
other means. A formal inquiry on gross human rights violations committed by the 
Rwandan government and its army in the DRC needs to be conducted as soon as 
possible. 
8.2 Establishment of a Confidence-Building Mechanism 
The objective of mediation is to build trust through a political solution and create 
conditions that lead to conflict de-escalation. South Africa should make an effort to 
reach a better understanding of the conflict dynamics and ultimately an agreed upon 
solution. 
Inter-Rwandan Dialogue 
It is necessary to eliminate the "we-they" enemy structure, create a feeling of equality 
between the parties and gain each party's trust. South Africa should therefore refrain 
from naming and labeling the FDLR as "negative force," which implies that the others 
are "positive forces." This suggests an unequal relationship between the different 
parties. 
Since it is also vital that all stakeholders participate in decision-making so that 
they can own and respect the agreements, South Africa should invite the FDLR in 











Rwandan government and the FDLR (Inter-Rwandan Dialogue), as the former refuses 
dialogue while the latter is ready. 
Inter-Regional Dialogue 
Similarly, Inter-Regional Dialogue between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda 
should be conducted. Prior to it, there must be a formal inquiry on human rights 
violations committed by Rwanda in the DRC. This can lead to greater chances of 
reconciliation. The DORRR process should also be a joint operation between the two 
states. 
Confidence-Building within the SA DC 
Another confidence-building process is crucial within the SADC in order to mitigate the 
animosity between South Africa and Zimbabwe. Mechanisms for peacemaking, 
security and economic cooperation should be thoroughly discussed and agreed upon by 
SADC members. Consensus over the SADC Organ's function is also required. 
***** 
South Africa needs to ensure that it should only facilitate problem-solving for the 
concerned parties. If all of the above-mentioned actions are implemented as soon as 
possible, the present danger that threatens future peace in the ORC and the entire Great 
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Question List for Interview 
1. Mining in Kivu 
When was the first time that the mining started in the Kivus? What kinds of minerals 
were mined? Since when do South African companies have a presence in the Kivus? 
2. South Africa's Mediator Role in DRC 
Why was President Mandela selected to be the mediator between Kabila and Mobutu in 
the South African warship? Why does the South African government appoint incumbent 
government officials, who are already occupied with their own work, as mediators? 
3. SADC 
Who encouraged the DRC to join SADC? Upon which motive did they join? If it 
was to bring regional peace and development under SADC, why was Rwanda not 
included? 
4. Intervention in 1998 DRC War 
Why did South Africa not intervene verbally or by action in the DRC while intervention 
was done rapidly in Lesotho? 
5. Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
ICD started in Addis Ababa in October 2001, and was taken over by South Africa. 
How much has South Africa spent in ICD? Why has South Africa spent so much time 
and money for ICD? 
The peace problem in the Congo is connected with Rwanda. Do you think there is a 
need to organize Inter-Regional Dialogue and Inter-Rwandan Dialogue. If not, why? 
Many Congolese whom I interviewed and many authors say that President Mbeki is not 
a neutral mediator. What is your opinion? 
6. UN Panel Report 
In the UN Panel Report on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources of the DRC, 
fifteen South African companies were accused in the illegal exploitation. Why has the 











South African companies listed in the same UN Report accompanied President Mbeki's 
delegation to the DRC in January 2004? 
7. Number and Type of South African companies' presence in DRC 
How many South African mining companies have been working in the Congo? What 
are their locations and the duration of their stay? Has South Africa have renewed 
interest in ORC's minerals since the fall of Mobutu/arrival of Laurent Kabila? 
8. Human rights and transnational corporations 
UN Commission for Human Rights adopted a resolution in 2003 on 'Human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises.' Only South Africa, 
Australia, and the U.S. voted against the resolution on the grounds that it was too weak 
or it had an 'anti-business agenda.' What is your opinion on this matter? 
9. Main Cause of Great Lakes Conflict 
Do you consider the natural resources as the main cause of the Great Lakes connict or 
merely an aggravating factor that has contributed to conflict? 
10. South Africa's Conflict Prevention Strategy in Great Lakes Region 
What can South Africa do to prevent another deadly conflict and to bring long-lasting 












List of Interviewees 
Date Place Nationality Profession 
6 March, 2007 Kinshasa (DRC) South African Diplomat 
18 July, 2007 Rutshuru (DRC) Congolese Traditional leader 
2 February, 2008 Walikale (DRC) Rwandan FDLR leader 











Interview with one Congolese Government Official, 1 June 2008 
Question: There were several waves of Great Lakes region contlict, but how did 
these conflicts start? 
I think that the Great Lakes region has seen several such events and to not go too far 
into these long stories, I would like to note that at this time in Zaire there was President 
Mobutu, that in Rwanda there was President Habyarimana in the 90s, we also saw 
General and Marshal Idi Amin in Uganda, in Sudan there was the rebellion in the south 
with John Garang and there you have the situation as it was, and in Burundi there was 
also the Tutsi regime of Colonel Micombero. 
That was the situation in the Great Lakes area in the 80s and 90s. At that time the DRC, 
which was very powerful and known as Zaire, played an impOltant role in maintaining 
and supporting the regimes which were in Rwanda with President Habyarimana, there 
was also an expectation with President Micombero, who would become the victim of a 
coup d'etat because he was considered not very radical, there were already conflicts 
between Hutus and Tutsi and before we speak of the genocide in Rwanda, there were 
already precursor ethnic contlicts in Burundi where several people were massacred. 
I forgot to mention that in the region, at that time, there was also Emperor Bokassa in 
the CAR, because that too is still in the region, and also remember that in the Congo 
there was President Marian Ngouabi and in Angola there was opposition between 
President Dos Santos and the Savimbi rebels, the two being supported by Marshal 
Mobutu against the communist powers in Luanda. Zambia and Tanzania remain the two 
most stable countries in this context. Then, very rapidly and at that time practically our 
country, Zaire, supported the liberation movements in southern Africa be they the ANC 
in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia, ZANU in Zimbabwe, because all this will be 
important in the future development of relations in the DRC. And then first there was 
the death of Congo Brazzaville President Ngouabi, who was killed and replaced by 
General Yombi Opango, who was in turn replaced by another, General Dennis Sassou 
Ngesu, who, to summarise, had both good and bad relations with Mobutu's Zaire and 
who ended by himself when Perestroika was introduced and ended up democratically 
overthrown in favour of a civilian president Pascal Lisouba, but this one too as time 
went by had to face civil wars with President Sassou Ngesu and the influx of Congo 











In Bangui, in CAR, the French played an important role in overthrowing General Bedel 
Bokassa, brought in a member of his family to replace President David Dacko, but this 
one too ended up being overthrown by General Kolingba, and we saw military authority 
replace civilian authority and then, at what I think is the culmination, the replacement of 
President Felix Patasse by the actual president, the General Bozize and who at that time 
was in war with Jean Pierre Bemba's MLC. 
In South Sudan, we saw its evolution first because it was a rebellion, which occupied 
the north-eastern part of the DRC, John Garang's SPLA troops were in Uganda but also 
occupied parts of Haut-Uele and Ituri, and thus the conflicts in Sudan had repercussions 
on the situation in the eastern DRC. 
In Uganda we had Milton Obote, who, with support of Tanzanian President Julius 
Nyerere, overthrew Marshal Idi Amin, and there were many Ugandan refugees on 
Zairean soil. Milton Obote was not able to stay in power long because he had too many 
conflicts with those accused of being partisans of Idi Amin and so Uganda also had a 
coup d'etat in which Museveni took power, which he still holds today. 
The rise to power of Museveni is an imp0I1ant event because in Uganda, we will find 
those Rwandan refugees who came to Uganda starting in '58, '59, and '60 up until 
independence and among whom we will find the leaders of RPF who occupied 
important positions in the country. And you know that the Arusha Agreements, 
negotiation between the Hutu authority of President Habyarimana and the Rwandan 
Tutsi RPF's rebellion, in fact the Rwandan refugees who had grouped into the RPF 
under the drive of General Paul Kagame, it is this movement that will begin attacks and 
who, through the Arusha negotiations in which President Habyarimana accepted a 
power sharing arrangement between the Hutu and the Tutsi. We know that the RPF 
march starting in Uganda practically caused the death of President Habyarimana and 
Burundi's Hutu President, and the tragic event of the genocide of the Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu in 1994 in Rwanda. 
It is in this environment, also, that we will see two Hutu presidents die in Burundi and 
so there is also the return of Tutsi power of President Buyoya in Burundi confronted by 
the RPF victory in Rwanda, but there also were interventions by several other powers, 











power. And we also know that this created the population displacements with Burundi 
Tutsi refugees, who ended up either in Rwanda or in Tanzania and also in other 
countries. 
One cannot understand this situation in Rwanda with the RPF forces against President 
Mobutu who was considered a Hutu ally and of Habyarimana, thus a very strong 
opposition point and as you know the link between Mobutu and Museveni in Uganda 
with the RPF who had just come into power in Rwanda, these two countries considered 
that Mobutu supp0l1ed the opposition forces and thus these countries sought all possible 
opportunities to overthrow President Mobutu who, in those 2 years, was the powerful 
master of central Africa and was considered as someone who had stayed too long in 
power. As if that weren't enough, President Dos Santos of Angola, in the west, 
considered that the support President Mobutu of Zaire gave to Savimbi with the supp0l1 
of the Americans had done a lot of harm to Angola and so we saw progressive 
encircling measures which would include the regimes of Rwanda, Uganda, and to a 
lesser extent also the Tanzanian regime who considered Mobutu the enemy of all central 
African countries and also of Angola in the west, but even further there was South 
Africa who, with the rise to power of the ANC, also considered that if Mobutu had 
helped it, he had also worked closely with the Americans against the revolutionary 
movements in southern Africa. 
So we end up with neighbouring countries that wanted to overthrow President Mobutu 
and countries in southern Africa who thought that his continuing power had slowed the 
African opposition. This is why with western support it was decided in '96 that 
Congolese opposition movements should be organised, for instance in taking the RPF 
which was the party of Mzee Laurent Desire Kabila, long-time opponent since the 
assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba in 1961, and it is at this time that he finally 
decided to oppose, we will see also the Congolese Tutsi movement who were refugees 
in Uganda and will also become a part of this coalition, we will see also Kisasu N gandu, 
who was our Lumumbiste in the resistance, and of course also the Banyamulenge of 
South Kivu filled this on the side of the Massasu Shi group, Nindanga and Tutsi group 
of North Kivu with Deogratis Bugera. 
This was the group who was first contacted by Rwanda and Uganda by putting them in 
contact with the Kigali power the PRF people to plan a regime change in Congo Zaire, 











has been called the AFDL march, but we know that there was in fact intervention by the 
two neighbouring countries, Rwanda and Uganda, who supplied arms and munitions 
with western support, but also with the support of another country, South Africa, who 
supported the regimes of those two countries, and at that time the long march of the 
AFDL will begin in November 1996 to end on the 17th of May 1997 with President 
Mobutu fleeing the country and the declaration by the AFDL that they had taken power. 
While combat occupies the eastern parts of Zaire at that time, the last resistance to 
power in Kinshasa will crystallise in Bandundu province, more specifically in Kenge 
some 200km from Kinshasa. The battle of Kenge was a very difficult battle and it was 
at that moment that Angola, seeing that Savimbi continued to help President Mobutu 
and if the AFDL troops did not prevail in Kenge, Savimbi would become even more 
powerful and create the problem and Angola would intervene militarily especially since 
they had saved the regime of President Sassou Ngwesou in Congo Brazzaville, they will 
thus intervene in the west and will come to take the coalition troops of President 
Mobutu and UNIT A so the battle of Kenge was won thanks to the intervention of 
Angola who will accompany the Rwanda and Uganda coalition in taking Kinshasa. 
So on this evening of May 17th, President Mobutu's regime had just ended and the new 
AFDL regime began, taking as its first decision a change in name to the DRC to remove 
the name Zaire which had been chosen by President Mobutu and thus we see that the 
regional power of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and to a certain extent South Africa was 
strong at that time. 
At first it was thought that things would calm down, only to discover that each country 
who had helped in Kinshasa had its own agenda, and there was no further mention of 
the Lemera accords which the Congolese never saw and for which Rwanda and Uganda 
claimed that they should be compensated first, 1) for the harm Mobutu had caused to 
their countries, and 2) for the war effort they had provided. This is where the difficulties 
between Laurent Desire Kabila and his allies begin. As President Kabila realises that it 
will be difficult to explain to the Congolese people that the Rwandans or the Ugandans 
should manage the entire entity to exploit the mines, in 1998 he decides to solemnly 
thank the powers which helped him into power but also practically sent them packing 
back to their own countries. 











that time Rwanda and Uganda decided to make their allies pay for the support they had 
provided, and so they react in two ways: first there was the attempt at a military coup 
that we know by Rwandan troops in the east of the country and the west in Kitona in the 
province of Bas Congo. 
In 1998, especially in August, on the 2nd of August, there came the surprise attack by 
Rwandan troops led by the actual leader of the country, Rwandan Major James 
Kabarebe in Kitona and the march of troops, which will reach Kinshasa after destroying 
the Inga Dam. At this point President Kabila appealed to the SADC because the DRC 
was a member of SADC, and saw the ambiguous attitude of South Africa. South Africa, 
who chaired the political commission, practically blocked its ears in order to avoid 
helping Mzee Laurent Desire Kabila. 
Kabila's luck was that the military commission was presided over by Zimbabwe and 
President Robert Mugabe said that it was not normal that member states of SADC 
should be able to attack other member states without SADC reacting. Thus, Zimbabwe 
will designate other countries, namely Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia for a military 
intervention, and so on Mzee Laurent Kabila's side we had troops from Angola, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia and on the other side we had troops from Rwanda, Uganda and 
we know that there were elements of support from South Africa and elements from 
Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia in this movement, and that is why it was referred to as the 
First African World War, because armies from more than seven countries confronted 
each other along with troops from the United Nations' MONUC whose attitude was also 
considered ambiguous because in the end these things developed and the battles were 
very hard. 
South Africa was strongly reproached for having played a role which wasn't very clear, 
because South Africa's support of the Rwandan regime was known, but other people 
mentioned to the South African powers that they had godfathered the negotiations 
between Mobutu and Kabila and that what should be remembered is the meeting on the 
South African military warship Ollteniqlla was that President Mandela and Thabo 
Mbeki, Mandela had come together with President Mobutu and his Vice President at the 
time, Thabo Mbeki who had come with L.D. Kabila and this was the country which had 
hosted these negotiations which came to nothing and that this country was thus not 
competent to mediate or advise or SUppOlt the new power in Kinshasa. And thus this 











International Rescue Committee first drew attention to the death toll, caused directly by 
war and indirectly by disease. The question also arose because one knew, for example, 
that the attack on Goma when the DRC was starting, we know that it was South Africa 
working with Rwandan troops, we were wondering how this small country was able to 
enter. South Africa also needed resources to develop itself. 
Q: So there was a South African presence among the Rwandan army? 
Yes, there was South African equipment and South African instructors on Congolese 
soil to support foreign troops. 
Q: Which year was that? 
96, 97 and 98, and during the war, the South Africans remained on the Rwandan side. 
SADC and other countries drew the attention of Thabo Mbeki who became the 
president at the time to the bad role South Africa was playing. This was the country, 
which had ended the war. But it became clear that he either closed his ears or closed his 
eyes, especially since we also had proof that in the zones controlled by Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops raw materials were being extracted and passed through South Africa 
coming from Kigali like the west. 
South Africa also profited from the illegal extraction and commerce of raw materials. I 
think there was enough genuine proof to show that South Africa benefited directly or 
indirectly from the presence of Rwandan and Ugandan troops in the ORe. 
I think the real change in direction was the confrontation between Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops in Kisangani and I think that the international community and the 
Security Council did not want to qualify this as an act of aggression. Because as I said, 
Rwanda and Uganda attacked with technical assistance first the military attack by 
General Kabarebe in Kitona, and then in Kinshasa and the second part was to create 
political prolongations like the RCD which was created in Kigali and that was created 
after the attack of Rwanda. These were in fact the political mouthpieces who were used 
to continue attacking and exploiting the DRC also because in the zones that were 
occupied by the RCD it was in fact to f1ll1her the Rwandan interests of South Africa and 
especially from the Ituri zone to Equateur where petrol was extracted for Uganda and 












As I said, the turning point was the battle between the Rwandan and Ugandan armies in 
Kisangani after the destruction of the Tshopo Dam, and where a large cholera epidemic 
had erupted and this was started in broad daylight with children killed in the schools, 
and at that time so many people were killed that it gave the impression of a Congolese 
civil war hut in fact the confrontation in Kisangani was very important to demonstrate 
the International community's hypocrisy, the hypocrisy of SADC and South Africa who 
cried that this was a Congolese civil war with no participation from foreign countries. 
It is at this time also that Congolese diplomacy finally started with Mzee Laurent Kabila, 
who told his partners, "make war if you need the resources, but it would be better to 
give peace to this country and see how one could accept the resources for development 
so that you may benefit from them, but you cannot kill the Congolese," but the war in 
Kisangani was an important event to show that you could not continue to pretend that 
these were Congolese fighting among themselves. Here also we found South Africa in 
her habitual role as intermediary as a country with a vocation to he a larger region, as 
we know in Africa there are three larger regions namely sub-Saharan Africa, South 
Africa, the DRC in the centre and Nigeria outside of Algeria and the Maghreb and I 
remember also that President Ohasanjo contributed as much as the AU president, 
attracted the attention of South Africa on the role that should be one of facilitating the 
negotiations among the parties rather than to continue trying to make believe that there 
are no contlicts between African countries. 
So South Africa will find itself on the morrow on this country as mediator, we had 
refused that it should be directly the country that designates the mediator, but the 
Americans after South Africa's consultation with Rwanda and Uganda will always 
designate that country. 
Kitumire Masire appeared as the facilitator, but the truth is that he also was someone 
who had been chosen to close his eyes because after that South Africa demanded 
negotiations between Congolese parties when we well know that the aggression was 
carried out by foreign nations and that is how the negotiation process started by Lusaka 
and this showed in fact that the RCD and the MLC were mouthpieces of Rwanda and 
Uganda. 
The Lusaka agreement is in fact Rwanda and Uganda with the Americans and the 











surprise although the agreement was unfavourable to the DRC, Kabila accepted it, so 
how does one remove someone who didn't refuse to accept the agreement from the 
start? And so we end up with the RCD and the MLC as "political parties" when in truth 
they were puppets paraded by Rwanda and Uganda, this is why there will be Gaborone, 
there was Rome but in the end the famous Inter-Congolese Dialogue which took place 
in Sun City in South Africa. There I think there were three important points: South 
Africa continued its intermediary role between the powers in Kinshasa and the 
Congolese rebels, but the first documents to be presented for the negotiation were 
documents which came from Kigali and elsewhere. As the situation worsened, clearly 
President Thabo Mbeki came to speak not as mediator but instead merely to put forth 
the position of Kigali, of Washington and even of London. 
The death of Mzee Laurent Kabila finally made it easier for the westerners to make 
South Africa appear like a great peace broker, but we know that South Africa at that 
point, from within there were people who said why do you continue to ignore the DRC 
and limit yourselves only to little Rwanda because here as peacemaker in fact you 
should be great beneficiaries of any peace in the DRC. South Africa hosted inter-
Congolese discussions in Sun City and the final agreement was signed in Pretoria. 
South Africa was, after that, the first African nation to send several delegations and 
businessmen to start obtaining its share of the pie and today it is this African nation who 
is trying to be in almost every sector - mining, agriculture, petroleum, wood, tourism, 
while continuing to maintain an ambiguous position given the strain which exists 
between the DRC and Rwanda through the Interahamwe groups and CNDP rebels, but 
you know the difficult role South Africa has with Burundi and the FNL. So this country 
is certainly the key for all southern and central Africa, and we also saw the role South 
Africa is playing with the Ivory Coast. But one must think that if the South African 
regime hadn't been so ambiguous, maybe it could have contributed more rapidly to the 
return of peace in the DRC and probably also to the other countries in the Great Lake 
regIOn. 
Q: Therefore, the Great Lakes region conflict started because of Mobutu? 
Yes, Mobutu in his support of Habyarimana was the enemy so Habyarimana was for 
them the friend of Mobutu and of France. Therefore, RPF considered Mobutu as a great 
obstacle to take the power in Rwanda. 











Burundi to put Micombero in power, so there also the opponents of Burundi thought 
that Mobutu was acting a lot in the region. 
In fact, Mobutu was absolute evil for whom if the westerners considered that he had 
helped them but it was time for him to leave and that is how we had what has been 
called the First War of Shaba in Katanga in 1977-1978, but this came from Angola with 
practically all those who were enemies of Mobutu who encouraged that, and so as 
President Museveni was affirmed as leader with prime ministers of Ethiopia and Eritrea 
these were the three who were called the young leaders who would change Africa, and it 
is to the Ugandan regime that westerners will ask something for this Mobutu affair. First 
the Rwandan Tutsi regime had started to be a thorn in Museveni's side in Kampala, and 
was planning to enter and take over power in Rwanda with RPF. So both countries were 
supported by westerners and the Americans and they said that we could not leave 
Mobutu isolated and so AFDL was created against Mobutu. It was not the Congolese 
who took the initiative of saying we are going to get rid of Mobutu, and so it was the 
western determination to do this without appearing in the spotlight but rather by using 
African countries in the war against Mobutu which eventually transforms into a war 
between neighbouring countries against all those who in Kinshasa considered that 
R wanda and Uganda should not exploit the resources and this is how they used political 
partners with the RDC and the MLC. 
Q: But was the AFDL goal only to expel Mobutu, or was it also for economic 
interests? And also to take over one part of territory from Zaire? 
Eh, I think that one should always remember that westerners have always said that the 
DRC is part of the countries, who have many unique riches and during the 
disorganisation under Mobutu in 1991-93 they thought that it was difficult to exploit 
these resources and they should first clean up Mobutu in order to have free reign over 
the Congo's riches. So the political classes, using Tshisekedi, also made an internal 
mobilisation to overthrew Mobutu, he had already been weakened in 1990 during the 
liberalisation of the political parties but with the national sovereign conference Mobutu 
managed to regain power and so it came to a radical solution which was to go to war 
against Mobutu. But the West didn't want to be seen as part of this war and therefore 
African countries were used as eat's paws, that is to say Uganda and Rwanda. But if we 
use these countries their population will be opposed to it and we must say that these are 
Congolese who started the revolutionary war of Masisi, Kabila, who came from 











Deogratias Bugera from North Kivu. And they said if you want to return to your 
country we will help you and we know it was Rwanda who carried out the war with the 
support of Washington and the South Africans also had a share in it and they supported 
this rebellion by the West and thus an African decision is an American decision 
supported also by the British to chase him out. And all this to come and exploit the 
Congo's wealth because they realised that it is a rich country but poorly governed and 
you can imagine that these people who supported Mobutu for 32 years then changed 
face, Museveni, Kagame ... , the Somalis and Ethiopians and Eritreans were on the side 
of AFDL Kinshasa to chase Mobutu out. The so-called young African leaders were the 
product of America. 
Q: So it was for economic interests 
Yes, it was for economic interests, and, geostrategically, to control central Africa and a 
part of southern Africa. 
Q: At the time, did Rwanda also have a hidden agenda to come take part of the 
land here in Kivu? 
Yes, the government or political leadership of the RPF, which comprised the FPR 
management, the RPF knew that they were Tutsi of Rwandan origin and that they were 
not numerous, they needed reinforcements and since here there was an operation in 
1990 in which when one said that there should be elections, the Congolese Tutsi were 
refused voter cards as Mobutu said they were Rwandan, so the young Congolese Tutsi 
left for Uganda and went to help the RPF to take power in Kigali, and this was a chance 
for them also to gain lands. The Congolese Tutsi held key posts and it was they who 
committed massacres of many leaders and businessmen in all Congolese. It was not the 
Tutsi Rwandan soldiers massacred in 1996-1997 but it was Congolese Tutsi who came 
from AFDL to kill many people, there is a lot of proof and it was therefore Rwanda 
which was the right arm of the West to create national space. Because it was said that in 
Rwanda they chased Hutu with Operation Turquoise when in fact it was to chase 
Congolese Hutu to diminish their numbers and create space for the Tutsi, and RCD was 
there to create a Tutsi land. Someone was saying that the idea was that from Kalehe up 
to Kanyabayonga will be the space for Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi to feel at home. 
Q: Why did Mobutu favour the Tutsi and why did he give the Tutsi great power? 
I think there is one thing one must recognise about President Mobutu, that he was an 











power Mobutu had was American power. Mobutu was a Western element, a strong 
element in the fight against the communists during the Cold War, but in the same way, 
he was also someone who had to surround himself with people from the entire DRC 
community. 
It was his quality and initiative and the foreign serVIces who worked with him and 
Bisengimana who began his studies in the DRC as a Rwandan refugee and who became 
probably the most powerful Congolese officer who designated people and we will see 
that Bisengimana will begin to place Tutsi in very strategic posts at GECAMINES, 
telecommunications, commerce, and we learned later that these elements gave part of 
the money to International Tutsi Power and they contributed financially to the creation 
ofRPF. 
Q: What was International Tutsi Power doing? Was it a movement? 
It was a movement in liaison with the Americans and the Israelis, which in fact, lobbied 
for and financed the power grab in Uganda. Kagame was the leader of all the operations 
to support Tutsis in asylum situations. Finally, it wasn't the choice of Mobutu but of 
those who financed him who put someone next to him because one must admit that 
while Madeleine Albrights said that the Tutsi are like apple of their eyes and if one 
touches them it is like touching her own eyes. Coming from the mouth of the American 
Secretary of State, this means that Mobutu probably didn't see anything coming. But 
Mobutu appointed strategic posts which enabled the others. These Tutsi cades made by 
Mobutu were used like a spider's web by Bisengimana who financed FPR a lot to 
prepare to buy weapons, to position armed people under the Habyarimana regime in 
Rwanda, to provoke massacres of people and accusing Habyarimana of killing people, 
and so the Americans I think played a large role through Bisengimana. 
Q: Therefore, there has been a long relationship between Americans and Tutsis? 
This is clear. 
Q: Because of this, was the nationality law of 1973 also made to favour Tutsis? 
Yes, the law on nationality always considered that there were two categories, there were 
the Tutsi and the Hutus. The Belgians saw that there were good lands in Masisi but that 
the local population was not very active. They created the MID (Movement Immigration 
Banyarwanda) and brought Hutu from Rwanda, Burundi and the Katanga region of 
Congo to work, and they are the majority population today. The Belgians were very 











Bisengimana said that there were problems each time elections were discussed, that is 
how he got Mobutu to create a law on nationality which gave the nationality to 
everyone and which was attacked and changed. The western partners are aware of this. 
It is an obvious conclusion given the support of the Tutsi by western powers, especially 
the Americans and the British. 
Q: But after the Cold War, Mobutu decided to keep his power by encouraging 
ethnic tension. 
Yes, to keep power after Perestroika and Gorbatchev delivering USSR to the west, 
Mobutu at that time was told "watch out, the world is changing, and you have to change 
as well" and he was sure that westerners would never abandon him. When he realised 
that the west were in fact starting to abandon him, he encouraged to start eliminating his 
principal rivals, namely certain Kasaians with Tshisekedi and the Katangans, and here 
in the east of the country he was not able to support the Tutsi. Bisengimana has 
meanwhile inherited the leadership, and so people thought that they could attack the 
Tutsi. Unfortunately the people here decided to attack the Tutsi and this is what will in 
fact lead to what has been called the Kanyaewanda. 
At that point President Mohutu in what was to be called Operation Mbata would send 
the DSP (Division Speciale Presidentielle) which did not attack the Tutsi but the Rutu 
and will attack other tribes who were fighting the Tutsi. This gave the pretext that there 
was genocide. Today some Tutsi who stood up and made statements on the radio and 
the Governor of South Kivu who gave the order within 48 hours to all Rwandaphones to 
evacuate as they will be eliminated from the province, that gave the pretext that this 
ethnic conflict had so great a dimension that disorder became uncontrollable. President 
Mobutu, who in addition was ill, no longer truly wielded power and everyone was 
starting their own little rebellion according to their tribe. One should also not forget 
history, that when the Belgians began the 1990 campaign to ask all countries to sever 
diplomatic or cooperative relations with the DRC. For a long time they have been 
beneficiaries of GECAMINES and more than 80% of their activities came from the 
resources of our country. 
Mobutu, leaving from Belgium, was about to get support from France and during the 
incidents at the University of Lubumbashi was taken by the Belgians to ask all countries 
to sever relations. In fact, the embargoes were decided at that time. The Americans did 











On top of that the opposition will be created including the current Senate president they 
flew to the western capitals to tell the campaigns that they should sever relations with 
the DRC and the opposition was paid to go ask that aid to the country be cut also. 
Mobutu reacted in 1991 by asking the DSP to attack Kinshasa but what happened was, 
the soldiers pillaged televisions in the Portuguese shops, so they targeted and the 
population did not follow orders and pillaged everything in 1991. Sadly this affected 
the Portuguese and the Greeks who were very important in commerce and so I think in 
that Mobutu had decided on Zaireanisation and this was a coup that had opposed the 
others, but with the pillaging that was the end. The country was in total disorder. 
Q: After the liberation in 1990, Mandela left for his African tour. He selected DRC 
as his first country to visit, and went to Goma and Kinshasa. Why DRC? 
Because Mobutu was also a good player, he was with the CIA to hunt down the 
liberation movement, it was his right hand, but on the left hand Mobutu also financed 
the ANC. Mandela knew the criticisms of him but knew that Mobuut aided the ANC. 
That is why he came to thank Mobutu, who helped the ANC a lot. Mandela wanted to 
find a starting point for unity because he did not forget that this man had much helped 
the ANC. Mobutu was ready to accept to leave and his wife also, but his entourage told 
him not to give up power in the South African warship, Outelliqua. 
Q. In 1995, new legislation was passed forbidding ethnic Tutsis from allocating 
homes and land in Zaire. 
I think 1995 was the period during which the extremists in Kinshasa pushed by those of 
the South were busy saying that the Tutsi were Kigali rebels and that they were trying to 
create a Tutsiland and we were talking of ITP (International Tutsi Power). Mobutu sent 
the DSP to punish not the Tutsi, but others, and this annoyed a lot of people who said 
there, Mobutu has been bought by the Jews. That was also the time that Mobutu bought 
Jewish bankers. This all created movements inside the country and this will increase the 
departure of young Congolese Tutsis to the Rwandan and Ugandan armies on the other 
side. 
Q. Even in September 1996, the Commission of IDPs and refugees of the Zairean 
parliament concluded that Burundi and Rwanda had forged an alliance to create a 
Tutsiland. 
It's because there was what was called the Vangu Mambweni commission which was 











commISSIOn crystallised which showed that there was a plan of International Tutsi 
Power which says that if there are large farms in the east of the country they are for the 
Tutsi, the ministers and vice-ministers are Tutsi, that most of the second wives of the 
great functionaries are always Tutsi. So you see that 1995-96 characterised by the RPF 
were an explosive situation in North and South Kivu. 
Q. Also, the arrival of Interahamwe changed this situation? 
The arrival of Interahamwe in 1994 reinforced the anti-Tutsi sentiment, saying that they 
came to say that the Tutsi were killing them. 
What is tme is that both Tutsi and Hutu were teachers and preachers so they were in 
leading positions in the community. For much of the population these were the first 
religious leaders they met, and the first politicians they met, and this crystallised the 
others also. 
I think therefore that not everything should be linked to Interahamwe because they only 
came to worsen a situation that existed well before between the communities. 
Q. In 1997, DRC joined the SADC. Was this the choice of Kabila or that of 
Mandela and if so, for what reason? 
It is very difficult to answer this precisely, but I think that Mandela favoured the joining 
because I know that at the time he had refused Rwanda, but facilitated things for the 
Congo. Mandela had a vision with the Congo, depending heavily on its resources, so he 
preferred that Congo be in the same bloc instead of being in the other Francophone 
groups. 
Q. Therefore, once again, due to the same reason of economic interest. .. 
Yes. 
Q. The role of mediator is to create an atmosphere of confidence and to treat all 
parties equally; however for the DRe, FDLR is called a "negative force" which 
already gives an unequal relationship. What do you think of this? 
Already, we are not in accord when we speak of negative forces, this appellation was 
requested by Rwanda and not by DRC and so one should also not forget that Rwanda 
has killed so many unfortunate people who were civilians. I can affirm that the Western 
people are more dangerous, they also contributed to the massacre of people and even the 
others were dying in the forests, there was Hutu genocide in Rwanda and in DRC, there 











trying to defend their populations who were massacred all the way down to Equateur 
where there was common grave. 
I tell you that in DRC we saw cases here, but it was from Kibumba on the hill that shells 
were fired to disperse people and many of them started to walk to Congo Brazzaville, to 
Angola, to CAR on foot. Today under the RCD, the Rwandan army continues to hunt 
these people but I think also that we cannot stop people from defending themselves, so 
the bad guys were the Germans and the good guys were the Parisians but how many 
massacres did the westerners do and this different weights and measures and I hope that 
in life we will one day be able to put things into perspective, there are those who fought 
to defend themselves and those who fought only to kill and this can be linked to 
negative forces and I think that it is not that they are called negative forces. 
Q. What is your opinion of President Mbeki, who receives criticisms directed at 
him saying that he protected Rwanda and Uganda, and never criticised them 
during their invasion and the fighting in the ORe. 
I can tell you that Mbeki even in the Sun City negotiations tried to put forward his point 
of view of Rwanda. Although it was an Inter-Congolese Dialogue, Rwanda was present 
there following up. He took this cause for Rwanda and was not in the middle and that is 
why even at the closing signature, President Joseph Kabila did not come because he was 
imposed on us. For the peace, President Kabila only said all right, I accept. One does 
not understand his reaction but it was to show the way in which things were imposed on 
him, in other countries, have you ever seen a government 1 + 4 it was really imposed 
because we had clearly asked the question of where in the entire world one had seen 
power shared in this way where everywhere governments have only one head and not 
five. 
Q. And you were there at Sun City at that time, weren't you? 
Yes, I was one of the chiefs of DRC delegation. 
Q. Regarding the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, is it only so-calJed Inter-Congolese 
because the conflict is more regionalised? 
That's hypocrisy, it wasn't a dialogue between Congolese but rather a dialogue imposed 
upon us with Rwanda and the countries supporting it, when things got blocked they 
would come tell us the American State Department is warning you, or we send Mustafa 











Congolese Dialogue, they give us an English-speaking intermediary and it is France 
who managed to impose that Niasse should be the mediator. France had helped the 
country a lot and all this shows that everything was done in order to eliminate one or the 
other who opposed it not out of love for the Congolese, but in order to put someone else 
in place who could help exploit the natural resources and from all this a clear-sighted 
Congolese must draw many things because when there was the First World War with its 
many dead (1,800,000) nobody said anything about their number which was the highest 
number since the end of World War II. But when it comes to Rwanda it's everyone's 
business and yet I have the impression that there were many more Hutus killed than 
Tutsis. 
Q. Here in the DRC, we often hear saying that we should also do an Inter-
Rwandan dialogue between the Government and FDLR, what do you think? 
As for that question, we saw even here in the DRC that when we thought we were in a 
position of strength a dialogue was imposed on us and in fact we ended up in difficulties 
and the RCD accepted the dialogue, but it was also they who started to block it. You are 
so convinced that there was legitimacy of the people and they said one couldn't impose 
anything from the outside. Today it's what Kagame says that one cannot impose a 
regime on him and one can see that the Tutsi only represent 10% of the Rwandan 
population and the number of Hutus increases every day through their children who 
increase daily, and I think that later the Tutsi will see a dialogue imposed upon them so 
that the Hutu majority protects the Tutsi minority, and so for the good future of Rwanda 
this dialogue must take place even if today the West continues to close its eyes. And if 
this dialogue does not take place, there will be a second genocide in Rwanda. There is 
no other solution but dialogue. I think it is a mistake for Rwanda to keep refusing the 
dialogue for the future of Rwanda. 
Q. Similarly, do you think there is a need to organise Inter-Regional Dialogue 
between the DRC and Rwanda, as these two countries don't have any diplomatic 
relations, which is a key to the peace process? 
No, I think that the determination of the president, he wants a genume peaceful 
cohabitation and in that sense he accepted the Nairobi accord, it is always to show his 
good will, so the President wants the actions of the international community especially 
HCR and MONUC and in that sense, the president has accepted that one should 
negotiate with the CNDP which is practically the open door to Rwanda, thus on the side 












But we think that Rwanda continues to believe that the DRC shelters terrorists, the 
Rwanda accumulates all for and always to the Interahamwe "the terrorists" and I think 
that this is the mistake of the leadership in Kigali especially as in the facts, the 
populations are having no problems and this shows a bad political perception at the top 
in Rwanda do not have the will to contribute to the peace of the population. 
But we would have wished that the population had been left to coexist, to trade with 
each other, to visit each other and I can see marriages which continue to take place, the 
politicians should come to that level of the population, and as we are seeing now they 
have agreed to open two embassies, have set a date for the tripartite, and have seen that 
we have entered into the framework of the Nairobi programme and will make a joining 
to contribute either to the return of Rwandan refugees to their home or that we was 
inside and I think on the side of the DRC there is enough will to do this. 
Q. South Africa spent a lot of effort and money for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 
Sun City and sent many peacekeepers to the DRC. What is their reason for this? 
In fact South Africa didn't have much choice, it is known as the West's policeman in 
the central and southern African nations and we don't think that this funding was from 
South Africa itself because we know that the United States were in support and 
Germany, the European Union, and there were ambassadors who came to stay there 
while South Africa spent its own money alone. If you see today South Africa has five 
flight rotations per week with even landings in the interior, it is the very first foreign 
company to be allowed to land in Lubumbashi and I think soon even in Mbuji Mayi and 
when you see the South African citizens who are in the underground and today we see 
what is happening with Rwanda and Uganda, I have the impression that the same 
operation is ongoing with South Africa. 
Q. Between 2000 to 2003, the UNSC published a report on the exploitation of 
natural resources in DRC and cited 15 South African companies who were 
pillaging these resources, has the Congolese Government taken action in this 
regard? 
Yes, I think that it did take action and the number of those pillaging went up and if I 
take as an example the east of the country, Walikale and all its coltan, we know that 











went directly to South Africa, I think that a number of South African companies worked 
in fraudulent and non-fraudulent natural resource exploitation and even in Katanga it is 
always fraudulent and I think the pillaging issue continues and until we find ourselves 
theoretically in a reinforcement of relations and also to the east of the country. The war 
is supported by this exploitation and we know that those Congolese that one sees are 
intermediaries and that the real masters of the lands for all these minerals are the South 
African companies. 
Q. What do you think are the causes of these conflicts in the Great Lakes region? 
I think that the poor management of the country has embarrassed the Westerners who 
saw only their own interests and forgot that the country should be managed so that all 
these riches profit its own population. 
And the western countries and Asian countries who have joined the dance have 
understood that they must continue to feed the disorder so that they may rapidly exploit 
the natural resources and you can imagine, a plane that leaves Goma and goes to 
Walikale takes and goes directly to Kigali without paying any kind of tax. For the 
capitalist, this is the best system. To know how many tons, with what packaging, and so 
this situation has made many Congolese enter this business world by using 
unfortunately certain political, military and traditional Congolese authorities. 
Q. And the circulation of illegal arms is an aggravating factor? 
Because of the coltan, why do we like weapons? It is to increase the perimeter and so 
that the population does not realise. And for these armed groups, where do their 
weapons come from? One must especially not lose sight that Mobutu's Zaire and 
Kabila's Congo have been under embargo since 1998, under embargo! And we must 
always remember that the embargoes on Rwanda and Uganda have been lifted. How can 
you explain this difference? This explains the incredible militarization and circulation of 
arms. This is why it is not easy to end this conflict. 
Q. What can South Africa do to prevent new conflicts in the region? 
I think that if what we call, as the Chinese say, the win-win, I think that if we could 
respect the discussions on human rights, this could contribute be it for the American or 
British partners who can contribute to the peace, or so that the exploitation of resources 
be done, that one create jobs or build basic infrastructures and this money will fall back 











Should we casually continue to kill populations and make blood flow and should people 
continue to drink champagne will telling each other they are rich? So today the question 
of human rights becomes a scarecrow which is bandied about while in reality we do 
otherwise and if we could put two things in place: win-win and the issue of real human 
rights, recognise that the population has a right to life, to live in their homes, I think that 
South Africa and other countries can contribute to this. 
Thank you very much for your useful information. 
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